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ABSTRACT

While many may agree that the Sermon on the Mount is the epitome of Jesus‘
ethics, many also recognize that the Sermon is often a riddle. The vastness and variety of
literature demonstrates that the interpretation of the Sermon is subject to many
disagreements. At the heart of the Sermon of the Mount, the antitheses (Matthew 5:2148) become one source of polemics in the study of the Sermon. The purpose of this
dissertation is to contribute to the scholarship of the Sermon on the Mount by addressing
two problems in the study of the antitheses. The first concerns the nature of the moral
demands in the antitheses. The second deals with their scope.
The intention of the dissertation is not to expose all possible misunderstandings of
the interpretation of the antitheses but to examine some of the hermeneutical options to
see how the nature of their presuppositions predetermines the logic of their conclusions. I
will inspect two aspects of the antitheses which are basic in the interpretations that are
given by the Roman Catholics, Helmut Thielicke, John Howard Yoder, Leonardo Boff,
and John Calvin. These are (1) the universality (the nature) and (2) the individuality (the
scope) of the moral demands in the antitheses. I will then demonstrate that the antitheses
constitute moral teaching, which God specially reveals to Christians in Scripture, and as
such are universal and binding on each human person. They are also intended to prescribe
moral conduct of individuals and not of States.

xii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Sermon on the Mount found in Matthew chapters 5, 6 and 7 is Jesus of
Nazareth‘s most celebrated discourse. In the history of Christian thought, the Sermon has
been considered the epitome of Jesus‘ ethical teaching and therefore, for many, the
essence of Christian morality, argues Luke Timothy Johnson.1 Jaroslav Pelikan further
states that ―a history of the interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount throughout the past
two millennia would virtually amount to an introduction to the entire development of
Christian theology and ethics.‖2 Even though the sea of literary works on the Sermon is
vast, some modern scholars have attempted to chart the waters of the history of its
interpretations.3 Indeed, such is the fame of the Sermon on the Mount that it is widely
considered to be the heart of Jesus‘ moral teaching.
I. The state of the problem
While many may agree that the Sermon on the Mount is the epitome of Jesus‘
ethics, many also recognize that the Sermon is often a riddle. The vastness and variety of

1

Luke Timothy Johnson, ―The Sermon on the Mount,‖ in The Oxford Companion to Christian
Thought, ed. Adrian Hastings (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2000), 654.
2

Jaroslav Pelikan, The Melody of Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 229. Cf.
Pelikan‘s statement in his introduction to The Preaching of Chrysostom, that the writing of the history of
the exposition of the Sermon on the Mount, which includes all the references to the Sermon in the history
of exegesis, would be a massive historical enterprise (John Chrysostom, The Preaching of Chrysostom:
Homilies on the Sermon on the Mount, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967], 28).
3

For example, Harvey K. McArthur, Understanding the Sermon on the Mount (New York:
Harpers, 1960); Warren S. Kissinger, The Sermon on the Mount: A History of Interpretation and
Bibliography (Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975); Ursula Berner, Die Bergpredigt: Rezeption und
Auslegung im 20. Jahrhundert (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1979); Robert A. Guelich, The
Sermon on the Mount: A Foundation for Understanding (Waco: Word Books, 1982); Clarence Bauman,
The Sermon on the Mount: The Modern Quest for Its Meaning (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1985); G.
N. Stanton, ―Sermon on the Mount/Plain,‖ in Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, ed. Joel B. Green and
Scot McKnight (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1992), 735-44 and A Gospel for a New People: Studies
in Matthew (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992): 285-306; and the latest The Sermon on the Mount through the
Centuries, eds. Jeffrey P. Greenman, Timothy Larsen, and Stephen R. Spencer (Grand Rapids: Brazos
Press, 2007).

1

2
literature demonstrates that the interpretation of the Sermon is subject to many
disagreements.4 Otto Riethmueller even remarks that the Sermon on the Mount has had
to put up ―with more opposition, distortion, dilution, and emasculation than any other
writing in the literature of the world.‖5 At the heart of the Sermon of the Mount, as V.
Hasler points out, 6 the antitheses (Matthew 5:21-48) become one source of polemics in
the study of the Sermon.7
This dissertation will address two problems in the study of the antitheses. The first
concerns the nature of the moral demands in the antitheses. The second deals with their
scope.

4

Modern studies on the Sermon on the Mount in the Matthew, including the devotional studies
and commentaries, are too numerous to list. As Warren Carter points out, in the last two decades of the
twentieth century the scholarship on the Sermon has been vigorous in Matthaen commentaries (see the
commentaries listed in Warren Carter, ―Some Contemporary Scholarship on the Sermon on the Mount,‖
Current Research: Biblical Studies 4 [1996]: 183-215). There are also other scholars who have attempted
to provide surveys and bibliography, such as: Martin Dibelius, The Sermon on the Mount (New York:
Charles Scribner‘s Sons, 1940); S. M. Gilmour, ―Interpreting the Sermon on the Mount,‖ Crozer Quarterly
24 (1947): 47-56; Amos Wilder, Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1950) and ―The Sermon on the Mount,‖ in The Interpreter’s Bible, ed. George A. Buttrick, vol. 7
(New York: Abingdon Press, 1951), 155-164; Hans Windisch, The Meaning of the Sermon on the Mount,
trans. S. M. Gilmour (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1951); Henlee Barnette, ―The Ethic of the Sermon
on the Mount,‖ Review and Expositor 53(1956): 23-33; Carl. F. Henry, Christian Personal Ethics (Grand
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1957), 278-326; Irvan Batdorf, ―How Shall We Interpret the Sermon
on the Mount?‖ Journal of Bible and Religion (1959): 211-17; Joachim Jeremias, The Sermon on the
Mount, trans. N. Perrin (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963); Eduard Thurneysen, The Sermon on the
Mount, trans. W. C. and J. M. Robinson (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964); A. M. Hunter, Design for
Life (London: SCM Press, 1965); Fred L. Fisher, The Sermon on the Mount (Nashville: Broadman Press,
1976); D. A. Carson, The Sermon on the Mount: An Evangelical Exposition (Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House, 1978), 151-57 (Appendix II); W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, ―Reflections on the Sermon on the
Mount,‖ Scottish Journal of Theology, 44 (1991): 283-309; Lorin L. Cranford, ―Bibliography for the
Sermon on the Mount,‖ Southwest Journal of Theology 35, no. 1 (1992): 34-8 and Warren Carter, What Are
They Saying about Matthew’s Sermon on the Mount (New York: Paulist Press, 1994). Other works will be
referred to in the course of the study.
5

Otto Riethmueller, ―The City on the Mount,‖ The Student World 30 (1937): 203.

6

V. Hasler, ―Das Herzstück der Bergpredigt: Zum Verständnis der Antithesen in Matth. 5, 21–
48,‖ Theologische Zeitschrift 15 (1959): 90–106.
7

Other issues identified by Stanton in his survey of scholarship on the Sermon on the Mount are:
the relationship of Jesus to Moses, the relationship of grace and law, the addressees of the Sermon, the
nature of the Sermon‘s language, and the place of eschatology (Stanton, ―Sermon on the Mount/Plain,‖
740; cf. A Gospel for a New People, 296).
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A. On the nature of the antitheses
While the antitheses seem to set forth an ethic of Christian discipleship, are these
moral demands only intended for those committed to the way of Jesus or for all people?
Cahill argues that if the Sermon on the Mount is intended for Christian discipleship, then
the moral demands of the antitheses are only for Christians and the question of whether
or not such requirements can be universalized is irrelevant.8 If Oliver O‘Donovan‘s thesis
is correct that Christian ethics must arise from the gospel of Jesus Christ or it can not be a
Christian ethics,9 how can Christian morality be considered a universal obligation for all
people and not only for Christians? Is there such a thing as a specifically redemptivebased morality, in New Testament terms, a distinctive Christian ethic?10 Or, as James
Gustafson states it, ―Can Ethics be Christian?‖11 If there is indeed such a morality, how
does one, then, avoid ―double morality,‖ namely, one for non-Christians and one for
Christians?
An analysis of the various views of the representative theologians and the official
position of the Roman Catholic Church reveals contrasts in their theological
interpretations on the nature of the moral demands in the antitheses. There are at least
three camps. The first camp, represented by Leonardo Boff, makes mute the question
whether or not the moral demands in the antitheses can be universalized. This camp
8

Lisa Sowle Cahill, ―Ethical Implications of the Sermon on the Mount,‖ Interpretation 41, no. 2
(April 1987): 156.
9

Oliver O‘Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Downers
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 11.
10

To borrow the phrase from Basil Mitchell, ―Is There a Distinctive Christian Ethics?‖ in How to
Play Theological Ping-Pong: Essays on Faith and Reason, eds. William J. Abraham and Robert W. Prevost
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1990), 42-56.
11

1975).

James M. Gustafson, Can Ethics Be Christian? (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,

4
believes the antitheses are not intended to convey moral demands to be obeyed. The
second camp, represented by John Calvin, the official position of the Roman Catholic
Church, and Helmut Thielicke, argues for the universality of the moral demands in the
antitheses. The third and last one, represented by John Howard Yoder, believes that the
antitheses are intended only for Christians.
B. On the scope of the antitheses
After surveying the range of authors and movements from patristic to modern
times, Kissinger concludes that one of the most difficult problems associated with the
Sermon on the Mount involves its relevance to social ethics.12 He does not give a definite
answer, however, as to whether or not these demands are meant to have applications for
―super-individual entities‖13 such as institutions and States. While Barnette has firmly
stated that ―there is universal agreement that the ethic of the Sermon is personal,
individual, relating to man‘s neighbor,‖14 more recently, there are those who confuse
individual morality applied by Christians in their individual relationship within society
with social morality for a State to legislate.15
12

Warren Kissinger, The Sermon on the Mount, 124.

13

According to Henry Stob, super-individual entities are ―more or less integrated human groups,
collectivities, and communities‖ (Henry Stob, Ethical Reflections: Essays on Moral Themes [Grand Rapids:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1978], 4).
14

Barnette, ―The Ethic of the Sermon on the Mount,‖ 32. Cf. Herman Bavinck, ―Christian
Principles and Social Relationship,‖ in Essays on Religion, Science, and Society, ed. John Bolt, trans. Harry
Boonstra and Gerrit Sheeres (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 131-2 and Lisa Sowle Cahill, ―Ethical
Implications of the Sermon on the Mount,‖ Interpretation 41 no. 2 (1987): 153.
15

See Jakub S. Trojan, ―The Sermon on the Mount and the Social Task of the Church,‖ in
Reformed and Ecumenical: On Being Reformed in Ecumenical Encounters, ed. Christine LienemannPerrin, Hendrik M. Vroom and Michael Weinrich (Atlanta: Rodopi, 2008), 24-41 and John Battle, ―The
Sermon on the Mount and Political Ethics,‖ Studies in Christian Ethics, 22 no. 1 (2009): 48-56. Battle in
his article even mentions that in YouTube there is a piece of speech by Barack Obama responding to the
question: ―Which bit of the Bible should guide public policy?‖ Obama suggested ―The Sermon on the
Mount,‖ adding it was doubtful that the U. S. Defense Department ―would survive its application‖ (Battle,
―The Sermon on the Mount and Political Ethics,‖ 48-9).

5
An analysis of various theologians such as Leonardo Boff, John Calvin, the
official position of the Roman Catholic Church, Helmut Thielicke and John Howard
Yoder reveals that they do not answer in agreement on the question of the scope of the
moral demands in the antitheses. Boff argues that the antitheses are a call to engage in
socio-political liberation against oppressive social, economic or political structures of a
State. Calvin and the official position of the Roman Catholic Church interpret the
antitheses as intended to address only the conduct of individuals and not the conduct of
States. Thielicke and Yoder insist that the antitheses can become a guideline for the
conduct of States.
II. Thesis statement
In this dissertation, in response to the first problem, I will argue against the
bifurcation of morality into one for Christians and one for non-Christians in the
interpretation of the moral demands in the antitheses. The comparative analysis in this
present study will further illumine my own position by asserting that the antitheses
constitute a teaching of moral demands which are binding on all human beings.
In response to the second problem, I will argue that the antitheses of the Sermon
on the Mount are best understood as moral demands only for the conduct of individual
persons. By contrasting some theologians such as Leonard Boff, John Calvin, the official
position of the Roman Catholic Church, Helmut Thielicke and John Howard Yoder in
their understanding of the scope of the antitheses, I will show that the antitheses are
intended to regulate moral conduct of individual persons and not of States.

6
III. Methodology
In this dissertation, I will read the text of the antitheses with the realization that
others have read it. I limit this dissertation to four theologians and one official position of
an institutional church. The theologians are Leonardo Boff to represent Liberation
theology, John Calvin from the Reformed tradition, Helmut Thielicke to stand for the
Lutheran tradition and John Howard Yoder from the Mennonite tradition. The
institutional church whose official interpretation of the antitheses I will examine is the
Roman Catholic Church. I employ a systematic method of description and analysis to
explore the interpretations of these theologians and the Roman Catholic Church
concerning the nature and scope of the antitheses. I do this in order to bring some
contributions to the study of the Sermon on the Mount, especially to shed light on the
universality and the individuality of moral demands in the antitheses.
Furthermore, as Robert Guelich concludes in his survey of the interpretation of
the Sermon on the Mount from patristic to modern times, there are generally two lines of
interpretation of the antitheses, either a narrow, more literal direction or a broader, more
illustrative one.16 On one side, the moral demands are interpreted literally as a call for
the church to be non-resistant (John Howard Yoder).17 On the other side, the demands are
read more symbolically calling for ethical and religious conduct whose application is
qualified in the broader context of either: (1) First, Scripture that provides a hermeneutic,
for example: the usus elenchticus of the law (Helmut Thieliecke),18 the natural law theory
16

Robert A. Guelich, ―Interpreting Sermon on the Mount,‖ Interpretation 41 (1987): 129.

17

John Howard Yoder, The Original Revolution: Essays on Christian Pacifism (Scottdale: Herald
Press, 1972) and The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub.
Co., 1994).
18

Helmut Thielicke, Life Can Begin Again: Sermons on the Sermon on the Mount, trans. John W.
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(the Roman Catholic Church)19 and the analogy of Scripture (John Calvin),20 or (2)
Second, social revolution (Leonardo Boff).21 The rationale and validity of this present
study therefore lie in the need to resolve in a comparatively objective way the various
theological interpretations of the antitheses.22 My hope is to consider their best insights,
to test them against my own and to contribute to the wider ongoing attempt to understand
the moral relevance of the Sermon on the Mount, particularly the antitheses.
The purpose of the dissertation is to analyze some hermeneutical options in the
interpretation of the antitheses. As a consequence, this project will systematically
approach the antitheses as a unit. The intention is not to formulate a historical-exegetical
interpretation or to comment on each antithesis. There will be some discussion on
particular antitheses whenever it is necessary to explain the hermeneutical option of an
author addressed in a chapter.
For practical reasons, the discussion of major theologians will be put in
alphabetical order. Following the treatment of individual theologians, I will treat the
churchly interpretation of the antitheses, in this case the official position of the Roman
Doberstein (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), Theological Ethics, vol.1-3, ed. William H. Lazareth
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), and The Evangelical Faith, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, vol. 1-3
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1974).
19

Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed., revised in accordance with the official Latin text
promulgated by Pope John Paul II (United States Catholic Conference, Inc., 1994).
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Catholic Church. The reason for this is to illustrate a move from an individual to an
institutional interpretation of the antitheses.
In sum, the intention of the dissertation is not to expose all possible
misunderstandings of the interpretation of the antitheses but to examine some of the
hermeneutical options to see how the nature of their presuppositions predetermines the
logic of their conclusions. I will inspect two aspects of the antitheses which are basic in
the interpretations that are given by the Roman Catholic Church, Helmut Thielicke, John
Howard Yoder, Leonardo Boff, and John Calvin. These are (1) the universality and (2)
the individuality of the moral demands in the antitheses. I will then demonstrate that the
antitheses constitute moral teaching, which God specially reveals to Christians in
Scripture, and as such are universal and binding on each human person. They are also
intended to prescribe moral conduct of individuals and not of States.
IV. Terminology
The argument in this dissertation requires some parameters in order to achieve its
goal. The first parameter is on the discussion of the term ―antitheses.‖ The second is the
distinction between personal or individual ethics and social ethics.
A. Antitheses
Matthew 5:21-48 is a large discourse unit usually called ―the antitheses.‖ Marcion
was perhaps the one who coined the name.23 He believed that in this passage Jesus was
cancelling the Law of Moses and replacing it with teachings that were antithetical to
Moses. But the previous passage (Matthew 5:17-20) demonstrates that Jesus is not
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discarding the Law of Moses.24 If anything, in Matthew 5:21-48 Jesus opposes a stated or
an implied interpretation of the Law of Moses that attempts to evade the full intent of the
demands of the Law. In none of the six antitheses is Jesus abolishing the law. This does
not also mean that the contrasting, antithetical element should be minimized, as does J. R.
Levison, who would translate the second element ―and I say to you,‖ thus avoiding the
contrastive ―but I say to you‖.25 Hans Dieter Betz instead maintains the contrasting
element in the sense that in the antitheses ―the refutation…is not directed against what
God has in fact said but against what he has allegedly said.‖26 Since the focus of the
dissertation is Matthew 5:21-48, I will not directly deal with the exegetical issues of the
relationship between Jesus and Torah in Matthew 5:17-20. I will instead follow many
other scholars which regard the antitheses not as an abolishment of the Law but as an
effort for the right interpretation of it, especially, in the light of the polemic of Jesus
against scribes and Pharisees.27 I will employ the term ―antitheses‖ within this parameter
of understanding.
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In addition, the present study will also not directly deal with and discuss the label
―radical‖ which is often attached to the antitheses. The antitheses are often called
―radical‖ in the sense that they are impossible to practice or impractical. For example,
Karl Barth argues that ―it would be sheer folly to interpret the imperatives of the Sermon
on the Mount as if we should bestir ourselves to actualize these pictures.‖28 He believes
that constructing a picture of the Christian life from directives contained in the antitheses
has always proved impossible. The direction of the present study is not to show whether
or not it is possible to live out all the moral demands in the antitheses. Instead, this
dissertation only assumes that the antitheses are possible to practice.
B. Personal and social ethics
There is a distinction between personal or individual ethics and social ethics.
Personal ethics has to do with the development of one‘s own character and social ethics is
concerned with the proper ordering of the life of society.29 In personal ethics, on one
hand, an individual makes the moral response to the neighbor who is immediately present
to him. This moral response is made directly, with a certain degree of intimacy, and not
mediated through the structures and agencies of society. Personal ethics is concerned
with human behavior on this level. On the other hand, social ethics pays attention to the
social dimension of human existence. As a consequence, it is preoccupied with superindividual entities. It is concerned with the moral significance of more or less integrated
human groups, collectives, and communities, such as a government or a State.
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The argument that the antitheses are only for personal ethics is set within this
parameter of distinction. It is simply to say that Jesus delivers the demands of the
antitheses for the moral formation and character development of individuals. The
antitheses are only concerned with the person in his or her attitudes and actions toward
others, and in the first instance toward those others whom the person meets in individual
or one-to-one encounter.
V. Chapter survey
The project of this dissertation will consist of seven main chapters. In the second
chapter, I will analyze Leonardo Boff‘s understanding of the antitheses in the Sermon on
the Mount. Two things I will argue. For Boff, the antitheses do not provide moral
precepts and he also interprets the antitheses as Jesus‘ call for people to engage in a social
revolution. The third chapter is on John Calvin. I will examine his exposition of the
antitheses in the Sermon on the Mount and argue two things. First, Calvin interprets the
moral demands in the antitheses to be binding on everybody, and not just Christians.
Second, he understands the antitheses as applying to individual persons but not to States.
The fourth chapter is on Helmut Thielicke. I will examine Thielicke‘s exposition
of the antitheses in the Sermon on the Mount and argue two things. He understands the
antitheses to primarily function as usus elenchticus to show human helplessness in
keeping the laws and to reveal their sin. He also extends this usus elenchticus of the
antitheses beyond individuals to States. The fifth chapter is on John Howard Yoder. I will
demonstrate in this chapter that for Yoder the antitheses comprise both personal and
social ethics because they reveal a life in the kingdom of God intended not merely for
individual Christians but also for States.
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The sixth chapter is on the official position of the Roman Catholic Church. The
aim of this chapter is to examine an institutional or a churchly interpretation of the
antitheses. The Roman Catholics argue that the antitheses are derived from the universal
moral order – through which the Decalogue is also derived – and revealed to Christians to
govern their individual moral conduct. The seventh chapter is where I will appropriate the
studies of previous chapters to argue that the antitheses are universal moral demands. The
eighth chapter is also where I appropriate the studies of previous chapters to argue that
the antitheses are intended to govern the conduct of individuals. The ninth and final
chapter is the conclusion. This is where I will draw some reflections on the project of the
dissertation for further study and for its contribution to church ministry in the world.

CHAPTER TWO: LEONARDO BOFF ON THE ANTITHESES
I. Introduction
Leonardo Boff was born in 1938 in Concordia, Santa Catarina, Brazil. His father
was a teacher who identified himself with the cause of the poor in Concordia. According
to Deane W. Ferm, Boff considers his father a decisive influence on his life in helping
him see the world from the perspective of the poor and oppressed. Deane Ferm also
points out two major experiences which lead Boff to embrace the theology of liberation.1
The first was his work as a priest in the slum of Petrópolis, near Rio de Janeiro, where he
came into contact with people who had to scavenge for food in garbage dumps and yet
were able to hope and draw a sense of self-worth from their base communities. The
second grew out of Boff's frequent trips to the diocese of Acre-Purus, in the heart of the
Amazon jungle. In his travels to visit and minister to the poor villages, Boff realized that
these villagers did not envision the church as a hierarchical institution. They knew
nothing about Vatican pronouncements or bishops‘ conferences. Those two experiences
had a profound impact to Boff in the development of his view of Jesus as the total
liberator of the human condition. They have led Boff to write his book: Jesus Christ
Liberator: a Critical Christology for Our Time.2
Harvey Cox mentions that as ―an eloquent interpreter and prolific writer,‖ Boff is
one of the liberation theology‘s prominent figures for the struggle for justice. 3 As a
liberation theologian, Boff attempts to interpret Scripture and Christianity from the
1
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perspective of the oppressed, especially poor people. He argues that reflection on poverty
in Latin America is, in the first place, a part of the necessary commitment that is a
prerequisite to doing theology in that setting. Boff says, at the beginning of his study of
Christology, ―It is with preoccupations that are ours alone, taken from our Latin
American context that we will reread not only the old texts of the New Testament but
also the most recent commentaries written in Europe.‖4 He is convinced that to follow
Christ in Latin America means to work to change the existing social, economic, and
political structures. He works out this conviction by his endeavors to look at the message
of Jesus through the eyes of those who have normally been oppressed, excluded and
ignored.
One of Boff‘s endeavors is evident in his understanding of the Sermon on the
Mount. While he does not write a major commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, there
are three writings in which Boff analyzes either some parts of the Sermon or the Sermon
in general. They are Ecology and Liberation,5 Jesus Christ Liberator, and The Lord’s
Prayer: the Prayer of Integral Liberation.6 In his Ecology and Liberation, Boff titles the
prologue ―A Sermon from the Mount of Corcovado.‖ The Christ of Corcovado is the
famous sculpture that towers above Guanabara Bay in Rio de Janeiro. Boff imagines the
statue coming to life and preaching the Sermon to the city. Christ addresses the
oppressed with compassion, detailing various types of exploitation that Indians, slaves,
peasants, street children, and the earth have experienced. He declares blessed all those
4
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who struggle in their oppression: ―You are all blessed, all who are poor, hungry, sick and
without hope.‖7 This word of blessings, however, is not extended to the oppressors.
Those people, like ―masters of power, who have sucked the workers‘ blood for five
hundred years,‖8 are instead subject to curses and destruction. In Jesus Christ Liberator,
Boff dedicates a chapter, ―Jesus Christ, Liberator of the Human Condition‖ to argue that
the norms of the Sermon presuppose love, a new person free for greater things.9 In the
Lord’s Prayer, Boff argues that an involvement in struggles against injustice can provide
the impetus for one to his or her knees. He also explains that the Lord‘s Prayer maintains
the religious and political dimensions of one‘s faith in creative tension, avoiding
deadening reductionisms. For example, the petition ―Give us this day our daily bread‖
has both structural-political and spiritual-personal connotations. ―Heavenly bread,‖ Boff
argues, ―deprived of earthly bread, is incomprehensible.‖10
William T. Cavanaugh has written an essay comparing Leonardo Boff and John
Paul II in their interpretation of the Sermon.11 They both consider the Sermon as the heart
of Jesus‘ teaching to his disciples. They differ, however, on their diagnoses of the evils in
society. For Boff, as Cavanaugh identifies, the problem lies in poverty and human misery
while for John Paul II it is in the personal desire to have an illusory freedom based on the
relativism of the truth. Cavanaugh specifically points out that Boff interprets the Sermon
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to characterize a permanent crisis for all social and ecclesiastical systems. 12 Given the
oppressive situation and the enslavement of the marginalized in Latin America, Boff
understands that the Sermon does not reinforce social order but overturns it.
While Cavanaugh deals with Boff‘s interpretation of the SM in general, in this
chapter I will specifically analyze Boff‘s understanding of the antitheses in the Sermon.
Two things I will argue. First, for Boff the antitheses are not moral precepts. And
secondly, Boff interprets the antitheses as Jesus‘ call for social revolution.
II. The antitheses are not moral precepts
The moral precepts are universally binding moral requirements for all people.
They are distinguished from moral rules. A moral rule is an application of a moral
precept to a specific context. In this chapter, I will use the term ―moral precepts‖ with law
interchangeably. To show that Boff does not consider the antitheses as moral precepts, I
will examine Boff‘s argument that the antitheses display Jesus‘ complete freedom before
the exclusivism and authoritarianism of the law. He says, ―In the Jewish religion at the
time of Jesus, everything was prescribed and determined, first relations with God and
then relations among human beings. Conscience felt itself oppressed by insupportable
legal prescriptions. Jesus raises an impressive protest against all such human enslavement
in the name of law.‖13 For Boff, his interpretation of the antitheses as Jesus‘ ―impressive
protest‖ means two things. First, Jesus is against the prevalent exclusivism of his era.
Secondly, Jesus is above the law.
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A. Jesus vs. exclusivism
Boff explains that in the antitheses Jesus is against the Pharisees and the scribes of
his era because they enslave people in the name of the law in which consciences are
―oppressed by the insupportable regimentation of legal prescriptions (cf. Matthew
23:4).‖14 The Pharisees and the scribes indeed are not immoral people. They observe the
letter of the law. They pay all their taxes (Matthew 23:6), they have the first places in the
synagogue (Mathew 23:6), they observe fast and pay tithes (Luke 18:12), they appreciate
religion that they build holy monuments (Matthew 23:29) and they are even passionate
for their established system of life that they would travel the world in search of a follower
(Matthew 23:15). The problem with them begins when they tie up heavy burdens of laws
and lay them on the shoulders of others but then they themselves will not lift a finger to
move them (Matthew 23:3-4). They only want to make sure that the people observe all
the law strictly but then they leave the people to their own. As a consequence, a social
stratification emerges. On one side, the Pharisees and the scribes are ―structured into the
system that they created for themselves,‖ as Boff explains, ―they are rich, well known,
have religion, and are confident that God is at their side.‖15 On the other side, there are
those people in their ―marginalized situation within the socio-religious Jewish system,‖16
such as, shepherds, tax collectors and prostitutes (Matthew 21:3), who are not able to
observe all the law strictly. Jesus reacts against this social stratification in his teaching of
the antitheses.
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Jesus disdains the social stratification created by the Pharisees and the scribes
through their law. Boff calls the antitheses ―radical formulas‖17 because through them
Jesus identifies himself with a conscience liberated from the oppression of legal
prescriptions which divides people into classes of pious and impious. In the antitheses
Jesus does not intend to engage in a polemic with the Pharisees and the scribes against
their legalism or works-righteousness. What Jesus addresses is not their problem of
legalism but of exclusivism. Jesus does not indict the Pharisees and the scribes of his day
for their moral action but for their elitist action. 18 The antitheses demonstrate Jesus‘
break from the social conventions of his era. He does not endorse the established order of
his era which legitimates a social status quo which alienates people from one another and
divides and discriminates people into different classes. In Boff‘s words, ―The present
order of things [the religious and social order in Jesus‘ era] cannot save people from their
fundamental alienation. It is order in the midst of disorder. A change of life is required, a
complete turnabout of the old situation.‖19 Jesus in the antitheses is especially against the
class division or discrimination between the pious and impious established by the
Pharisees and the scribes because of their blind submission to the letter of the law.
B. Jesus above the law
Jesus does not only demonstrate his contempt of the established order which
divides people into classes of pious and impious but also he shows his authority over the
law which he addresses in the antitheses. As Boff argues, ―Jesus comports himself as one
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higher than laws.‖20 Boff interprets that in the antitheses Jesus shows superiority over the
law not by appealing to other superior moral precepts.21 The evidence of Jesus‘
superiority in the antitheses is not that he has the authority to correct the corrupted
interpretation of the laws by the Pharisees and scribes of his era. Instead, he is superior
because Jesus ―de-theologizes the conception of the law,‖ namely, that ―the will of God is
not to be found only in the legal prescriptions and sacred books.‖22 Using something
outside oneself as a standard, such as laws, will require the person to alienate himself or
herself from others who do not use the same standard. This situation will not happen
when one chooses to look within oneself. Boff explains in this way:
The distinction between pure and impure no longer exists outside of the human
person, but depends on you, on the intentions of your heart, wherein lies the root
of your actions. In this regard, the support given by the crutch of law no longer
exists. If we have purified ourselves, all around us will be equally pure (cf. Luke
11:41). The distinction between pious and profane works no longer exists,
because the manner of practicing works of piety ought not to be distinguished
from the manner of practicing other works (Matt. 6:17-18). The true distinction is
that which a person establishes in his conscience when confronted with God
(Matt.6:4, 6, 18).23
What counts now is not exterior categories and labels that people can adhere to or not,
but instead, what matters is what is revealed in the heart of one who open himself or
herself to God and to others. Jesus shows his superiority over the law by choosing to
follow his own heart and conscience to open himself to God and others instead of
choosing to submit to the law. This is evident when in the antitheses he does not repeat
what the Old Testament has taught but instead he has the courage to rise up and say:
20
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―You have heard but I say to you,‖ (Matthew 5:21, 27-8, 31-32, 33-34, 38-39, 43-44).
Jesus is ―a person who boldly proclaims ‗I‘,‖ as Boff explains, ―without guaranteeing
himself by other authorities from outside himself.‖24
Boff‘s interpretation of the antitheses, which shows Jesus‘ superiority over the
law, implies two things. First, Boff puts Jesus of the antitheses in contrast to the law of
the Old Testament. And secondly, Boff understands Jesus to provide a source, other than
the law, for people to look for the will of God.
First, Boff‘s reading that in the antitheses Jesus is above the law implies Jesus
contrasts himself with the law in the Old Testament. This is evident when Boff says,
―The God of Jesus is no longer the God of Torah, the Law. He is the God of mercy, of
unlimited goodness, and of patience for the weak who recognize that they are weak and
start on the road back to God.‖25 In addition, Boff commends St. Francis‘s rule for
employing a ―minimum of law and a maximum of spirituality.‖26 In the antitheses, Jesus
reveals himself as one who is liberated from the oppressed conscience by the law of the
Old Testament and is now free to bend the law to the higher purpose of love, even loving
the enemies (Matthew 5:43-48). The lesson of the six antitheses from Matthew 5:21-48 is
the ―liberty and nonconformity‖ of Jesus with regard to the law.27 As a consequence,
while one may understand that Jesus is not completely against the law, one must realize
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that Jesus considers the law something which can easily be discarded, in Boff‘s term, ―a
crutch,‖28 once a person, like Jesus, no longer needs it.
Secondly, when Jesus reveals in the antitheses that the law no longer has an
absolute grip in the life of people, he also provide them with a different source for finding
the will of God. Jesus does not encourage libertinism in the sense one leading a depraved
and irresponsible life. One might not be bound by the law, but one is still bound with
something else. Jesus is the prime of example of this. The antitheses reveal a person who
is not bound by the law but instead binds himself with something higher than the law.
―The clear and juridical vision of the law no longer exists,‖ Boff argues, ―Jesus offers a
clear objective, expressed in the Sermon on the Mount…Jesus permits us to observe
traditions insofar as they do not harm but favor the principal objective (Matthew 5:19-20;
23:23).‖29 The principal objective, which Boff speaks here, is love. ―The Pharisees do not
wish to listen to Jesus because his message is disquieting, obliging them to de-establish
themselves,‖ as Boff explains, ―it demands a conversion away from the safe and solid
ground of the law and to the norm of a universal love that is superior to all laws (Matthew
5:43-48).‖30 Love is the principle which is other and higher than the law. The antitheses
are samples of this creative love.
C. The antitheses are samples of Jesus’ creative love and not laws
Boff does not take the antitheses to constitute moral precepts which are fixed and
require all people to obey. Instead, he interprets them as samples of Jesus‘ creative love
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in his era. They are not laws but ―a catechism of comportment for a disciple of Jesus, for
one who has already embraced the good news and is seeking to construct norms that
conform to the tidings brought by Christ: divine sonship.‖31 As a catechism of
comportment, they only provide guidance or model for one to practice his or her love to
God and others in each given moment. Love is higher than the law because it calls for
creative imagination. The law can only restrain people‘s creativity because they can only
follow and obey what the law demands. Love, as an alternative to the law, allows one to
exercise ―the vigor of one‘s interior decision‖ and ―the responsible autonomy of those
who know what they want and why they live.‖32 Boff believes that it is easier to live
within laws and prescriptions that determine everything than it is to create a norm
inspired by love for each moment.33 In the antitheses Jesus does not give another law to
restrain and burden one‘s conscience and life but instead he only sets samples for one to
make a creative decision. In Boff‘s words,
[Jesus] does not theologize. Nor does he appeal to superior moral principles. Nor
does he lose himself in a minute and heartless casuistry. But his words bite into
the concrete world until it is forced to make a decision before God. His
determinations are incisive and direct: ‗Be reconciled with your brother‘
(Matt.5:24b). ‗Offer the wicked man no resistance. On the contrary, if anyone hits
you on the right cheek, offer him the other as well‘ (Matt.5:39). ‗Love your
enemies, and pray for those who persecute you‘ (Matt.5:44).34
By providing love and not law in the antitheses as the source to find the will of God,
Jesus is able to treat humans as human and help them to be true to themselves. As Boff
explains, ―In the important questions of life, nothing can substitute for the human person:
31
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neither law, nor tradition, nor religion. People must decide from within, before God and
before others. Because of this they need creativity and liberty.‖35 Only love can fulfill
people‘s need for creativity and liberty.
Boff further argues that Jesus‘ liberty and creativity demonstrated in the
antitheses are based on common life experience. ―He appeals to sound reason,‖ Boff
says.36 For example, he commands that one should love enemies (Matthew 5:43-48).
Why? Because all, friends and enemies, are children of the same Father who causes his
sun to rise on the wicked as well as the good, and his rain to fall on the honest and
dishonest alike (Matthew 5:45). Likewise, it is not good simply to say: do not kill, or do
not commit adultery. Anger and covetous looks are already sinful (Matthew 5:21-30).
Why? What use is it to combat the consequences if first one does not heal the cause
(Matthew 5:22, 28)? Common sense tells people that it is better taking out the root of the
problem rather than mere handling the surface. Jesus draws his teaching from the
common experiences that all people can verify and not just some elite students of law.
What Jesus brings is not something esoteric, something in which common people are not
invested. Cavanaugh points out that Boff‘s view of what Jesus brings to the people is ―the
ability to discover latent possibilities in oneself.‖37 ―Jesus does not wish to say something
new, merely for effect and whatever the cost, but something as old as humankind,‖ Boff
further explains, ―not something original, but something that is valid for all; not
astonishing things, but things people can comprehend on their own if they have clear
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vision and a little good sense.‖38 Jesus invites people to understand and apply freely and
creatively this common-sense teaching of love in the antitheses. He no longer demands
that people obey the law, but invites them to love and gives them an example by the way
he handles the law in the antitheses. He discloses to people what they are capable of but
because they have been oppressed, blinded and alienated by the exclusivism and
authoritarianism of the law, they are no longer what they are capable of.
The antitheses express this love. Jesus rebukes the exclusivism and
authoritarianism of his era in the antitheses in order to announce the good news of love,
namely, instead of social stratification, there is a fundamental equality: all are worthy of
love. In Boff‘s words, ―[Jesus] does not preach any such system of justice that signifies
the consecration and legitimation of a social status quo that has as its starting point
discrimination between people…He announces a principles that checkmates all fetishistic
and inhuman subordination be to a system, be it social or religious.‖39 This display of
Jesus‘ power in the antitheses is a call to his followers to participate in the new order
which liberates them from exclusivism and authoritarianism. They are liberated from
exclusivism because in this new order they are no longer divided within themselves
between those who observe strictly the law and those who do not. They are also liberated
from authoritarianism because they are no longer subjected to the requirement to always
submit themselves to the demand of the law.
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How does one freely and creatively make love the principal guidance of life and
moral conduct? Boff answers that such love ―exists only in giving oneself to, and putting
oneself at the service of, others‖ and that kind of love is ―that we love one another as God
has loved us.‖40 Boff and his younger brother outline some characteristics of people who
creatively and freely express this love.41 Like the Good Samaritan, they will act
comradely, making liberation of others their own struggle, determining what sort of
support they can give and how they can identify with the consequences of their actions
however burdensome they may be. They will also be prophetic, denouncing mechanisms
that generate oppression. They are committed to the oppressed for their liberation,
traveling together with others who share the same vision, expending their energies in
achieving it, and being ready to lay down their lives for it. They seek freedom from the
schemes and illusions imposed by the dominant system, in order to be free to create with
others more adequate forms of life, of work, and of being Christian. They are joyful to
accept the price to be paid for liberation. They are contemplative in the struggles and
resistance of the poor and lowly to find God in human history. Finally, they are utopian
because they will not rest after advances or be disheartened after setbacks.
III. The antitheses are Jesus’ call for social revolution
The previous section examines Boff‘s understanding of the antitheses as
expressions of love. Jesus does not require his followers to obey the demands of the law.
What he requires is that they follow their own liberty and creativity in how they love God
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and others. If the law can help them to love, they may employ the law. But if the law is in
their way of expressing love, they should not submit to the law.
This section deals with Boff‘s interpretation of Jesus‘ teaching in the antitheses as
a call for social revolution. He grounds this interpretation on his conviction that Jesus is
the Liberator. From the perspective of the oppressed, as Boff explains, ―to worship and
proclaim Jesus Christ as the Liberator is to ponder and live out our Christological faith
within a socio-historical context marked by domination and oppression.‖42 To understand
Jesus Christ as the Liberator in this way implies two things. First, since Jesus is
concerned with the oppressed, the antitheses have a social dimension and provide a
stimulus for social revolution. They are Jesus‘ call to engage in social revolution to
liberate the oppressed. Second, in this call for liberation the emphasis is on dealing with
the social injustice instead of personal sin.
A. Jesus Christ the Liberator
When Boff interprets that in the antitheses Jesus calls people to be liberated from
the exclusivism and authoritarianism of the law, he further argues that Jesus does not
only call for people to be creative and free in their expressions of love, but also to join his
cause of greater things, namely, the struggle to liberate the oppressed, the lowly and the
poor. As he explains, ―The norms of the Sermon on the Mount presuppose love, a new
human person and one liberated for greater things.‖43 The antitheses, which are not law,
are ―addressed to everyone, inviting us to have extremely clear consciences and an
unlimited capacity for understanding people, sympathizing with them, being tuned into

42

Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 264.

43

Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 71.

27
them, and loving them with all their limitations and realizations.‖44 When people are
liberated from the tentacles of the law that have kept them oppressed, they should also
liberate others who are still oppressed.
The liberation Boff understands here is not only from personal sin but also from
social and structural oppression. Boff says that there is a sin that is mortal, ―the sin
against the humanitarian spirit.‖45 He interprets Jesus‘ invitation in Matthew 5:48, ―You
must therefore be perfect just as your heavenly Father is perfect,‖ to mean that as God
has showed his indiscriminate love without limits and as Jesus has lived out that love in
his challenge to the oppressing structures of his era, his followers should also express and
demonstrate this love by confronting the social oppression of their own era.46 In Boff‘s
view, the situation in Latin America has striking parallels with the sociopolitical situation
of Jesus‘ time; Palestine too is suffering from unjust structures. Jesus preaches the
kingdom of God and delivers his teaching in the antitheses as the start of a new age of
liberation. In doing so, he aligns himself with the oppressed and takes on the Pharisees
and the scribes who oppress people in the name of the law.
Boff illustrates the relationship between Jesus‘ struggles to liberate the oppressed
in his era and the same struggles people should have in their own era in his book, Way of
the Cross—Way of Justice.47 Written in blank verse, the book is a series of meditations on
the stations of the cross, a traditional exercise of individualistic Catholic piety that Boff
transforms into a communal exercise as well. He effects this transformation by offering
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meditations on each of the ―stations‖ of Jesus‘ original journey along the Via Dolorosa,
all of which are followed by second meditations reflecting on the meaning of the station
for Jesus‘ followers in today‘s world. The practice exemplifies Boff's conviction that
theology must have ―two eyes,‖ one looking to the past ―where salvation broke in‖ and
the other looking toward the present ―where salvation becomes a reality here and now.‖
The ―way of the cross‖ focuses on Jesus‘ struggles with the oppressed in his era, but the
―way of justice‖ focuses on his followers‘ struggles who continue Jesus‘ passion today
―in his brothers and sisters who are being condemned, tortured and killed for the cause of
justice.‖48 The parallel between what Jesus suffered then and what his followers suffer
today is meant to encourage the continuing efforts in liberating people from oppressing
social structures.
If one is willing to follow Jesus, then one should also take on the social structures
which oppress people so that they may be liberated. Boff calls this concern for the poor
and the oppressed ―the sacrament of brotherhood.‖ As a visible sign of invisible reality,
Boff understands the sacrament of brotherhood to mean that one is a follower of Jesus
whenever he or she joins the visible struggles to liberate the oppressed people, as Jesus
has done. Boff interprets Mark 9:38-40 and Luke 9:49-50 to demonstrate that Jesus ―feels
his mission realized wherever he sees people that follow him and – even though there be
no explicit reference to his name – do what he wanted and proclaimed.‖49 What Jesus
wants and proclaims is the liberation of the oppressed. As Boff explains, on the Judgment
day (Matthew 25:31-46), ―the eternal Judge will not ask people about the canons of
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dogma, nor whether they made any explicit reference to the mystery of Christ while they
lived,‖ instead, ―He will ask if we have done anything to help those in need.‖50 Jesus
Christ is for Boff the Liberator primarily for those who are socially oppressed and the
antitheses are his call to engage in this liberation effort.
B. The primacy of social over personal
Boff‘s understanding of Jesus Christ as the Liberator and his call for social
revolution in the antitheses is contextualized with the Latin America experience of
poverty and oppression. This localized experience of poverty in Latin America provides a
significant context for Boff and also predisposes Boff to deal with the social injustice as
the first priority in his doing of theology.
While Boff recognizes corrupted individuals as the source of evil, he rather
considers social structures as the principal carriers or motors of evil. For example, Boff
acknowledges the personal aspects of sin (such as Paul‘s list of sins of the flesh in
Galatians 5:19-21). He also believes that personal aspects of sin find their historical
expression in the mechanisms of society, specifically that which tends to the
accumulation of wealth by the few at the expense of the many.51 For Boff, the personal
aspect of sin is always imbedded within a social web of relations. He argues that
individual consciousness cannot exist separate from the collective social unit:
There are not two conscious awareness, one individual (I) and one social (we).
There is only one human awareness that finds elaboration and expression amid the
reality of shared life with others (we). Individualism is a false understanding of
the human being. The ego is always inhabited by others. The individual is always
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an abstraction. In concrete reality the person always shows up as a complicated
web of active relationships.52
This is also evident when Boff, in his appropriation of the Sermon on the Mount as a
Sermon from the Mount of Corcovado, does not at the first place argue for personal
redemption of the oppressed from their personal sinful life. Instead, he puts in Jesus‘ lips
this saying: ―You are oppressed and victims of a corrupt society, so how can I expect you
to live a life of perfect virtue or upbraid you for all your imperfections?‖53 Personal order
will not emerge unless the heavy burden of social disorder and structural oppression is
first lifted from the shoulders of the oppressed.
In Latin America context, Boff argues the structural evil which brings forth social
injustice manifests itself in a socio-economic system called capitalism: ―Latin America
underdevelopment is not a technical problem nor a fated historical circumstance. It is the
by-product of a socio-economic system that favors a small minority with wealth while
keeping the vast majority of humankind in a state of dependence on the margins of
societal life.54 Churches in Latin America, in order to follow Jesus, the Liberator, as Boff
explains, ought ―to accentuate particularly the secular and liberating dimensions
contained in the message of Christ.‖55These churches come to see that the problems they
encountered are of a structural kind. Their marginalization is perceived because of the
socio-economic character of the capitalist system. The desire for liberation is placed in a
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concrete, historical context. They look upon it not simply as liberation from sin but also
as a liberation that has economic, political and cultural dimensions.56 For Boff, the
churches in Latin America are instruments of social change against the capitalist system.
They are a liberating force that works for a new social order in which justice and equality
prevail.
IV. Summary and assessments
A. Summary
For Boff the antitheses in the Sermon on the Mount are not moral precepts or
laws. Rather, these sayings of Jesus delineate a conscience liberated from the oppression
of legal prescriptions so that the liberated people are able to make a creative decision in
their life with love as their principle guidance. The antitheses are samples of Jesus‘
creative love and they invite people to be true themselves and marshal their creativity to
imagine ways to love one another, including their enemies. They do not exemplify a new
morality; instead, they are an exposition of how people, liberated from the oppression of
exclusivism and authoritarianism of the law, should be. They call people to engage in
social revolution.
B. Assessments
Three assessments are now in order. First is the question of a contextualized
theology. Second is the primacy of social over personal. And finally, third is the contrast
Boff posits between love and law.
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B1. Liberation theology as a contextualized theology
Liberation theology attempts to interpret Scripture and Christianity from the
perspective of the oppressed, especially poor people. In Boff‘s case, the social injustice in
Latin America is the sole context of his doing theology. This is evident when Boff
interprets the antitheses as expressions of love against the exclusivism and
authoritarianism of the law which oppresses people. To interpret the antitheses or any
biblical text solely from the perspective of the oppressed has its own risk. The risk is that
liberation theology would not be biblically based but instead existentially based. Since
the mandate for starting liberation theology is the need to address social injustice, then
one can ask, is there a biblical basis for such a perspective, or does this perspective
become the sole basis for scriptural interpretation? If the antitheses must only be read
within the context of liberating the oppressed from social injustice, then taken at face
value, this may indicate that the antitheses do not address the context of their own; rather,
the context of social injustice determines the context the antitheses should address.
B2. The primacy of social over personal
Even though Boff argues that the antitheses address a conscience liberated from
the oppression of the law, he places more emphasis on their call to people to engage in
social liberation. In treating the social dimensions of sin, does Boff also treat the personal
dimensions adequately? Does oppression have only social manifestations, or are there not
also personal dimensions of spiritual or Satanic influence (for example, the challenge of
Spiritism in Brazil) that have not been given sufficient consideration by Boff? One
wonders whether or not Boff‘s interpretation of the antitheses from the perspective of the
oppressed is adequate and complete.

33
Furthermore, if liberation is primarily tied to social justice and theology has to
primarily be committed to those socially oppressed, then Boff seems to argue that what
God is doing among the poor constitute either a new or a continuing revelation of the acts
of God, which in effect become the Word of God in the context of the poor. This
historical contextualizing of God's revelation in the current existential situation, on the
one hand, tends to negate any sense of concrete objective revelation, while on the other
hand, tends to elevate the truth in the liberation theology to a position of objective
revelation. Does the social reality of the poor determine our theology in any absolute
sense? Does our interpretation of the antitheses pass only through the reality of the
socially oppressed, or are there not also other biblical way stations that also ought to be
taken into account? It appears as though Boff argues that biblical truth becomes
meaningful only in the dynamic dialectic between the written Word and the historically
rooted reflection of social liberation.
B3. The contrast between law and love
Boff interprets the antitheses as free and creative samples of love. He explains
that Jesus ―subjects the Torah and the dogmatics of the Old Testament to the criterion of
love, thus liberating human practice from necrophilic structures.‖57 This means that for
Boff love is the only law there is since in ethics there must always be room for a basic
imperative. Even though Boff does not actually deny other laws than love, for him love
absorbs the law and virtually removes it from sight. Love relativizes all other laws, such
as the Ten Commandments and the antitheses. As a consequence, Boff denigrates law,
robs it of its importance, and renders it finally functionless.

57

Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 284.

34
By taking love as the only law there is, Boff minimizes law, reducing it to a set of
rules which oppress people. This is an unwarranted denigration of law. Henry Stob points
out that law and love should not be smelted together beyond recognition, but what is
needed ―is a loving obedience and an obedient love.‖58 Instead of contrasting to one
another, one should embrace love and law mutually. Law, in order to rightly function as a
guide, must be informed by love; just as love, in order to do the same, must be structured
by law.
The next chapter on John Calvin will portray a contrast to Leonardo Boff‘s
hermeneutical option of liberation theology. In that chapter, I will discuss a
hermeneutical option whereby John Calvin first puts the context of Scripture, in this case,
the analogy of Scripture. He then argues against his opponents, the Anabaptists and the
Roman Catholics of his era, to establish the ongoing relevance of moral demands in the
antitheses for everyone in personal Christian discipleship.
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CHAPTER THREE: JOHN CALVIN ON THE ANTITHESES
I. Introduction
John Calvin (1509-1564) is one of the most important Protestant reformers of the
sixteenth century. One exemplary trait of Calvin as a Reformer is his passion for truth.
W. Robert Godfrey claims the reason Calvin still matters today is because he is ―a teacher
of truth.‖1 To be more specific, Calvin is a teacher of the truth of God‘s word. Richard
Muller points out that Calvin understands himself as a preacher and exegete and the chief
work of his life is to interpret Scripture.2 He has produced commentaries on almost every
New Testament book (except 2 John, 3 John and Revelation) and on much of the Old
Testament, including the Pentateuch, Joshua, Psalms, and all of the Prophets.3
In one of his commentaries, Harmony of the Evangelists: Matthew, Mark and
Luke, Calvin provides his most extensive exposition of the Sermon on the Mount (SM).4
Several important studies investigate Calvin‘s theological-exegetical method in his
interpretation of the SM. Keith Boudreaux, for example, examines Calvin‘s exegesis of
the SM to show that Calvin is not promoting a stern and rationalistic approach to life and
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Christian faith.5 Boudreaux‘s thesis counters Th. Engelder‘s claim that for Calvin Holy
Scripture is the source and norm of theology only in so far as it agrees with human
reason.6 Other scholars, like Schlingensiepen,7 Stadtlund,8 Holler,9 and Spencer,10
observe Calvin‘s broad competency as a biblical scholar in his handling of the SM. In
their general assessments, they show Calvin‘s adeptness of patristic literature, his
humanist training to uncover the original meaning of Scripture, and his dislike of
allegorizing or spiritualizing interpretations. Holler specifically argues that Calvin‘s
conviction of the unity of Scripture (the principle of the analogy of Scripture) underlies
his frequent recourse to claiming Jesus‘ use of hyperbole in order to explain the meaning
of the SM.11 Spencer particularly discusses Calvin‘s handling of the SM as redaction
critic, either noting that the SM comes from a variety of Jesus‘ discourses on a variety of
occasions or emphasizing that Matthew gathered them together in literary collections.12
I will continue in the scholarship of several studies mentioned above through my
analysis of Calvin‘s theological ideas and their applications in his exposition of a specific
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part in the SM, particularly the antitheses (Matthew 5:21-48).13 I will examine Calvin‘s
exposition of the antitheses in the SM and argue two things. First, Calvin interprets the
moral precepts in the antitheses to be binding on all people, and not just Christians.
Second, he also understands the antitheses to apply individual persons but not to States or
political governments.
II. Calvin’s exposition of the antitheses 4-6 (Matthew 5:33-48)
I will first examine Calvin‘s exposition of three antitheses: oaths (5:33-37); eye
for eye (5:38-42); and love for enemies (5:43-48). Later, in part III I will contrast
Calvin‘s interpretation with the Anabaptists on oath and on eye for eye. In interpreting
the whole passage of the SM, Calvin explicitly refutes the Anabaptists by name in two
contexts: the section on persecution ―because of righteousness‖ (Matthew 5:10) and the
section on Oaths (Matthew 5:33-37). The contrast will show that for Calvin the antitheses
are applicable only to individual persons and not to States or political governments. On
part IV I will argue for Calvin‘s universality of the antitheses by contrasting him with the
Roman Catholics of his era on the interpretation of Matthew 5:43-48. Calvin‘s other
adversary in his exposition of the SM is without doubt the 16th century Roman Catholics.
He explicitly refutes their theory of Christ‘s ―advises‖ as opposed to commands in his
exposition of love for enemies (Matthew 5:43-48).
I will investigate two things from each of these three antitheses. I will first look at
Calvin‘s confidence in the unity of Scripture when he explains and broadens the meaning
of Jesus‘ commands in the antitheses. In other words, I will look at Calvin‘s
hermeneutical principle of the analogy of Scripture. And secondly, I will examine
13
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Calvin‘s interpretation in each of those antitheses which will demonstrate that they are
moral precepts for individuals to practice.
A. Oaths (Matthew 5:33-37)
It is obvious that to swear by the name of God and do it falsely is not a slight
insult to God (Matthew 5:33). In this antitheses Jesus takes it further by saying ―do not
swear an oath at all‖ (Matthew 5:34). Calvin interprets it as a rebuke of an erroneous
interpretation of the third commandment in Exodus 20:7 (―You shall not misuse the name
of the Lord your God‖) which applies only to perjurers and not to those who call on the
name of God for trivial reasons. He argues that Jesus instead intends that ―all promises
and engagements which have been sanctioned by the use of the name of God‖ be honored
(294). To understand the reason why Calvin does not take Jesus‘ command ―do not swear
an oath at all‖ to mean literally to never swear, I will examine Calvin‘s hermeneutical
principle of the analogy of Scripture and his interpretation of this antithesis to be a moral
precept for individuals to practice.
A1. The principle of the analogy of Scripture
Calvin defines what an oath is within the context of Scripture. He argues that an
oath, when duly taken, is a means of divine worship (it falls under the scope of the third
commandment).14 For example, in Jeremiah it is said, ―If they learn well the ways of my
people and swear by my name, saying ‗As surely as the Lord lives‘ – even as they once
taught my people to swear by Baal – then they will be established among my people‖
(Jeremiah12:16). By appealing to the name of God and calling him to witness, one is
justly said to declare one‘s own religious veneration of him. One acknowledges that God
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is eternal and unchangeable truth and that one does not only call upon him in preference
to others, as a proper witness to the truth, but also as its only underwriter, a discerner of
heart who is able to bring hidden things to light. Since oath, as a means of divine
worship, is lawful and even commanded in a case of necessity (for example, Exodus
22:11), Calvin argues that to take Jesus‘ command ―do not swear at all‖ (Matthew 5:34)
to literally mean to never swear will make God contradict himself, ―by approving and
commanding at one time‖ and ―afterwards prohibits and condemns.‖15
Understanding that God would take oaths to be a means of divine worship, one
must be careful that they do not contain insult or contempt. Calvin argues that Scripture
cautions one‘s use of expressions such as ―May God deal with me‖ (1 Samuel 14:44) and
―I call God as my witness‖ (2 Corinthians 1:23).16 Such expressions imply that one could
not call God to witness without invoking the judgment-seat of God. For this reason
Calvin admonishes that one should not only abstain from perjury, but also remember that
an oath is not appointed or allowed for passion or pleasure, but for necessity, ―where
some purpose of religion or charity is to be served.‖17
A2. Calvin‘s interpretation of the antithesis ―oath‖
Calvin argues for taking an oath out of necessity for religious or charitable
purposes because he understands humans in their fallen nature tend to abuse oaths. He
even assumes swearing originates in the wickedness of human beings: ―Whence comes
the great propensity to swearing, but from the great falsehood, the numerous impositions,
the unsteady and light conduct, so that hardly anything is believed?‖ (296). If honesty
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prevails among human beings, if humans are not inconsistent and hypocritical, and if they
maintain fairness, then there may be no longer any occasion for an oath.
Even though swearing or taking an oath has a wicked origin, Calvin argues that
people should not condemn taking an oath in every instance: ―It does not follow that it is
unlawful to swear, when necessity demands it: for many things are proper in themselves,
though they have had a wicked origin‖ (297). Everyone should indeed cultivate honesty
and fairness in their words. Calvin says that Jesus‘ command ―All you need to say is
simply ‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘‖ (Matthew 5:37) does not mean that people are not allowed to take
an oath. What Jesus demands here is for individuals to practice ―fairness and honesty‖ so
that ―there may be no longer any occasion for an oath‖ (296). When people can speak
honestly, they do not need to always ask God to be their witness in ordinary
engagements, affairs and promises. There are times, however, where circumstances
demand people to formally ask God to be their witness. Calvin realize this and he gives
some guidance on taking an oath, namely, as long as oaths ―are not rash, indiscriminate,
wanton or trifling, but that they may serve a just need, either to vindicate God‘s glory or
to further a brother‘s edification, they are lawful.‖18 One example he gives is that if one‘s
reputation is imperiled because of others‘ stubborn ill-will, one can without offense call
upon God's judgment to make manifest one‘s innocence in due time.19
B. Eye for eye (Matthew 5:38-42)
Calvin recognizes that the lex talionis (Matthew 5:38) is a statute to be enforced
by the magistrates. God commands judges and magistrates to punish evil-doers by
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making them endure as much as they have inflicted (Deuteronomy 19:21). Calvin
explains that in this antithesis Jesus corrects the error of using the lex talionis as an
authorization for private revenge. According to Calvin, the subject of the antithesis here
is personal retaliation. He distinguishes between two ways of resisting: first, ―by warding
off injuries through inoffensive conduct,‖ by which one prevents attacks from being
made without doing ill to any person; and secondly, ―by retaliation,‖ by which one
renders evil for evil (298). The command, ―do not resist an evil person‖ (Matthew 5:39),
as he argues, means that Jesus ―does not permit his people to repel violence by violence‖
(298). By forbidding personal retaliation, to resist violence by violence, Jesus intends to
teach his followers two things (297-8). First, he teaches that Christians should not indulge
in taking private revenge; and secondly, they should exercise patience since when they
are injured or hurt, they should not break out into hatred or wish to make their offender
endure as much as or even more the injury or hurt they have endured. To analyze the
reason Calvin interprets the command in this way I will look at his hermeneutical
principle of the analogy of Scripture and his understanding of the precept ―do not resist
an evil person‖ to be a moral precept for individuals to practice.
B1. The principle of the analogy of Scripture
When Calvin explains that by the command ―do not resist an evil person‖ Jesus
teaches Christians should not indulge in taking private revenge, Calvin distinguishes
between the evil one receives and the response one gives. To support this distinction,
Calvin explicitly says that the best interpreter of this antithesis is Paul, who in Romans
12:21 admonishes Christians to ―overcome evil with good‖ (298). Calvin argues that Paul
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instructs them to respond to the evil they receive by doing good rather than doing the
same thing or worse to the enemy who has done them wrong.20
In addition to the instruction that Christians should not indulge in taking private
revenge, Calvin explains that Jesus also commands them to exercise patience. Jesus gives
one practical example in Matthew 5:40 that even when an evil person gives one an ordeal
of lawsuits, one ought to be patient. Not only one should learn to forget the wrongs that
have been done to him or her but also that even if the more the rage of evil people is
inflamed and employs the lawsuits to oppress, one should be the more fully disposed to
exercise patience. In Calvin‘s words, ―when Christians meet with one who endeavors to
wrench from them a part of their property, they ought to be prepared to lose the whole‖
(300).
Jesus‘ instruction in Matthew 5:40 might appear to encourage Christians to
denounce all lawsuits. In 1 Corinthians 6:1-11 Paul also seems to support the argument
that lawsuits are universally condemned. Since Calvin is confident in the unity of
Scripture, I will show why for Calvin Matthew 5:40 does not denounce all lawsuits and
how 1 Corinthians 6:1-11 does not contradict his interpretation of Matthew 5:40.
Calvin argues that Matthew 5:40 does not denounce all lawsuits because if one
always yields to the enemies what they demand, ―such compliance would more strongly
inflame the minds of wicked men to robbery and extortion; and we know, that nothing
was farther from the design of Christ‖ (299). For Calvin, one is not entirely prohibited
from engaging in lawsuits, provided one has a just defense to offer. With respect to 1
Corinthians 6:1-11, Calvin explains that using this passage to support one‘s
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disengagement with all lawsuits is false.21 He argues the context of the passage shows
that Paul does not denounce all kinds of disputes and lawsuits. Paul is only against a
frenzy for legal actions prevailed in the church of Corinth to the point that they could not
bear witness for the gospel to the unbelievers because of the intemperance of their
dissentions. Their frenzy for legal actions also testifies that they are so easily moved by
every kind of loss and not prepared for patience. Paul‘s exhortation in this passage in fact
supports Jesus‘ instruction in Matt 5.40 because in this passage Paul teaches, as Calvin
explains, ―Christians should always feel disposed rather to give up part of their right than
to go into court, out of which they can scarcely come without a troubled mind, a mind
inflamed with hatred of their brother.‖ 22
B2. Calvin‘s interpretation of the antithesis ―eye for eye‖
I have shown that there is unity of Scripture in Calvin‘s interpretation of not
taking private revenge and in the exercise of patience. Now I will examine Calvin‘s
moral precept in his interpretation of Jesus‘ command ―do not resist an evil person‖
(Matt. 5:39). I will specifically look at his handling of ―If anyone slaps you on the right
cheek, turn to them the other cheek also‖ (Matthew 5:39) and on protecting oneself.
Calvin argues that the phrase ―turn to them the other cheek‖ does not mean an
encouragement for the evil person to continue doing their evil. He says, ―Christ did not
intend to exhort his people to whet the malice of those, whose propensity to injure others
is sufficiently strong‖ (299). It would be unrealistic to interpret Jesus‘ command to mean
that one should inspire the evil person to continue doing wrong or injury on him or her.
Instead, Calvin argues that by this phrase Jesus shows ―that the end of one contest will be
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the beginning of another, and that, through the whole course of their life, believers must
lay their account with sustaining many injuries in uninterrupted succession‖ (299). The
upshot in acknowledging a possible successive suffering in Christian life is Calvin‘s
deduction that when one has been wronged in a single occasion, one may learn to be
patient since such occasion often comes more than one time. This is one reason Calvin
interprets Jesus‘ expression ―If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the
other cheek also‖ (Matthew 5:39) to teach Christians to exercise patience. They are not
only to bear patiently the injuries they have received, but also to prepare for bearing new
injuries.
While Jesus‘ command teaches one to be patient when wrong has been done; it
does not invalidate the right to protect oneself by avoiding attack, particularly further
attack. Jesus indeed ―does not permit his people to repel violence by violence, yet he does
not forbid them to endeavor to avoid an unjust attack‖ (298). Calvin explains that when
one has in his or her power to protect oneself from injury, without exercising personal
retaliation, Jesus‘ command ―do not resist an evil person‖ (Matthew 5:39) do not prevent
one from ―turning aside gently and inoffensively to avoid the threatened attack‖ (299).
One example to protect oneself is Calvin‘s exposition on Matthew 5:40 discussed above,
namely, that Christians can engage in lawsuits as long as they engage with a just cause
and without a desire to take a personal revenge. Otherwise, if Christians condemn all
lawsuits, then to take that position would be to encourage robbery and extortion.
C. Love your enemy (Matthew 5:43-48)
Calvin explains that with this antithesis Jesus brings forth the proper
interpretation of the law in Leviticus19:18, ―love your neighbor as yourself, I am the
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Lord.‖ Jesus is against the error of limiting the word ―neighbor‖ only to ―benevolent
persons.‖ The word ―neighbor,‖ as Calvin argues, includes the ―whole human race‖
because ―the charity, which God requires in his law, looks not at what a man has
deserved, but extends itself to the unworthy, the wicked, and the ungrateful‖ (304).
Calvin‘s hermeneutical principle of the analogy of Scripture and his interpretation of this
command to love one‘s enemies to be a moral precept for individuals to practice will
explain the reason Calvin interprets the antithesis in this way.
C1. The principle of the analogy of Scripture
Calvin assumes that when God, in speaking of neighbors, includes all humankind
because all humans are related by a common nature, namely, they come from one
ancestor, Adam. Calvin refers to Genesis 29:14 and says, ―Whenever I see a man, I must,
of necessity, behold myself as in a mirror: for he is my bone and my flesh‖ (304). In his
interpretation of Genesis, he explains that Laban should endeavor to assist Jacob because
they are relatives. Calvin argues further that even though the bond between relatives is
closer, the act of kindness, represented by Laban to Jacob, ought to extend more widely
because the phrase ―You are my own flesh and blood‖ (Genesis 29:14) points beyond the
ties of blood between relatives to ―all the sons of Adam.‖23 There are in Scripture itself,
as Calvin shows, examples of the act of kindness beyond relatives to even enemies, such
as, in Exodus 23:4 and Proverbs 25:21.24
In addition, Calvin argues that when Paul brings under the rule of love in
Romaans13:9 the two commandments, ―You shall not steal‖ and ―You shall not commit
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adultery,‖ Paul must suppose that under this precept, ―love your neighbor as yourself,‖
one is bound to love enemies just as friends.25 One should not steal whether from a friend
or an enemy and one should not commit adultery with regard to the wife of a foe not less
than the wife of a friend. Calvin explains that if Paul does not understand the precept in
that way, then Paul must contradict with Jesus‘ command ―love your enemy‖ (Matthew
5:44).26
C2. Calvin‘s interpretation of the antithesis ―love your enemy‖
Calvin substantiates his interpretation that the law ―love your neighbor as
yourself‖ does not contradict Jesus‘ command ―love your enemy‖ by looking at Matthew
5:45-47. Jesus‘ command is based on God‘s own character, namely, ―He causes his sun
to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous‖
(Matthew 5:45). Because God‘s love is indiscriminate, Jesus‘ command ―love your
enemy‖ is already within the scope of God‘s command ―love your neighbor.‖ Calvin
explains, however, that Matthew 5:45 does not mean that ―it would be becoming in us to
do whatever God does‖ (306). He understands that ―love your neighbor‖ includes ―love
your enemy‖ because one only needs to imitate God‘s indiscriminate kindness to humans
and does not need to wait until one becomes a god, which is in itself a blasphemy, in
order to love indiscriminately. The command to love one‘s enemy is a command which a
human person able to obey without first requiring to become a divine.
Similarly, Calvin argues that in Matthew 5:45-47 Jesus employs ―ordinary
phraseology‖ to describe that ―those who are devoid of humanity have some appearance
of discharging mutual duties, when they see it to be for their own advantage‖ (308). He
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explains that one should not understand those verses to imply that ―tax collector‖ is the
worst of all humankind and then concludes that one needs to become the worst in all
humanity in order to love indiscriminately. Calvin clarifies that in those verses Jesus only
shows that even greedy people, such as tax collectors who in Jesus‘ era are the agents of
the Roman Empire tyranny, can still love whenever convenient and advantageous for
them (308). Since it is not strange for those kind of people to do that, it is practical for
those who are called ―children of your Father in heaven‖ (Mathew 5:45), Calvin argues,
should practice to have ―free and pure kindness, which is not induced by the expectation
of gain‖ even to their enemies (308).
III. The antitheses are intended to govern the conduct of individuals
I will now discuss Calvin‘s understanding that the antitheses are intended to
govern the conduct of individuals. This section will consist of three parts. In the first part,
I will contrast Calvin‘s exposition of oaths (Matthew 5:33-37) with the Anabaptists. I
have examined and showed in the previous section that with his hermeneutical principle
of the analogy of Scripture, Calvin interprets the antithesis to be a moral precept for
individuals to practice. He does not interpret Jesus‘ command ―do not swear an oath at
all‖ to mean literally to never swear. The contrast with the Anabaptists‘ interpretation
will further establish that Calvin interprets this antithesis is for individuals to practice.
In the second part of this section, I will also contrast Calvin‘s interpretation of the
command ―do not resist an evil person‖ (Matthew 5:39) with the Anabaptists to
demonstrate this antithesis is for individuals to practice in two ways. First, Calvin argues
that even though the antitheses are to govern the conduct of individuals, they do not
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forbid Christians to engage in political affairs. Second, for Calvin the antitheses are not
intended to govern the conduct of a State.
In the third and final part, I will examine Calvin‘s concept of the two kingdoms
which gives the reason Calvin interprets the antitheses as individual moral precepts.
A. The contrast between Calvin and the Anabaptists on oaths
A1. The contrast on the interpretation on oaths
I will analyze the contrast the way Calvin himself does. I distinguish between the
image that Calvin had of the Anabaptists and the image that they had of themselves. It is
the former perspective that is the subject of my project. I plan to limit my treatment to the
image of the Anabaptists that Calvin has. I recognize that there are some historical
questions, such as, whether Calvin distinguishes clearly between the various radical
currents of the Reformation and whether he treats the Anabaptists properly.27 Since my
project does not aim to be exclusively historical, I have to lay aside those historical
questions, however interesting, in order to achieve methodological consistency.
The Anabaptists reject and oppose the oath in strict obedience to the express
prohibition of Jesus in Matthew 5:34. They conclude that all use of the oath was
illegitimate for Christians.28 Calvin disagrees with this interpretation. He argues that the
Anabaptists have taken Jesus‘ words out of their context without carefully considering
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the occasion on which Jesus gives the command. He points out that the verse in question
constitutes a correction to the error of those who misuse swearing an oath: ―Our Lord
Jesus in no way condemns lawful oaths that were permitted in the law; rather, he only
repairs and corrects this license which the people, being badly taught by corrupt teachers,
had given themselves.‖29 Calvin insists that by understanding the verse in the context of
error-correction, the command does not categorically prohibit all use of the oath but
instead only prohibits its misuse in perjury and unnecessary swearing.
Not only do the Anabaptists fail to consider the occasion in which Jesus gives the
command, Calvin also points out they ignore the immediate context of the verse within
the passage as a whole. He says, ―The Anabaptists betray not only a rage for controversy,
but gross ignorance, when they obstinately press upon us a single word, and pass over,
with closed eyes, the whole scope of the passage‖ (295). Calvin argues that in the
command ―do not swear an oath at all‖ (Matthew 5:34) the phrase ―at all‖ does not relate
to the substance of the command but to the form and means, ―neither directly nor
indirectly‖ (294). Jesus immediately stipulates, following the command in Matthew 5:34,
that one should not swear either in this or that way, namely, ―either by heaven, for it is
God‘s throne, or by the earth, for it is his footstool; or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of
the Great King…by your head, for you cannot make even one hair white or black‖
(Matthew 5:34-36). In other words, Jesus means nothing more than that all oaths are
unlawful, which in any way abuse and profane the sacred name of God.
The contrast shows that the rift between Calvin and the Anabaptist comes in the
area of hermeneutics. Calvin rejects the extreme approach of the Anabaptists in their
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interpretation of the antitheses, especially, on oaths. He indeed acknowledges that a
misuse of the oath is shameful.30 He does not go to the extreme like the Anabaptists,
however, in using Matthew 5:34 to argue that the cure for the misuse of the oath is to
condemn all use of the oath. Greed is a grievous sin too. But to forbid all use of money
would be to insult God and censure him for his good gifts to us. The reason the
Anabaptists take the extreme approach lies in their hermeneutics in which they set the
New Testament in opposition to the Old Testament. Calvin, in contrast, emphasizes the
continuity between the Old and the New Testaments.
A2. Calvin on the relationship between the Old and New Testaments
For Calvin, the Old and the New Testaments differ only in the mode of
administration, not in their substance.31 Calvin‘s list of the five differences may be
summarized in this way, that the New supersedes the Old: 1) by completing what was
partial; 2) by exhibiting the substance instead of only the shadows of figures; 3) by a
spiritual doctrine written on the heart rather than in literal and external form; 4) by liberty
through deliverance from former bondage; and 5) by its universality in contrast with the
older limitation to one nation.
Since the differences do not imply any changes on the substance of the two
testaments, Calvin stresses the continuity of God‘s rule of life for his people. He believes
that one should not understand Jesus‘ antitheses as an opposition of the gospel for Jesus‘
disciples against the law of God for Israel in the Old Testament. Calvin argues that
Matthew 5:17-19 supports this continuity of the law between the Old and the New
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Testaments (275-80). The specific references to the law and its continual practice and
teaching until heaven and earth disappear in that passage make it clear that Jesus is not
changing the law, but rather unveiling its proper requirements.
This continuity between the Old and the New Testaments guides Calvin to
conclude that Jesus does not condemn the legitimate oath, but only censures the
licentiousness of people with their foolish swearing. Jesus does not intend to abrogate the
law of God given to Moses in the Old Testament. He does not add anything to the law but
instead he interprets it in its true meaning.
In contrast, the Anabaptists claim that Jesus declares ―the perfection of the
law.‖32 Though the Old Testament is of divine inspiration, it was given only to the
Israelite nation as a rule. It is the New Testament alone that is the rule for the Christian,
for only the New Testament manifests the perfection of Christ. They argue that while in
the Old Testament oath is commanded to be performed in God‘s name; Jesus in the
antitheses explicitly prohibits all swearing to his followers, whatever the reason might be.
For The Anabaptists, the Old Testament law represents a lower level, inferior to the New,
and has no authority for Christians.
Calvin is against the Anabaptists‘ teaching that the Old Testament is totally
different from the New Testament. He explains that the fulfilling of the law by Jesus
(Matthew 5:17-19) does not mean an elevation to a higher level, but rather a progress in
the history of salvation. ―It has been a prevailing opinion,‖ Calvin says, ―that the
beginning of righteousness was laid down in the ancient law, but that the perfection of it
is pointed out in the Gospel, but nothing was farther from the design of Christ, than to
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alter or innovate anything in the commandments of the law‖ (282). He especially dislikes
the Anabaptists who scorn at Moses and the Old Testament law: ―It is doing a grievous
injury to God, the author of Law, to imagine that the eyes, and hands, and feet alone, are
trained by it to a hypocritical appearance of good works, and that it is only in the Gospel
that we are taught to love God with the heart‖ (283). Calvin challenges the Anabaptists‘
insistence on Jesus as ―the perfection of the law‖ by asking whether this same
―perfection‖ had not also been required previously in the Old Testament. If not, then, for
Calvin, to say that Moses, only partly and not perfectly, teaches Israel to honor and serve
God is ―a blasphemy.‖33 Instead of contrasting between the perfection of Jesus and of the
law, Calvin argues one should understand perfection as ―the grace of the Holy Spirit,
through whom what is contained in the law is written and imprinted on our heart, in order
that…not only we might hear what He commands us, but do it.‖34 Calvin acknowledges
that the law can never bring fallen humans to perfection. Only the Holy Spirit can do that.
In contrast to the Anabaptists, Calvin argues that the law, such as the command on oaths,
as it was previously and as it is now, delivered and propounded by Jesus in the antitheses,
has not changed. It remains to express God‘s will for individuals to have a right living.
B. The contrast on the interpretation “do not resist an evil person” (Matthew 5:39)
B1. The contrast of socio-political engagement
The Anabaptists argue that Jesus‘ command ―do not resist an evil person‖ obliges
Christians to be nonresistant in their life.35 Nonresistance is the proper way of life in
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obedience to the will of God. Retribution and vengeance have no place in the life of the
Christian. As noted above, the Anabaptists are convinced that the Old Testament is
inferior to the New Testament. Such conviction also lies behind their concept of
nonresistance. In the Old Testament, civil law is on a lower level and leaves room for
vengeance and retribution. But the spiritual blessing of the New Testament requires
Christians to live according to the moral precepts of the New Testament, especially those
delivered by Jesus, which supersede the Old Testament. Obedience to Jesus of the New
Testament obliges Christians to refuse to serve in military forces. Pacifism expresses this
nonresistant way of life. It becomes an essential aspect of the Anabaptist faith and life.
The Anabaptist conviction that the New Testament supersedes the Old Testament
and that nonresistant is the proper way of life in obedience to the will of God results in
the Anabaptist‘ insistence that Jesus‘ command ―do not resist an evil person‖ obliges
Christians to refuse taking part in political affairs. In their view, Israel of the Old
Testament disciplines the disobedient with the sword and with the death penalty (for
example, Exodus 21:12-17), the church of the New Testament, however, may punish only
with the word of God and with the sword of Spirit.36 The sword of the Old Testament
theocracy is not transferred to the church. The Anabaptists concede that the sinful world
needs a government that deals strongly with the evildoers. They view, however, the
government, as ordained to maintain order in a world, is essentially evil. Calvin says that
the Anabaptists believe ―The office of the sword has no place at all in Christianity.‖37
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They consider state politics to lie outside the purview of the New Testament.
Consequently, they hold that a Christian may fill no role in the state.
In contrast, Calvin argues that in his command ―do not resist an evil person‖ Jesus
does not intend to forbid Christians to engage in political affairs. He argues that ―our
Lord Jesus was not to add anything to it, but solely to restore the true meaning of the law
in its entirety, which the rabbis had reversed by their false glosses.‖38 As noted above,
Calvin interprets that in this antithesis Jesus corrects the error of using the lex talionis as
an authorization for private revenge. Calvin is against the Anabaptists‘ use of Matt.5:30
to support their teaching that individual Christians should withdraw from their social
responsibilities to the State. He argues instead, for example, that a Christian should not
refuse to serve in the military: ―The Christian man, if according to the order of his
country is called to serve his prince, not only does not offend God in taking up arms, but
also fulfills a holy vocation, which cannot be reproved without blaspheming God.‖39
B2. The contrast of scope
Humans are by nature social. When one acts, others are unavoidably affected by
the action. One‘s choices and decisions have social consequences. Jesus‘ command ―do
not resist an evil person‖ is interpersonal in this way since it concerns with one‘s action
toward others. The command is concerned with the moral response an individual makes
to the neighbor who is immediately present to him or her. The response is not mediated
through the structures and agencies of societies, but a response made directly and with a
certain degree of intimacy. The problem I will discuss in this section is whether or not the
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moral significance of the command can be extended beyond interpersonal relationship to
institutional or super-individual community relationship. By contrasting Calvin with the
Anabaptists, I will show that for Calvin the command ―do not resist an evil person‖ is
only concerned with individuals and not with States or political governments.
As noted above, the Anabaptists argue that Jesus‘ command ―do not resist an evil
person‖ forbids Christians to use violence and weapons. Christians should not participate
in their socio-political affairs since those affairs legitimate the use of weapon and
violence. Calvin grants that the Anabaptist intention is good. He explains that the duty of
Christians is ―suffer patiently when someone offends us rather than to use force and
violence‖ and that the weapons of Christians are ―prayer and gentleness in order to pass
their days.‖40 Calvin, however, rejects that the command in Matthew 5:39 implies such
withdrawal from socio-political affairs.
The Anabaptists not only interpret Matthew 5:39 to forbid individual Christians to
engage in political affairs, they also argue that with this command the juridical law in the
state is eradicated because the more perfect law, delivered by Jesus, is established in his
church. They say, ―We hold that the sword is an ordinance of God, outside the perfection
of Christ. Hence the princes and authorities of the world are ordained to punish the
wicked and to put them to death. But in the perfection of Christ, the ban is the heaviest
penalty, without corporal death.‖41 The Anabaptists consider Matthew 5:39 to have moral
significance beyond interpersonal relationship to institutional or super-individual
community relationship. While they concede the state must use weapon and violence,
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they universally condemn the use of weapon and violence by individual and institutional
because Jesus Christ has come and delivered a higher and more perfect law which
requires the dissolution of violence and the use of weapon.
Calvin explains that the Anabaptist acknowledgement that the state must use
violence but at the same time also condemn the use of violence is ―the convenient ruse‖
they use to show that they still ―honored principalities and lordships‖ so that they can
avoid the charge that they are ―forms of brigandage.‖42 Calvin argues against this and he
rebukes the Anabaptists that ―to condemn the public sword which God ordained for our
protection is a blasphemy against God himself.‖43 He argues that Jesus‘ command ―do
not resist an evil person‖ does not mean to ―mete out corporal punishment‖ because ―his
office is to forgive sins and to address His Word to the consciences of sinners.‖44 To
understand the basis of Calvin‘s argument, I will examine Calvin‘s concept of two
kingdoms.
C. A short analysis on Calvin’s concept of the two kingdoms
Calvin believes that there are two kingdoms or governments with distinct
purposes, yet that both are legitimate and divinely ordained. The spiritual kingdom
pertains to heavenly and eternal matters while the earthly kingdom educates citizens for
duties of citizenship and humanity.45 The civil government or magistrates govern the
earthly kingdom and the ecclesiastical government is to exercise authority over the
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spiritual kingdom. Calvin insists that to confuse these two kingdoms is to make an error
of large proportions. He explains:
By attending to this distinction, we will not erroneously transfer the doctrine of
the gospel concerning spiritual liberty to civil order, as if in regard to external
government Christians were less subject to human laws, because their consciences
are unbound before God, as if they were exempted from all carnal services,
because in regard to the Spirit they are free.46
In opposition to the Anabaptists, Calvin believes that the formation of the church in the
New Testament is not a testimony that the fallen created civic order is dispensable.
Christians are to live and participate in this earthly kingdom even though it means that
they live in a world infected with disorder.
For Calvin, the two kingdoms are so distinct that when people think about one
kingdom they should suspend their minds from thinking about the other. He explicitly
states that ―when the one is considered, we should call off our minds and not allow them
to think the other.‖47 There are at least two implications of this view. First, the spiritual
kingdom has nothing to do with earthly laws. This kingdom consists not in earthly
delights, but in renouncing the worldly temptations. Christians can endure the horrible
suffering of the present life because they know that the spiritual kingdom is only
concerned with the life of heaven.48 For now, Christians are pilgrims on earth,
maintaining hope in a heavenly kingdom. Second, since the spiritual kingdom is by
nature spiritual, Christians need not worry when Scripture fails to give guidelines about
civil matters. For example, since the New Testament is concerned with establishing the
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spiritual kingdom rather than civil polity, the New Testament does not give a warrant for
warfare. Calvin argues that the New Testament‘s silence is no objection to the legitimacy
of war.49 Christians need not think that the earthly kingdom must assume a particular
form in order for the spiritual kingdom may flourish. They may abide in all sorts of
earthly conditions without fear of separation from the spiritual kingdom.
The analysis of Calvin‘s view of the two kingdoms illumines the reason Calvin
does not interpret Jesus‘ command ―do not resist an evil person‖ to forbid Christians to
engage in social-political affairs. Calvin argues that Jesus does not condemn the use of
weapons, which is legitimate for the earthly kingdom. Instead, Jesus addresses the
matters of spiritual kingdom, namely, the evil desires and the corruption of people, who
make it necessary to use any weapon to retaliate, as demonstrated in taking a personal
vengeance. This two-kingdom concept also grounds Calvin‘s interpretation that Jesus
does not give laws to the earthly kingdom or political institutions in his antitheses. He
explains that Jesus ―did want to change anything about the government or the civil
order…He made his office, for which He came into the world, that of forgiving sins.‖50 In
contrast to the Anabaptists who consider the antithesis ―do not resist an evil person‖ not
only to govern the conduct of individuals but also of States, Calvin interprets the
antithesis only as an individual moral precept.
IV. The antitheses are binding on all people
I have shown in the previous section that Calvin, in contrast to the Anabaptists,
interprets the antitheses to yield moral precepts for individuals. In this section, I will first
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contrast Calvin‘s interpretation with the Roman Catholics of his era on the command
―love for enemies‖ (Matthew 5:43) to show that Calvin understands the moral precepts in
the antitheses as binding on all Christians. I will then examine Calvin‘s understanding of
morality to argue that the moral precepts in the antitheses are binding not only on
Christians but also on everyone.
A. The contrast on the interpretation of love for enemies
The Roman Catholics of his era, as Calvin points out, understand that Jesus‘
teaching ―love your enemies‖ (Matthew 5:43) is only an advice or a counsel (305). Since
―love your enemies‖ is only an advice, a person is free to obey or disobey it. Christians
are not obliged to observe it. The Roman Catholics argue for this interpretation because
they think this teaching is too heavy and burdensome for Christians to conform. They
only assign this as ―the necessary observance‖ to the monks, ―who were made more
righteous than ordinary Christians, by the simple circumstance of voluntarily binding
themselves to obey counsels.‖51
Calvin argues against this interpretation for three reasons. First, he explains that
there is no distinction in the Scripture itself between laws and counsels. He shows that
even in the Old Testament one is required, not advised, to love his or her enemies, such
as to feed them or bring back their ox or donkey if one meets it going astray (Proverbs
25:21; Exodus 23:4). Calvin says that the Scripture clearly establishes ―the Lord as a
Lawgiver, not falsely feign him to be merely a counselor.‖52
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Second, Calvin also argues that to distinguish between counsels and precepts on
the basis of human weakness is in itself a weak reason. Calvin recognizes that by nature
to obey God‘s law is difficult for fallen humans. It does not mean, however, that people
should make an excuse from this to determine ―what they owe to God and to his law‖
(305). The Roman Catholics of Calvin‘s era have made this mistake by interpreting the
teaching on ―love your enemies‖ on the basis of anthropological reason, namely, human
shortcomings. Since they think Jesus‘ teaching ―love your enemies‖ is a burden too
difficult for Christians to bear, it is not a law for all Christians to obey. In reply, Calvin
satirically asks them whether they should not also consider the teaching ―to love the Lord
with all the heart, and soul and strength‖ as an advice because ―compared with this Law,
there is none which may not seem easy, whether it be to love our enemy, or to banish
every feeling of revenge from our minds.‖53 In contrast to their anthropological approach,
Calvin interprets Jesus‘ teaching ―love your enemies‖ theologically. He argues that one
should not employ human shortcomings as an excuse to disobey God because ―the justice
of God ought to stand higher in our estimation, than all that we reckon most precious and
valuable‖ (291). If God remains to be God, human standard such as their shortcomings,
should not become God‘s standard. Calvin strengthens his case by arguing that Jesus‘
words ―but I say to you‖ in the antitheses can only mean ―I command‖ (306). He says,
―It is his to give what he orders, and to order what he wills.‖54 If the Roman Catholics of
Calvin‘s era identify ―love your enemies‖ merely as an advice or counsel, then they need
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to be consistent in their interpretation. Every teaching in the antitheses should be counsels
and not precepts.
Third, Calvin finally points out that the consequence of the Roman Catholics of
his era‘s distinction between counsel and precept on this antithesis is that ―monks alone
will dare to invoke God as their Father.‖55 The logic is simple. Matthew 5:45, ―that you
may be children of your Father in heaven‖ immediately follow Jesus‘ command on ―love
your enemy.‖ Calvin explains that Matthew 5:45 mean ―whoever shall wish to be
accounted a Christian, let him love his enemies‖ (306). If only monks are required to
observe this teaching, Calvin then argues that ―everyone who neglects it is struck out of
the number of the children of God‖ (306). The further outcome is that ordinary Christians
are basically ―confined to heathens and publicans‖56 because Jesus in Matthew 5:46-47
explains that if one does not observe the command in Matthew 5:44, one is not different
from tax-collectors and pagans.
B. Calvin’s theological understanding of morality
In contrast to the Roman Catholics of his era, Calvin interprets the antithesis ―love
your enemies‖ to bind all Christians. He rejects the distinction between counsels and
precepts. In order to show that his rejection is an expression of Calvin‘s belief that any
moral precept is binding not only to Christians but to everybody, I will now examine
Calvin‘s understanding of morality to relate his view on universal moral obligation to
Christian obligation.
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Calvin theologically assumes that the moral law is ―the testimony of natural law
and of that conscience which God has engraved on the minds of men.‖57 I will shortly
analyze two arguments in Calvin‘s description of the moral law. First, the moral law is
the testimony of natural law, namely, it testifies a moral standard imprinted by God in
human nature. Second, the moral law is the testimony of the conscience, a faculty which
God has engraved in human mind, whereby we gain some knowledge of the moral law.
After that, I will relate his view of this moral law to Christian obligation in the antitheses,
especially in the command ―love your enemies.‖
First, the moral law is the testimony of natural law because the moral law is ―the
true and eternal rule of righteousness prescribed to the men of all nations and of all
times.‖58 It is the law in God‘s created order according to which the entire natural-social
order is designed. The purpose for this law in creation is that ―we are all to worship him
[God] and mutually love one another.‖59 At the heart of God‘s created order is a social
design in which humans care for one another for the glory of God. Wherever humans
observe the moral law, the order of creation is exemplified since there sharing of goods,
services, and unimpeded communication among humans will come about.
Second, the moral law is the testimony of the conscience since it demonstrates the
internal witness of human conscience which reveals its Creator‘s moral righteousness.
Calvin explains that conscience is ―a kind of middle place between God and man, not
57
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suffering man to suppress what he knows in himself, but following him out until it bring
him to conviction.‖60 The moral law testifies to the engraving of God‘s law on the human
heart and mind. Calvin argues that the Decalogue is stamped on the human heart and thus
can be naturally known.61 Preaching on Deuteronomy 19:15, Calvin says: ―This law has
been admitted by men, without knowing that ever Moses spoke it. For indeed Our Lord
had printed the things in men‘s hearts, which he did set forth in writing to his people.‖62
Some scholars have noted this linking of conscience and natural law as one of the
distinguishing features of Calvin‘s natural law idea when compared to that of his
predecessors.63
By linking the moral law with the God‘s created order of nature and human
conscience, Calvin does not understand morality independent from God. He looks at
morality from above, so to speak, or theologically. The moral law reflects the moral
righteousness of its Giver. It also indicates the purpose or design for which human beings
are created. Humans ought to act according to the moral law because it expresses of what
humans are intended or designed to be by God.
Since Calvin understands morality theologically, it implies that his theory of
morality is a derivative theory in relation to a more inclusive theological design. While he
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does have a theory of morality, he is not interested in developing a self-contained or
independent theory of morality. Specifically, since Calvin is well aware of the fact that
humans are fallen, his theological concept of morality deals with humans being who are
in the state of rebellion against God. By all rights, human disobedience, represented by
Adam, should have been followed by ―the entire destruction of nature.‖64 Despite the
nature of human beings having been ―despoiled of the true good,‖65 as Calvin explains,
God‘s providence keeps humans from being entirely destitute of good. This is the reason
that the order of human relationship and society after the devastating effects of sin is still
preserved. Calvin says that in the perverted and degenerate nature of human beings ―there
are still some sparks.‖66 Certain vestiges remain to direct human action toward the good
and to enable humans at least faintly to distinguish that good from its opposite. Humans
even in their fallen state continue to posses – minimally, to be sure – some conscious
awareness of the demands of the moral law.
Calvin argues that while God sees to it that the essential social character of human
nature is maintained in their ―impressions of civil order and honesty,‖67 fallen humans
have no access to true community with God through morality. The knowledge of morality
for Calvin is not a saving knowledge. Fallen humans only know enough of the moral law
to maintain order in human society, to make them inexcusable before God‘s judgment
and to make them aware of their need for Christ. But because of their sin and corruption,
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they do not have a full and clear knowledge of God and his law so as to worship him
properly and to embrace Christ in faith.
For Calvin, the moral law not only deals with the social relations between human
beings (the second table) but also with our relations with God (the first table). The fallen
human conscience has hardly any understanding of the first table of the law. Its
knowledge of the second table, although certainly greater, is still very defective, subject
to vanity and error.68 The very fact that humans could simultaneously approve the second
table and then in specific instances reject portions of it ―inflamed with headlong passion‖
proves for Calvin ―the weakness of the human mind, which, even when it seems right on
the path, halts and hesitates.‖69 This is why Scripture is needed as the teacher and guide
to have saving knowledge of the true God, Christ, our Mediator, and to know the way of
life that is pleasing to God.70
Since the knowledge of morality is not a saving knowledge and sins have
corrupted human knowledge of God, Calvin prefers to view morality primarily with the
second table of the Decalogue. The first table ―teaches us how to cultivate piety, and the
proper duties of religion in which his worship consists‖ and the second table ―shows, how
in the fear of his name, we are to conduct ourselves towards our fellow-men.‖71 He
believes that humans in their fallen state with respect to the second table ―there is
considerably more knowledge of them, inasmuch as they are more closely connected with
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preservation of civil society.‖72 By being concerned primarily with the second table in
relation to human knowledge of morality Calvin prefers to discuss morality in terms of
one‘s relationships in society rather than one‘s standing before God.
I have explained that for Calvin morality is universal because it is part of created
order which humans are capable of knowing it naturally. He argues that even the
Decalogue is stamped on the human heart and thus can be naturally known. For Calvin
fallen human do have some knowledge of the moral law. But he insists that it is God who
implants this in the human heart. When there is any conformity of the moral law comes
from this natural knowledge with the one revealed in Scripture, it must be attributed to
God‘s preserving grace.73 The knowledge of morality is indeed not a saving knowledge;
though in God‘s providence, humans, by having this knowledge, keep the order in their
life from complete disintegration. I will now relate his view of the universality of
morality to Christian obligation in the antitheses, especially in the command ―love your
enemies.‖
On the surface, the command ―love your enemies‖ (Matthew 5:44) seems to only
oblige all Christians and not necessarily all people. Deeper than this, however, is Calvin‘s
understanding of morality which qualifies that the antitheses, including ―love your
enemies,‖ oblige all people. His concept of morality demonstrates that the Decalogue is
stamped in human hearts and can be known naturally. When Moses delivers the
Decalogue to the Israelites, the people of God, he does not deliver something that has no
basis in the created order. Similarly, when Jesus delivers the antitheses to Christians, the
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people of God, he does not deliver something in contrary to the created order. He only
corrects the misinterpretation in his era on the application of the moral law. This is the
theological-ethical reason behind Calvin‘s argument that the antithesis ―love your
enemies‖ (Matthew 5:44) is a universal moral precept ―which had formerly been
delivered to all the Jews‖ and then ―delivered universally to all Christians.‖74 It is a moral
precept which is binding on all people.
VI. Summary and assessments
A. Summary
For Calvin, the antitheses are moral precepts for individuals to practice. They deal
with individual relationships, in the intimate, immediately-adjacent circle of daily
relations and not with the larger question of the duties of social groups in the order of
politics. They apply only to individuals and not to States. They are also binding on all
people. They are not revealed in the Scripture because they are then hidden and now
made known only to specific people, such as Christians. Instead, they are revealed in the
Scripture because sin and corruption have crippled human capability to naturally know
the moral law God has already imprinted in human heart.
B. Assessments
Two positive assessments are in order. First, it would be a mistake to imply that
Calvin‘s view of the moral law, revealed in the Decalogue and in the antitheses, is an
example of a legalistic exposition of God‘s will to human beings. Georgia Harkness has
made this mistake by criticizing that Calvin ―conceived of the will of God in terms of
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biblical literalism and set up a moralistic code.‖75 While Calvin recognizes that moral
precepts, either in the Decalogue or in the antitheses, are binding on all people, he also
recognizes the importance of the example of Christ and the sanctifying work of the Holy
Spirit. This is shown when he puts together the work of Spirit and the teaching of Christ
in his exposition on Matthew 5:45: ―the same Spirit, who is the witness (Rom.8:16),
earnest (Eph.1:14) and seal (Eph.4:30) of our free adoption, corrects the wicked
affections of the flesh, which are opposed to charity‖ and ―Christ therefore proves from
the effect, that none are the children of God, but those who resemble him in gentleness
and kindness‖ (307). The significance of the moral law in the process of sanctification
should not be understood in the life of a Christian apart from the regenerating power of
the Holy Spirit. This qualification prevents, especially, Calvin‘s exposition of the
antitheses from becoming legalistic.
Second, Calvin does not interpret the antitheses in such a way which eventually
weaken their demands. Stadland-Neumann has accussed Calvin with this charge because
of his polemic against the Anabaptists. In his concluding remark, Stadland-Neumann says
that Calvin, in his eagerness to resist the Anabaptists, leans toward an ethical
indifferentism in reference to his interpretation of the antitheses in SM.76 StadlandNeumann is wrong because Calvin‘s realism flows from honest recognition of the
shameful reality of human continuing sins. He realizes that the moral precepts in the
antitheses are hard for fallen humans to obey. This recognition does not prevent him from
arguing that while the antitheses are hard for Christians to obey, with the help of the Holy
75
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Spirit they should make a beginning and make a daily progress toward that ideal Jesus
describes in the antitheses. These moral precepts are indeed hard to obey but this does not
mean that Christians should not obey them. He says in his exposition of Matt.5:31, ―God,
in prescribing a spiritual law, looked not at what men can do, but at what they ought to
do. It contains a perfect and entire righteousness, though we want ability to fulfill it‖
(292). The ideal of perfect obedience to the demands in the antitheses, for Calvin, is not
only a cause for hope for Christians to please God, but also serves to stimulate Christians
to strive constantly toward that ideal.
While Calvin recognizes that the antitheses are moral precepts for individuals to
practice, the next chapter will have a different approach from this. Helmut Thielicke will
argue that the intention of the antitheses is not for individuals to practice. Instead, they
are meant to bring despair to people of how hard for them to practice. As a consequence,
people will seek hope and can find grace in Jesus Christ.

CHAPTER FOUR: HELMUT THIELICKE ON THE ANTITHESES
I. Introduction
Born in December of 1908 in Barmen, Germany, Helmut Thielicke, a Lutheran
theologian, described his life (1908-86) emotively in the the title he chose for his
autobiography, Zu Gast auf einem schönen Stern.1 Included in his autobiography were his
dismissal from his teaching post by the Nazis, his church teaching and preaching during
the war, and his meetings and stories about many theologians, from arguments with Barth
and Bultmann to sketches of his post-war colleagues at Tübingen and Hamburg. In the
last paragraph, written about two years before he passed away, Thielicke concluded, ―We
are admittedly only guests on this beautiful planet, wayfarers on call and with sealed
orders in which the day and hour of our departure are recorded.‖2 Even though he was
only a guest on this beautiful planet, Thielicke was no passive passenger. Whatever his
Maker bestowed upon him, Thielicke grabbed enthusiastically. Especially, he faithfully
exercised the gift of rhetoric in his preaching. He received national attention for his
sermon primarily through his proclamation at St. Michaelis Church in Hamburg. There he
preached to groups of several thousand people.
Thielicke‘s most widely read sermonic work is the book The Waiting Father.3 It is
through this book his popularity among the general public in the United States begins. H.
George Anderson explains that Thielicke is popular through his sermons because of ―his
ability to meet a spiritual hunger among well-educated people who found the typical
1
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sermonic fare of the 1950s less than satisfying.‖4 Billy Graham‘s revival camps could not
address many church members and academics who find Graham‘s appeal too simplistic.
Other preachers of the 50s, like Norman Vincent Peale, emphasized too much positive
thinking and as a result disregard human struggles with God, like the ones recorded in
Scripture. Thielicke‘s sermons were widely accepted because he filled the void between
revivalism and religious self-help.
Even though Thielicke is best known in the United States for his many learned
sermons, he is a major theologian in his own right. His three volumes Theological Ethics5
and three volumes systematic theology (The Evangelical Faith6) still reward careful
reading. In fact, Geoffrey W. Bromiley testifies that Thielicke ―has been disconcerted
rather than flattered that his incidental activity [as a preacher] became the basis of his
reputation‖ in the United States, rather than his theological works.7 Be that as it may be,
Thielicke understands that theologians and preachers should be able to dialogue with
common people. This is evident when he writes A Little Exercise for Young Theologians
in which he sends out a call to theologians and preachers to reclaim the task of seeking
theological excellence and community responsibility.8 This concern for common people
allows Kenneth Vaux to comment that Thielicke ―has been the preacher's theologian of
our generation‖ and he believes that as a preacher‘s theologian Thielicke ―has been to the
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modern German society and language what Luther was to the 16th century—the shaper
of the popular idiom, conviction and value.‖9
Thielicke‘s lifelong concern that theologians should be able to address common
people in their doing theology is also evident in his handling of the Sermon on the Mount
(SM). He not only presents his theological understanding of SM in the first volume of his
Theological Ethics,10 but he also provides the practical treatment of SM in his sermons,
Life Can Begin Again.11 As Thielicke became more well-known, there have been some
studies on his preaching and ethics.12 I would like to advance the scholarship on
Thielicke in his understanding of SM in general and of the antitheses in particular. In this
chapter, I will examine Thielicke‘s exposition of the antitheses in the SM and argue two
things. First, Thielicke understands the antitheses primarily function as usus elenchticus
to show human helplessness in keeping the laws and reveal their sin. Second, he extends
this usus elenchticus of the antitheses beyond individuals to States.
9
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II. The usus elenchticus of the antitheses
To examine Thielicke‘s idea of the usus elenchticus of the antitheses, I will first
study his understanding of the law in general and then specifically his treatment of the
three uses of the law.
A. Thielicke’s understanding of the law
Thielicke argues that ―the doctrine of the Law must always be viewed against the
background of the fall.‖13 Whatever one says theologically concerning the nature of the
law must take its standpoint from the Pauline statement that the law is ―added because of
transgressions‖ (Galatians 3:19). To understand the law in this way implies two things.
First, there is a distinction between God‘s will in the creation and in the fallen world.
Second, the law has significance only for a particular historical epoch within the salvation
history, that is, only for the fallen world.
A1. From Gebot to Gesetz
Since the law must always be understood from the background of the fall, then the
law for Thielicke is ―the will of God as altered by the fallen world.‖14 The law cannot be
identified with the will of God viewed from the standpoint of the creation. Thielicke, as a
consequence, distinguishes between the command or the original will of God for creation
(Gebot) and the law of God for a fallen world (Gesetz). He contrasts Genesis 1:28 and
9:1ff to illustrate the distinction between Gebot and Gesetz : ―If biblical evidence is
sought for this ‗refraction‘ of the divine nomos through the medium of this aeon,
reference may be made to the way the command [Gebot] of God in creation (Gen.1:28) is
changed into the law [Gesetz] of the Noachic covenant which has reference to the fall
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(Gen.9:1ff).‖15 There is an obvious similarity in those two passages. They both display
God‘s will for humankind to fill the earth. The will of God in the second instance
(Genesis 9:1ff), however, is followed by a different situation. Fear and dread are also
brought in during the exercise of human dominion on earth while in Genesis 1:28 nothing
is mentioned about them. Thielicke interprets this different situation to show that the
command of God (Gebot) has become the law of God (Gesetz) in the fallen world. One
cannot understand the law in the fallen world simply as the ―will‖ of God. Instead, the
law is God‘s will as it pertains in the ―refracted‖ light of human particular situation. In
Genesis 9:1ff, in contrast to Genesis 1:28, humans fill the earth and exercise their
dominion through the fear and dread of other creatures on earth. The will of God for
humans to fill the earth is refracted by the particular situation in the fallen world, namely,
the fear and dread of other creatures toward human beings.
Thielicke further qualifies that we should not think the refraction or modification
of God‘s will in the fallen world in the sense that ―man through the fall has forced God to
abandon his original plan.‖16 He argues that God alone is the author of this modification.
The change is a sign of his ―gracious condescension.‖17 God undertakes this action in the
freedom of grace. God could have chosen to do otherwise. Instead, he has chosen to stoop
down to meet human beings on their own level. There would be only condemnation if
God requires humankind, in their fallen state, to keep up with the original God‘s will in
the creation. In Thielicke‘s own words: ―If God were to maintain unswervingly the
original command, if in his grace he did not reach out to us in the particular
15
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circumstances of our fallen state…an intolerable situation would arise, and the
unmodified command of creation would cause real misery.‖18 It is the miracle of God‘s
gracious refusal to let human beings perish.
Thielicke demonstrates more fully the distinction between Gebot and Gesetz in
his treatment of divorce.19 He explains that the allowance of divorce in the Mosaic law
(Matthew 19:1-12) does not correspond to the original command of God in creation.
Originally, the marriage should be permanent. In the fallen world, however, the presence
of sin makes divorce a regulation of necessity. ―It is clear that the legal ordinance of
divorce is a mark of ‗this aeon,‘‖ says Thielicke.20 Because humans live in the fallen
world, legal divorce is a poignant necessity. Since the legal ordinance of divorce is
necessary in the fallen world as a refraction or modification of God‘s original will in the
creation, this regulation should never be seen as the true will of God.
Thielicke interprets Jesus‘ reminder of God‘s original will in the creation, namely,
the indissolubility of marriage (Matthew 19:6), as a call to repentance addressed to those
who are subject to the legal ordinances of divorce in this fallen world.21 The law of
divorce is adapted to fit human‘s ―hardheartedness‖ (cf. Matthew 19:8). As a result, if
humans take the law as the standard of their understanding of themselves, they would not
be orienting themselves upon the original will of God. They would be in a very dubious

18

Thielicke, TE 1, 148.

19

Thielicke, TE 3, 101-98.

20

Thielicke, TE 3, 109. Here I have a slightly different understanding of the law of divorce in
Matt.19 from Thielicke. He perceives the law of divorce in the passage as a moral law for all humanity. I
prefer to perceive more literally the law as a civil law of Israel. There Jesus argues against the people of
Israel who take pride of their civil ordinances and by obeying them they think they have satisfied God‘s
demands. As a consequence, they forget the original will of God appropriated by those civil laws.
21

Thielicke, TE 3, 164.

76
way overlooking the fact that they do not satisfy God‘s will and that God says ―no‖ to
their life as it is. Jesus‘ call to repentance is, as Thielicke points out, ―a calling to
remembrance of God‘s ‗real‘ order of creation.‖22 It is intended to startle humans out of
their self-chosen defenses and to testify the fallen nature of human beings and the broken
relationship of this fallen world and its ordinances to the original will of God.
A2. Gesetz is only for the fallen world
The law (Gesetz) is the command of God modified by God for the fallen world.
The command of God (Gebot) can never become the law of this fallen world because it is
not at all suited to function as law in a fallen world. This also means that when Jesus
proclaims the original command or will of God (Gebot), such as in Matt.19:6, it cannot
mean that ―it is to take place of these legal ordinances, or better, that it is now to
constitute a new law, a new code.‖23 In other words, the meaning and purpose of the
revelation of Gebot in Scripture is the call to repentance. The summons back to the
original will of God in creation is not to eliminate or to replace but to relativize the legal
structures of the fallen world. As one can recognize sin itself only against the background
of the unblemished creation, so one can recognize the law which refers to sin only against
the background of the pure command of creation. Thielicke illustrates this using the
parable of the prodical son (Luke 15:11-32): ―We must see to it – as the Bible repeatedly
does – that the son remains aware of this approach, that he always views the Law which
prevails in the far country (this does not mean simply whatever is the law of the land

22

Thielicke, TE 3, 164.

23

Thielicke, TE 3, 165.

77
there!) against the background of the true Law which obtains in the father‘s house.‖24 The
law which pertains to the fallen world must always be put into contrast with the
command of God in creation. In this manner, the law must be understood ―in terms of its
particular locus in salvation history.‖25 For Thielicke, since the law is historically and in
terms of its very substance connected with sin, the particular epoch within salvation
history for which the law has significance is ―the interim between the fall and the last
judgment.‖26 In other words, the law is only for the fallen world.
As a consequence, Thielicke opposes the idea of the law as timeless moral
precepts since it will make the law no longer rooted in history. As he explains, ―with
respect to the Law there is no such thing as a continuum stretching from the beginning of
creation across this interim to the eschaton; there is no such thing as a legal norm which
could be neutral or indifferent toward differences in time, and hence itself timeless.‖27
The law has significance only for a particular historical time namely that of the fallen
world, over against the law of another time, the original state of creation. The notion of
moral precepts imbedded in the creation order since the creation of the world, or the
natural law, is not correct according to Thielicke. He argues that to apply the laws within
the original creation before the fall to the completely different world after the fall is
unreasonable. In order for the argument to be reasonable, as Thielicke points out, one
must assume all conceptions of the natural law based on the presupposition that the fall
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has only ―a comparatively accidental but not an essential significance.‖28 In other words,
for Thielicke, to assume God‘s laws revealed in the fallen world, for example the
Decalogue, as already imbedded in the creation order since the beginning, is to take the
fall lightly. One should instead regard the fall as a reality which characterizes human
existence in its totality in which the imperfection of this existence is a complete
qualitative revolt against God and not just some quantitative failures to reach any norm.
This does not mean that one should do away with the question of timeless moral
precepts. Thieliecke refuses to link this impulse to ask about timeless moral precepts with
his rejection of timeless moral precepts itself. He allows that one raises such question
because even when asked apart from faith, the question of timeless precepts is an antidote
to the worst consequences of pride. This question conveys a kind of involuntary
confession that, living in this fallen world, the good is something which has to be sought.
The fallen world, being incompatible with the will of God, can no longer produce the
good from within itself. The reason is because, in intention at least, its quest always
reaches out beyond humankind. When genuinely put, the question leads one to
repentance. To be sure, it can be genuinely put only when man recognizes the distance
between the will of God and the orders of this fallen world.29 When one contrasts a
Gesetz with its Gebot, one sees the very existence of that Gesetz as a sign of one fallen
nature. In the above example of divorce Thielicke gives, the contrast between the Gesetz
of divorce with the Gebot of marriage allows one to see that not only divorce but even the
legal allowance of divorce is questionable. This call to repentance functions as a
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―warning and preservative‖30 to prevent indiscriminate divorce, which might be allowed
by the Gesetz.
B. Thielicke and the three uses of the law
The contrast between Gesetz and Gebot reveals that the law to be part of this
fallen world. While one should not confuse the command of God with the law of God,
when one contrasts the law of God in the fallen world with the command of God in the
creation, the contrast between the two brings forth a call to repentance. A brief look at the
notion of three uses of law will further clarify Thielicke‘s understanding of usus
elenchticus of the law (Gesetz).
In the Reformed tradition, the law of God is frequently perceived as having three
different functions. First, in its ―accusing role,‖ or usus elenchticus, the law gives the
knowledge of sin. Second is the political or civil use of the law. In its third use the law
gives believers knowledge of God‘s will so they know how to live in gratitude. Thielicke
sees usus elenchticus as the primary use of the law. While he recognizes that there are
other two uses of the law, he explains the other two uses of the law from the perspective
of the first use.
B1. Thielicke and the first use of the law (the theological use)
Thielicke argues that the true function of the law is ―to serve as ‗gauze in the
wound.‘‖31 The accusing role of the law serves to remind humankind of their fallen
nature and their need for redemption. Thielicke illustrates more clearly this role of law in
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the framework of salvation history, ―which God pursues with us in Law and Gospel.‖32
Thielicke explains the relationship between law and gospel in this salvation history as
follows:
This history, being on the one hand the action of the author of the Law towards
us, confronts us in the first place with the impossibility of every good, and with
the absolute incompatibility of our existence with the command of God. But since
it is just as much as the action of the author of the Gospel towards us, this history
in addition imparts to us for and the possibility of living before God in new
obedience.33
In the salvation history, as Thielicke understands it, the law mainly has the function of
disclosing what is wrong with human existence. The law gives the knowledge of sin
necessary for repentance, but only the gospel gives the hope necessary to cope with this
self-knowledge of sin which may lead humans into the depths of despair.
B2. Thielicke and the second or civil use of the law
Thielicke understands that the civil use of the law has to do with the preservation
of society from destruction. The preservation Thielicke has in mind is the physical
preservation of the world: ―that God will not send another flood, that he will not destroy
the human race physically, e.g., by giving it up to the chaotic forces latent within it (in
the sense of Romans 1:24).‖34 In this function, the law has nothing to do with anything
spiritual and can be exercised through the laws of society which apply regardless of a
person‘s relation to God. Because of this, God can remain anonymous although he is its
author. Thielicke explains that ―the civil or criminal code is in force whether I know the
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legislator personally or only indirectly, and whether I approve or disapprove of his
intentions.‖35
Since the law must be viewed within the background of the fall, Thielicke
clarifies that the civil use of law should not to be construed merely as the preservation of
a certain structure given the world at creation. He argues against the preservation of
existence in terms of orders of creation: ―There is here no place for the idea that there are
certain basic laws which are immanent in the cosmos since creation, and which must be
maintained if the world is not to perish.‖36 Instead, he explains that the civil use of the
law is the result of God‘s patience. He says, ―The relation to God to which the usus
politicus points consists in the fact that God in his patience gives order even to disordered
man, who since the fall has turned against God and thus brought himself into jeopardy.‖37
In his patience, God prevents fallen humankind to a total self-destruction.
Thielicke acknowledges that the civil use of law possesses a universal character in
terms of ―the technique of exercising power, the mechanics of operating the government
and preserving the form of rule and organization.‖38 He further argues, however, that the
moment one considers ―the intention‖ present in the civil use of law, ―this is very
different among Christians on the one hand and pagans on the other.‖39 This does not
mean to point to a very distinctive way of existence, like to establish Christian states or
Christian economies. What Thielicke means here is that for Christians, because of their
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recognition of God as the author of law, the intention behind the law in its civil use is ―a
constant and necessary reminder.‖40 It reminds Christians that there are still any
unredeemed spheres whose relation to God of judgment and grace remains unrecognized
or disregarded. Because they know the true function of the civil use of the law, they
should also remind non-Christians of the fact that when people can appropriate law in its
civil use without recognizing its Author demonstrates that even civil sphere is in need of
cleansing. ―The task of the usus politicus for the Christian is,‖ as Thielicke explains, ―to
remind us of this fact.‖41
It is in being a reminder for Christians that Thielicke relates the civil use of the
law from the perspective of its accusing role or usus elenchticus. He argues that the
church has the task to show the fallen world that the civil use of law is more than for the
sake of world betterment:
It is the task of the church, particularly in its preaching of the Law and in its office
as watchman, to show how questionable is the thing thus demonstrated [the
attempts for world betterment]. In this proclamation, in the preaching of
repentance to itself and to the world, there must be heard the cry that the ax is laid
to the trees (Luke 3:9), that this world which vacillates between God Satan,
between obedience and hypocrisy, between longing for redemption (Rom.8:19)
and rejection of it, between the service of God and self-love, that this world lives
only by the longsuffering of God, and that by his grace and patience alone for the
façade of this crumbling world order may at the same time be a circumscription, a
surety, and – however faulty – a representation of God‘s true order.42
The world is not getting more peaceful even though geniuses may have formulated their
best political and economic plans. ―It would not be difficult to recount from recent
history dreadful illustrations of the ‗unredeemed‘ and autonomous sphere of political,‖
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says Thielicke.43 People are still longing for true peace. Why is that? Thielicke‘s answer
is that the civil use of law points to something greater than merely attempts to make the
fallen world a better place to live. It points to God‘s salvation at work in the physical
existence of human beings.
Thielicke‘s choice of the first or theological use of law as the primary use informs
him to arrive at the conclusion that the civil use of law does not have the physical
safeguarding of social structures as an end in itself. The civil use of the law indeed
displays God‘s patience, but more importantly it provides ―the provision of a physical
basis for the sphere of repentance.‖44 For Thielicke, this is the proper basis for the civil or
political use of law: ―The usus politicus legis [the political use of law]…has its basis here
and here alone, in its reference to the goal of salvation, not in an order of creation but in
the order of salvation, not in the origin of the world but in the goal set for the world.‖45 In
its civil use, the law should remind humans of their fallen nature and their need of
redemption. ―If we are preserved by the divine commandments, not for own sake, but for
the sake of this sonship,‖ says Thielicke.46 God in his patience preserves the structures of
the fallen world with the law primarily to provide a physical sphere in which humankind
may receive the salvation of God from the peril of their fallen nature.
In its accusing role, the law functions to lead people to recognize their sinful
nature and their need of redemption. In its political or civil use, the law comprises
external works and has nothing to do with anything spiritual. Regardless of one‘s relation
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to God, all people can exercise this function of law through any positive law in society.
Thielicke argues further, however, that for Christians, who recognize the true author of
the law, even in its political/civil use the law still retains its accusing role. It is the task of
Christians to inform non-Christians of their fallen nature and need of redemption using
the law in this second function. The next issue Thielicke addresses is the third use of law,
that is, the use of law in the life of believers.
B3. Thielicke and the third use of the law
Does the law cease to function when one become Christian? To understand
Thielicke‘s answer to this question, I will examine his appropriation of Luther‘s doctrine
of simul justus et peccator: the three perspectives within justification.47 The first
perspective is to look away from oneself. In this perspective, one looks to God as the
object of one‘s faith, to the God who justifies in Christ. Since one looks away from one‘s
sinful nature and only looks to Christ who justifies, one is freed from the curse of the law.
Second is to look at oneself. In this perspective, the law functions its accusing role to the
fullest. The law leads one into despair because one is confronted by the persistent fallen
nature of human beings. External righteous works cannot help and even crumble in one‘s
hands. Here one stands before the eyes of the divine Judge. The third and last perspective
deals with one‘s looking back to oneself as one whom God justifies. One still looks at
oneself. This look, however, no longer plunges one into despair. Instead, this perspective
of looking back to oneself again as one justified drives one to repentance. The repentance
Thielicke has in view here is the repentance within the faith, not the repentance prior to
faith. As he explains:
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The ―Woe to me!‖ turns into an imperative, specifically the imperative associated
with the indicative (―nothing can separate me any longer from the love of God‖).
This third perspective thus places me at what for me is not the end, but the
beginning, the point from which I have to advance.48
In other words, while the law still retains its accusing role, in the case of the justified
ones, its accusing role no longer brings them to despair but it now becomes ―a loving
reminder‖ of their unredeemed areas which need to be cleansed.49
A loving reminder is Thielicke‘s answer to the issue of the third use of the law or
the continuing pedagogic significance of the law for Christians. As a loving reminder, the
law retains its significance because even the justified ones in their life on this fallen
world are always imperfect. As Thieliecke explains, ―That the Law continues to serve an
educational function even in the justified is obvious in light of the fact that our
Christianity is never something complete and finished but is constantly in process of
becoming.‖50 This does not mean that the law now functions to perfect Christians.
Instead, it functions to point Christians to ―specific areas in which the question of
obedience is acute.‖51 Thielicke understands obedience here as something already given
to Christians in their state of justification.
At this point, one needs to look at Thielicke‘s distinction between the
―qualitative‖ and ―quantitative‖ aspects of justification.52 He does not talk about the
qualitative justification as a firm state in human perspective. Instead, the justification he
has in mind refers to God‘s perspective, that is, God‘s fixed manner of viewing the
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justified person. In this perspective, qualitative justification means a justified relationship
with God, a justified standing before God, that one either has or does not have, regardless
of how consistently one lives with that justification. If one is justified, then God
qualitatively ascribes total righteousness and perfect obedience to them. In contrast, the
quantitative aspect refers to how the justified consistently lives with his or her qualitative
justification. ―This way of viewing the matter has reference to progress in our
Christianity, to the process of maturing spiritually,‖ says Thielicke.53 While Thielicke
equates this quantitative justification with sanctification in Christian life, he argues that
sanctification is ―really in the strict sense only re-enactment, repetition.‖54 It is a
reenactment and a repetition of the point from which one has to advance because an entry
into the new being (a qualitative justification) already includes the whole: ―From the very
first, it is granted totally and unconditionally.‖55 Thielicke chooses to use the term ―to be
justified more and more‖ for Christians instead of to be sanctified more and more to
demonstrate how the justified more and more consistently lives with his or her qualitative
justification.56 The reason is because one‘s growth and progress are simply a constant
beginning. As Thielicke explains, ―my growth, progress, and becoming take place as I
constantly go back to the beginning.‖57 This does not mean that one needs to be
qualitatively justified again and again in order to advance. Instead, since one has been
qualitatively justified and thus receives total righteousness and perfect obedience, one
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now is able to advance. The advance one takes, however, must always be put in the
perspective of his or her qualitative justification. One can only mature in spiritual life
because one is justified once and for all.
Since obedience is something already included in one‘s qualitative justification,
Thielicke argues that the law for the justified people has ―a regulative significance,‖
namely, to remind them of the way in which their given obedience may be actualized.58
He gives the analogy of the stone lying in the sun to get warm.59 One does not command
the stone lying in the sun to get warm. For the stone to get warm under the sun is
something that just happen of itself. It is only an actualization of the law of nature:
something gets warm when it is heated. As in this case of a law in nature, when
Christians obey the law, they only actualize the perfect obedience already given in their
justification. As Thielicke explains:
It is in this sense that, for the justified, special significance attaches to the fact that
the law of God is not simply done away, but retains its validity. The justified man
must inquire of the particular laws whether and how far he has really given
attention to the actualization of his faith in the particular spheres of life.60
Since Christians are not yet perfect in this fallen world, the law is still significant. It
lovingly indicts them of the unredeemed parts of their life and gently tells them to always
learn to apply their given obedience, their justification, to every sphere of their life. In
short, for Thielicke the law in its third use demonstrates that ―its imperatives tell me to be
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in all life‘s dimensions what I am indicatively: a justified man living now by
justification.‖61
Strictly speaking, the first or theological use of the law allows one to receive the
qualitative justification and the third use of the law, from the perspective of the first use,
allows the justified one to exercise their quantitative justification. This shows that for
Thielicke the law functions primarily in its theological use for both non-Christians and
Christians. The similarity lies in its indictment for both Christians and non-Christians of
their fallen nature and their need of redemption. The difference lies in that while for nonChristians the indictment may bring them to despair, for Christians it may take them to
advance in their spiritual life. As Thielicke describes:
There are thus two relations to the Law, and two ways in which the Law is valid.
There is first the Law which drives us, which judges and accuses us; from this
Law we are delivered. Then there is also the Law to whose fulfillment we are
impelled by the Holy Spirit, as those for whom Jesus Christ has already fulfilled
the Law and who now live in a new bondage (Rom. 6:16).62
He also illustrates the relationship between the first and the third use of the law in the
analogy of a sheep dog and a wolf. He says, ―For in performing its task, in reminding us
continually of things omitted and forgotten, it no longer kills us. Instead it is friendly; it
helps us. After all, the sheep dog is anything but a wolf. The wolf kills; the dog tries to
protect us from it.‖63 As it will be shown below, Thielicke demonstrates this theologial
use (usus elenchticus) of the law in his interpretation of the antitheses.
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C. Thielicke’s exposition of the antitheses
Thielicke provides through his sermons the exposition of the antitheses. There are
three sermons which directly deal with the antitheses: ―The Costs of Grace‖ (Matthew
5:17-32),64 ―Every Word an Oath‖ (Matthew 5:33-37),65 and ―No Retaliation!‖ (Matthew
5:38-48).66 In each of this sermon, Thielicke appropriates his understanding of theologial
use (usus elenchticus) of the law in order to show that through the antitheses Jesus
invokes his hearers their helplessness in keeping the laws and their need for redemption:
for non-Christians, their qualitative justification, and for Christians, their quantitative
justification.
C1. ―The Costs of Grace‖ (Matthew 5:17-32)
In his sermon ―The Costs of Grace,‖ Thielicke argues that Jesus, in his
relationship to the law of Moses in the Old Testament, does not come to abolish the law
of prohibiting murder, adultery and divorce, but instead he makes ―its profoundest threat
apparent.‖67 Not only Jesus makes it clear to his hearers that God‘s demand lays claim
not only upon their outward actions but even the inward thoughts of their hearts.
Thielicke comments that in doing so Jesus makes the Law of Moses ―so radical that the
people‘s eyes filled with tears.‖68 The reason for that is to bring people to recognize their
hopelessness to perfectly obey the total demands of the law and thus recognize their
fallen nature. If Jesus does not demonstrate the law in all its radical demands, which
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covers both outward actions and outward desires, then, as Thielicke points out, people are
in danger of deluding themselves and imagining that they are never ―really so badly
wounded and sick after all.‖69
Thielicke first qualifies that Jesus demonstrates this severity of law as a kind of
introduction to discipleship.70 One needs to realize his or her sinful nature through the
threat of law in its theological use so that one may further recognize the need for a savior.
This accusing role of the law, however, does not stop even after God calls that person his
child. Thielicke then adds that ―there is a danger of being sure of forgiveness before one
has become insecure because of one‘s sins.‖71 In the life of Christians, the accusing role
functions to show them two things. First, it reminds them that they are still sinners. There
is always room for them to advance and grow. Second, this constant accusation allows
Christians to always depend on God‘s constant acceptance of their condition because of
his grace. This will preserve them from pride and carelessness based on workrighteousness.
C2. ―Every Word an Oath‖ (Matthew 5:33-37)
Thielicke interprets Jesus‘ saying ―do not swear at all‖ to reveal that an oath in
itself testifies the nature of fallen human. Swearing an oath makes the fallen human
nature obvious because an oath is an exception and an expectation in this fallen world.
An oath is an exception that testifies human fallen nature because when one, in
taking an oath, soberly ―disassociate by means of an oath‖ a particular statement from
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ordinary and everyday utterances.72 This implies that the oath is an exception from what
usually one does in life. One‘s everyday utterances do not have the same degree of
bindingness and earnestness which one now wants to emphasize by taking an oath. In
other words, one needs only be sincere in taking an oath and not in everyday speech.
An oath, as an expectation that testifies human fallen nature, is manifest because
in this fallen world ―there are cases in which one does not have to speak the truth, cases
in which they may be a mental reservation‖ such as white lies.73 Those words uttered in
white lies are not to be taken seriously and have lost their specific gravity. Taking an oath
is expected in this fallen world since otherwise people will not weigh every word
carefully.
In short, Thielicke preaches Jesus‘ ―do not swear at all‖ to mean two things. First,
he interprets by this saying Jesus reminds his hearers that they are fallen people of
unclean lips. This is evident because fallen people employ oaths to disassociate
themselves from their reckless ordinary speeches. Second, this saying does not mean that
one should not take oath at all. Instead, when one swears an oath, one is reminded that an
oath is ―a temporal necessity‖ which is expected in this fallen world. Otherwise, in a
world shot through with lies there will be no area in this world which is marked off by
way of exception the truth is to be told. God allows people to take an oath because of his
condescending patience to prevent chaos caused by lies and rumors in this fallen world.
Understood from the perspective of the fallen world, specifically an oath as an
exception and expectation in this fallen world, Thielicke argues that this saying will strike
someone with a knowledge of his or her ―own lostness‖ which allow one to cry out in
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awe and confession: ―Lord, I am a human of unclean lips.‖74 Jesus‘ ―do not swear at all‖
for Thielicke reveals the sacredness of human word which has been depraved in this
fallen world. It is sacred because ―the Last Judgment will concern itself with them and
will surprise us with a precise enumeration of every careless word we have uttered
(Matt.12:36).‖ 75 This fact allows one to recognize his or her fallen nature and the need
for the Word made flesh for their redemption. Even after they become the children of
God, the fact that they may still take an oath testifies that they still have areas which need
to be redeemed in terms of taking their words seriously in their ordinary lives. In
Thielicke‘s own words, ―whenever we demean our human speech to the level of stupid
drivel and deceit and thus empty it of any weight, we are nothing less than throwing off
from our words this precious burden of the Savior and consigning him to a second
death.‖76
C3. ―No Retaliation!‖ (Matthew 5:38-48)
Thielicke begins the sermon by laying out the impression one may get from this
passage. It is as if Jesus is describing an utterly different world from which one now
lives. This sense of otherworldliness of the passage seems to make Jesus indulges in
―visionary daydreams, unreal and alien to this world.‖77 Thielicke argues that the fact this
passage seems to describe a world that is not possible to have in this world we are now
living even demonstrates that humans ―absolutely cannot fulfill this command of Jesus‖
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and that this world we are now living is ―lost and estranged from God.‖78 The antitheses
of this passage demonstrate an indictment of the fallen world.
The indictment is not at all about liquidating all law and order with one mighty
principle, ―love your enemy.‖ In this passage Jesus seems to challenge the completely
legal and recognized juridical ordinances of the fallen world, namely, the counterbalance
of values and reparation. If that is the case, then Jesus proposes chaos and anarchy.
Thielicke argues against such interpretation. He interprets instead that in this passage
Jesus is talking about the incapability of human law and justice to regulate ―our relation
to our neighbor as God wants it to be.‖79 The law of justice is still needed but only as a
regulation of necessity, which is necessary in the fallen world, to prevent chaos and
anarchy.
The knowledge of how fallen this world from what God originally intended to be
brings people to acknowledge their fallen nature and their need of redemption. Moreover,
for Christians, who have received that work of redemption, such knowledge also brings
them to recognize the area of human relationship which needs to be redeemed, especially,
one‘s relation to his or her neighbor as God wants it to be. For example, Thielicke argues
that to turn the other cheek (Matthew 5:39) does not mean that Christians are weak or
coward. They turn the other cheek because they practice to be concerned with the
spiritual well-being of other people. As Thielicke says, ―In this world we Christians have
our eyes opened to see that all who make life hard for us and all who give us a sour
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reaction are dearly bought and paid for by Jesus Christ.‖80 Like God is concerned with
Christians and redeem them even when they are still in enmity with him, a Christian is
concerned with non-Christians for their salvation even if he or she has the right to
retaliate them. All of them, friends and enemies, the good and the bad, are beloved and
straying children of the Father in heaven who is seeking them.
III. The socio-political implication of the antitheses
Thielicke argues that the radicalness of the antitheses brings humans to realize
their incapabilities to obey God‘s laws so that they may realize their sinful nature and
need of a Savior. The usus elencthicus of the law Thielice appropriates in his
understanding of the antitheses allows him to apply the demands of the antitheses to all
people, non-Christians for their qualitative justification and Christians for their
quantitative justification. This section will deal with the question whether the antitheses
are then restricted only to address individuals concerning their sinful nature. Or, do they
also address the super-individual entities, such as political governments or States? Based
on his appropriation of Martin Luther‘s two kingdoms, Thielicke argues the demands in
the antitheses do not only address individuals but also super-individual entities. A brief
review of Martin Luther‘s two kingdoms is first in order.
A. A brief review of Martin Luther’s two kingdoms
One may find Martin Luther‘s significant articulation of a two kingdom doctrine
in his treatise ―Temporal Authority,‖ of October 1522.81 The two kingdoms doctrine,
however, is not exclusively Martin Luther‘s teaching. One is justified, as Franz Lau
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observes, in looking upon the doctrine as a common Reformation teaching.82 Similar to
Luther, Calvin speaks of two kingdoms when he deals with the civil kingdom in chapter
20 of the fourth book in his Institutes of 1559. David VanDrunen has further
demonstrated the teaching as an expression of Luther‘s approach to the Christian‘s
relation to the broader world that draws from the Christian tradition such as Augustine‘s
two cities. Reminiscent of Augustine, Luther draws a stark contrast between two people
in two kingdoms, the one marked by righteousness, the Spirit, and the lack of any need
for the physical sword, and the other marked by wickedness and the dire need for the
sword if any outward peace is to be maintained.83
At the beginning in his treatise on ―Temporal Authority,‖ Luther divides the
human race into two classes, those belonging to the kingdom of God and those belonging
to the kingdom of the world. The former, he explains, need neither law nor sword, but the
latter do and are under their authority. 84 God has ordained two governments in order to
establish his rule in these two kingdoms. The purpose of the spiritual government is for
the Holy Spirit to produce righteous Christians under the rule of Christ and the purpose of
the temporal government is for restraining the wicked by the temporal sword. Luther
states that ―one must carefully distinguish between these two governments‖ and yet
affirm the existence of both, one to produce righteousness and the other to maintain
―external peace‖ and ―prevent evil deeds.‖85
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Luther further explores in the second part of the treatise how far temporal
authority extends. His principal claim is that temporal authority can enact laws only that
―extend no further than to life and property and external affairs on earth, for God cannot
and will not permit anyone but himself to rule over the soul.‖86 This implies that Luther
does not treat temporal authority as an autonomous realm. He allows civil rulers to
exercise their sword only within justice and within the limits of their authority.
To be sure, Christians are indeed under a spiritual government that does not bear
the sword. They still live, however, in the fallen world and therefore they together with
non-Christians are under a temporal government that indeed uses the sword to keep order
among the wicked. Luther explains that though Christians have no use of the sword
among themselves, they submit to its rule in this fallen world and even do all that they
can to help the civil authorities, in order to benefit others and not for the purpose of their
own vengeance. He even rebukes that if a Christian is not willing to serve for common
good, then he or she ―would be acting not as a Christian but even contrary to love.‖87
This, claims Luther, brings harmony to the Christian‘s life in both kingdoms: ―No
Christian shall wield or invoke the sword for himself and his cause. In behalf of another,
however, he may and should wield it and invoke it to restrain wickedness and to defend
godliness.‖88 Luther thus makes clear that the temporal authority, which executes the
legal and coercive government of the earthly kingdom, brings both Christians and nonChristians under its sway.
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The above brief review of Luther‘s two kingdoms suggests that his teaching is not
about two separate and unrelated kingdoms, but rather about two different types of divine
activity within one kingdom, namely, the kingdom of God. Craig L. Nessan finds it
valuable to refer Luther‘s teaching as ―two strategies.‖89 God employs two strategies to
work out his salvation on this fallen world in order to establish his kingdom. The first
strategy or the spiritual kingdom involves the proclamation of the gospel of Jesus Christ
and the administration of the Holy Sacraments of baptism and the Lord‘s Supper. The
second one or the earthly kingdom involves the establishment of just order in society
through the institutions of the State, economy, laws and politics.
These two types of divine activity also imply that Luther‘s teaching of two
kingdoms simply expresses the fact that human beings must occupy two distinct positions
in their relationship to God. As Robert Kolb and Charles Arand put it, using Luther‘s
language, ―into theses [two kingdoms] we place the two kinds of righteousness, which
are distinct and separate from each other.‖90 In the earthly kingdom, the relationship is
indirect (humankind‘s relationship to God‘s creation), while in the spiritual kingdom, it is
direct (humankind‘s relationship to God). To be more specific, one‘s engagement in the
earthly kingdom does not pertain to salvation, unlike his or her engagement in the
spiritual kingdom.
B. Thielicke’s appropriation of Luther’s two kingdoms
Thielicke appropriates Luther‘s teaching of the two kingdoms without any
principal discrepancy. He agrees that Luther in his two kingdoms doctrine does not teach
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individuals to have a double standard of ―official‖ and ―personal‖ morality as if there
seems to be two distinct classes of human beings belonging either to the one kingdom or
to the other. Thielicke says that to misinterpret Luther‘s doctrine of two kingdoms in this
way will suggest that ―the Christian – who must also participate in the temporal kingdom
as a father or a mother, a citizen or a soldier – surrenders, as it were, the identifying
marks of his Christianity the moment he enters the worldly sphere.‖91 Christians, living in
the fallen world, should engage in civil affairs like the rest of the people. The distinction
is that they do not engage for the purpose of their own vengeance but instead for the
benefit of others and of civil order.
Since Luther‘s teaching of two kingdoms deals with two types of divine rule for
individuals, Thielicke rejects the idea of Eigengesetzlichkeiten (―laws unto themselves‖).
This idea suggests that two kingdoms doctrine implies that the world, human institutions,
politicians, and everyday people are free from the power and the laws of God because the
world has its own rules and ethical norms, which are produced by processes internal to
the world.92 Thielicke instead argues that the State is indeed ordained by God to repel
forces of chaos have been radically threatening the very existence of the world ever since
the fall. Because of that the state is a normative instrument in God‘s hand to protect
humanity against the destructive consequences of sin. This does not mean, however, that
the state has nothing whatever to do with God. Thielicke points out that the State or
politics, which are required in the fallen world, have meaning not in themselves but in
relation to the divine purpose toward which they are directed, namely, to preserve human
beings by restraining evil and to give humans the physical opportunity to attain to God‘s
91
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goal in salvation history. In other words, Thielicke believes that Luther‘s two kingdoms
doctrine demonstrate that the State does not exist simply as a necessity in the fallen
world. It is rather a ―gift‖ and a ―miracle‖ of God‘s preserving grace.93 Without it the
world would sink into the abyss of chaos.
God‘s purpose in the ordination of the state applies to all human beings. It is an
order to provide the space in which humans may repent. Accordingly, one should not
derive either the state or its norm from the Gospel or even from the Sermon on the
Mount. As Thielicke argues, one should expose himself or herself to ―the temptation of
confusing Law and Gospel, and of entertaining theocratic illusions.‖94 Moreover, none
but Christian is aware of this real purpose of the State. Thielicke claims that ―the
Christian has a relation to the state which differs not ontically or ethically but noetically
from that of the non-Christian.‖95 Christians recognize the fact of this relationship of the
state to God and to his preserving grace. This awareness allows them to assess the limits
of the state, namely, they can ―distinguish the areas of its actual competence and
legitimate authority from all forms of idolatrous absolutization.‖96 Christians are able to
take this task because they are aware of the significance of the state as an instrument
serving a particular purpose within God‘s salvation history.
It is at this point that Thielicke advances Luther‘s concept of two kingdoms. Even
though he calls it ―the eschatological corrective‖ it is not as much a correction of error
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than an emphasis of eschatological perspective.97 Thielicke points out that Luther is
primarily concerned with the Christian‘s engagement within the two kingdoms standing
side by side in this fallen world. He then argues that Luther should not also overlook the
fact that ―when the two kingdoms are regarded as succeeding one another, however, and
the eschatological tension remains, then there is none of this putting oneself at ease, none
of this geometrically calculated finality and sense of inevitability.‖98 In other words, from
eschatological perspective Christians should always bear in mind that a never-ending
peaceful co-existence between the two kingdoms is thereby ruled out.
The basis for this eschatological corrective is Thielicke‘s understanding of the
law. Since the Fall is always the background of the law, Thielicke argues that all ethics is
―an emergency discipline following upon the fall – i.e., following upon the loss of our
original state, our original fellowship with God – and yet taking place also within the
promise and the dawning power of the new aeon.‖99 This means the laws of jurisprudence
and politics are enclosed within brackets behind and before: behind they are determined
by the fact that the original fellowship no longer exists; and before they are determined
by the fact that the promised dominion of God, with its new and total fellowship between
God and his children, does not yet exist but is only dawning.
Christians are able to recognize the orders of the fallen world, such as the State, as
―emergency‖ or ―interim‖ solutions because they find out in Scripture how such orders
fail to measure up to the radicalness of the divine requirement. Thielicke argues that this
ability of the divine requirement to call radically in question the orders of the fallen world
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is ―certainly present in the Sermon on the Mount and must necessarily be brought out.‖100
Now is the time to demonstrate how Thielicke extends the usus elencthicus of the
antitheses not only to individual disorder but also to super-individual disorder.
C. Thielicke’s extension of the scope of antitheses to states
The background of fallen human nature determines human incapabilities to obey
the radical demands of the antitheses. They lay claim to humans, so to speak, as if the fall
had never taken place, as if the whole human existence is not determined by this fallen
world. They impose their demands upon humans as if the kingdom of God has been fully
established on the earth. In so doing they would reveal how sick this fallen world is and
that when God allows for any lack of perfect obedience; this is a sign of his patience and
forbearance.
Obviously there are moral precepts that should order society and her institutes.
The question now discussed is really whether Jesus‘ demands in the antitheses express
any of them. As discussed above, Thielicke argues for the meaning and purpose of the
radical demands in the antitheses as a call to repentance. He disqualifies any
interpretation which suggests the demands of the antitheses should constitute a new law.
Instead, he interprets such demands to show the contradiction between the conditional
allowance of legal ordinances such as divorce and oath and the radicalism of the original
will of God. In Thielicke‘s own words:
[T]he proclamation of the original will of God (ap’arches) over against the legal
ordinances of this aeon cannot mean that it is to take the place of these legal
ordinances, or better, that it is now to constitute a new law, a new code. This
would be a completely wrong conception if only because a new law in the sense
of a possible set of statutes simply cannot be derived from the radicalization of the
Mosaic nomos in the Sermon on the Mount. These are simply not justi[f]iable
(Matt.5:21ff., 5:27ff., 5:33ff., 5:38ff., 5:43ff.). The meaning and purpose of the
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call to repentance and the summons back to the order of creation is not to
eliminate but to relativize the legal structures of this aeon.101
Thielicke is then able to extend the scope of usus elencthicus of radical demands in
antitheses not only to individuals but also to States for two reasons: the correlation
between individual and institutional spheres of history and the institutional perversion of
orders in the fallen world.
C1. Individual and institutional spheres of history
Thielicke argues that the requirements in the antitheses will not put the claim only
within the individual spheres of one‘s history but also to his or her institutional spheres.
As he argues, ―Just as a firm line cannot be drawn between creation and sin in the
individual heart, so it is impossible to draw any such line in the macrocosmic
dimension.‖102 The reason is because the guilt is transmitted from individual to
institutional: ―the supra-individual spheres of history do come within the magnetic field
of human guilt in a particular way, and that they are thus to be interpreted as a zone to
which this guilt is transmitted.‖103 The very fact that the antitheses claim one as a whole
makes it clear that one must include not only himself or herself but also those structures
in society which are part of one‘s existence in this fallen world.
C2. The institutional perversion of orders in the fallen world
An institutionalized evil, in which injustice has taken on structural form, is not
just a deviation from the true nature of God‘s original creation, but also an extreme
example of a institutional perversion of this fallen world. This is what the world has
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become after the fall, namely, in the extreme perversion of the orders and in times of
crisis when sin is not merely present in individual acts, but has become crystallized
within the institutions of the fallen world. Thielicke perceives that the orders of the
world, such as States, do not belong to ―orders of creation‖ but rather ―orders of the
divine patience, given because of our ‗hardness of heart‘ (Matt.19:8).‖104 Within States,
God adapts the principles of the fallen world, such as fear, terror, and violence so that in
virtue of his miraculous preservation and blessings such principles do not lead to the
destruction of the world but instead preserve it. For example, God employs the egoism of
the State to restrain the egoism of individuals and of groups. In plain words, God uses
poison to prevent poisoning.
As a consequence, such orders of the fallen world are in reality an ordered
disorder because they are as a matter of fact the structural form of fallen existence
permitted by God and ―cannot be described as having been created such as to be good by
nature, or morally neutral in the sense of their belonging to a sphere of pure causal
necessity as factual requirements beyond good and evil.‖105 They are merely orders of
preservation in order to restrain evil rather than promoting good. For Thielicke, to
understand them more than that is to push to the point of absurdity, namely, to argue that
the idea of a positive and describable good is implicit in the concept of evil.
Because of two reasons above, Thielicke perceives States in this fallen world are
part of the fallen existence and they also need gauze in their deep wounds. The demands
of the antitheses bring into light how questionable the personal orders of human beings
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really are. Likewise, such radical demands also discloses disorderness to which States of
this fallen world is repeatedly prone.
Since perfect realization of these radical demands will only happen in eschaton,
both the individuals and the States in their de facto action do not truly accomplish
righteousness. It instead means that on the level of deeds what an individual does is only
an imperfect likeness or copy of complete obedience. A person‘s concrete obedience in
this fallen world has symbolical significance to the degree that it is always incomplete
and improper. It also does not eradicate the actual incongruity which always obtains
between what is demanded and what is achieved. Likewise, in the fundamental
conception of an economic or political order set forth by a State, such an order is only
illustrative and symbolically demonstrative of what God really intends to have in the
eschaton (true justice and peace). In a just war, for example, we may say that the will of
God which is at work is not his original will but a will which is accommodated for the
sake of human beings by means of institutional and political laws to establish order and
peace.
By encompassing the whole structure of human life, both individuals and States,
Thielicke understands the radical demands of the antitheses to constitute a continuing
reminder of how fallen the world is and what is ought not to be. He interprets them to
primarily function in their usus elencthicus. The demand to have love for your enemies
(Matthew 5:43-48), for example, is a reminder that a just war is not the way is supposed
to be for any State to implement. It is because the world has fallen that such
implementation is needed. Thielicke explains in this way:
In this text there is an indictment of our whole world…This becomes especially
clear when we consider that here Jesus‘ mercy is at odds, not merely with certain
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degenerate aspects of the world, but even with the completely legal and
recognized juridical ordinances of our world…In this stark, slashing, striking, and
therefore unescapable way of stating it, Jesus is saying to us that human law and
justice are incapable of regulating our relation to our neighbor as God wants it to
be, but that the law is only a regulation of necessity which is necessary in our
fallen world.106
This implementation will not last into eternity. It will disappear when the eschaton, the
true kingdom of God established by Jesus‘ second coming, arrives. When that happens,
there will no longer be any continuing reminder of what is ought not to be since there will
be no wars in the world to come.
IV. Summary and assessments
A. Summary
Thielicke highlights the usus elencthicus of the antitheses by which individuals
may recognize their fallen nature and need for redemption. He also extends this function
as mirror of human shortcomings not only to individuals but also to States. The basis of
this is his assumption of the radical transformation the world has undergone after the fall.
Since nothing good can be found in the totally corrupted world, States in the world are
belonged to the fallen order of the world and also sinful. God in his grace has revealed his
radical demands in the antitheses in order to show how corrupt human beings are,
individually and structurally.
The summary signifies that Thielicke interprets the antitheses of the SM do not
tell people what they can do but rather reveal to them the fallen character of the present
world. They describe an innocence lost in the Fall and not yet regained, since the second
coming has still not occurred. For the time being, one must in some way come to terms
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with this fallen world. The church needs to always look out on human history as
constantly marked by human sin.
B. Assessments
The risk of interpreting the antitheses primarily in this way, namely in its usus
elencthicus, and his insistence that law must be understood from the background of the
Fall, may cause Thielicke to have, using George L. Frear, Jr.‘s phrase, a ―relatively dark
understanding‖ of one‘s ethical options.107 In regard to personal ethics, for example,
Thielicke argues that ―what the Law provides are really negative presuppositions in the
sense of ‗tearing down,‘ rather than positive foundations for a building up to
completion.‖108 His claim on the function of the law to ―tear down,‖ similar to his other
term discussed above: the function to perform ―gauze in the wound,‖ has the risk to
become too much emphasis. Since one must deal with the refraction of God‘s will in the
fallen world, one can only compromise with the sinful world in his or her engagement
with ethical options. The reason for compromise is not because one can find an ultimate
norm which in fact is merely the average of two other norms more extreme than itself, an
average which one can accept and so put himself or herself at ease. Instead, it is because
one can never actualize the original or true will of God but only his will refracted by the
fallen world. One must live with it in this fallen world. Even one must never make a
virtue out of the necessity of so doing. At best, one can only see how far from the
kingdom of God this present world is. As a result, any notion of positive and constructive
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engagement in one‘s personal ethics is minimal. One must only be content with the
―refracted‖ will of God, no more and no less.
In regard to social ethics, for another example, Thielicke interprets a State as an
―emergency measure‖ in which God makes use of legitimate force against unruly
violence in order to preserve the order in this fallen world and to provide a physical space
for God to work out his salvation for sinful people.109 Thielicke is so persistent in this
matter which may put him to have a grim outlook on constructive political possibilities.
Though he holds that the state is a necessity, he wishes its role in education to be
―minimal‖ and he considers the development of the welfare state with anxiety.110
While Thielicke interprets the antitheses of the SM do not tell people what they
can do but rather reveal to them the fallen character of the present world, the next chapter
on John Howard Yoder will demonstrate a contrast. Yoder will argue that the antitheses
do tell people to do something. Especially for Yoder, the church, whom Jesus directly
delivers the antitheses, should practice the non-resistant way of life evident in the
antitheses.
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CHAPTER FIVE: JOHN HOWARD YODER ON THE ANTITHESES
I. Introduction
In this chapter I will discuss John Howard Yoder‘s interpretation of the antitheses.
After a short survey on Yoder‘s background as a Mennonite, I will demonstrate that for
Yoder the antitheses address Christians both as individuals and as a community. The
scope of the antitheses comprises both personal and social ethics because the radicalness
of the antitheses is a life of discipleship intended not merely for individual Christians but
also for the church as a community as a whole.
John Howard Yoder is a Mennonite and a well-known pacifist. Being a
Mennonite and pacifist Yoder may be misunderstood as a narrow-minded theologian who
is limited in his engagement with other Christian traditions. Yoder‘s life is indeed shaped
by a particular time and a particular people. His roots are Amish Mennonite. Reared in
Oak Grove Mennonite Church, which was founded around 1816 just outside of
Smithville in northern Ohio, Yoder was an heir to the Anabaptist heritage.1 James
Lehman narrates that Yoder‘s great-great grandfather, his great-grandfather, and his
father together provided leadership at Oak Grove for over one hundred years.2 The
knowledge of such a background, however, should not bring one to misunderstand Yoder
either 1) as a person who was born into a backwater, rural ethnic Mennonite world or 2)
as a theologian who only seeks to establish his own sectarian groups.
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On the first misunderstanding that Yoder was only raised in a cloistered
uncultured community of the Mennonites, Mark Nation wrote according to his interview
with Yoder that Yoder came from one of the most liberal and cultured Mennonite
communities.3 His home church, the Oak Grove Mennonite Church, probably had more
college graduates in its membership than any other Mennonite church, except for the
churches at the colleges. Furthermore, after his family‘s move to Wooster in the summer
of 1935, Yoder spent most of his childhood in a community and in a school that were not
populated by ethnic Mennonites. In fact, as Yoder told Mark Nation, he was the only
Mennonite in his classes at Wooster.4
On the second misunderstanding that Yoder was narrow-minded, Stanley
Hauerwas points out that Yoder does not like to be ―pigeonholed‖ as a blinkered
Mennonite thinker.5 He is indeed largely responsible for the fact that Mennonites are now
on the theological map. Mark Nation points out that in American academic theology
circles, ―the name of John Yoder is largely synonymous with what it means to be
Mennonites.‖6 Yoder, however, in the introduction of his book, The Priestly Kingdom,
writes that he does not want to marginalize what he has to say to merely ―a Mennonite
vision.‖7 Instead, his passion is to share what he discovered from the tradition in which
he was raised. He says that what is meant by the label ―Mennonite‖ or ―Anabaptist‖ is a
3
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―hermeneutic.‖8 This is to describe that he attempts to take his Mennonite heritage
seriously, being faithful to it, while creatively reworking it in various ways. He works
and reworks his own tradition in order to contribute in theological discussions among
different traditions.
II. The nonviolent9 epistemology and the antitheses
The fact that Yoder‘s theology has deep roots in Mennonite soils is beyond doubt.
Coming from this Mennonite and pacifist background, as Ted Grimsrud points out, Yoder
proposes to establish nonviolence not merely as an ethics but also as an epistemology.10 It
is for him not only ―a spirituality‖ but also ―a lifestyle,‖ as he writes in his posthumously
published essay: ―Nonviolence is not only an ethic about power, but also an epistemology
about how to let truth speak for itself.‖11 For Yoder this means the commitment to
nonviolence is a life-shaping conviction that shapes all other conviction. It is an
epistemology because such commitment actually shapes how a person sees and
understands the world in a certain way. In other words, Yoder‘s commitment to
nonviolence shapes how he arrives at knowledge and understands Scripture.
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A. The nonviolent epistemology of Yoder
The center of nonviolent epistemology is the decisive commitment to offer ―good
news for the other‖ in the willingness to respect others‘ freedom either to accept or to
reject.12 The quest for truth is not to be taken as a competitive process based upon the
desire to hold the power (―See, I am right, and therefore you are wrong‖). Instead, one‘s
knowledge of truth depends upon one‘s listening to others, even to the adversaries. For
Yoder truth has much more to do with concrete expressions in life than with theories or
abstract principles. ―What it means to qualify statement as ‗true‘ in the faith community,‖
Yoder argues, ―is not an ontological statement about the status of a proposition. It is an
historical judgment about the statement‘s compatibility with the life directions and value
insights, the narrative memories and the practices, of that community.‖13 Here for Yoder
the quest for truth is not a matter of knowing either universally or particularly, but how to
live in order to come to know the truth.
Yoder believes that one needs not to use coercion of any sort to ensure the
survivability of truth. This truth is lived out and inseparably linked with non-coercive
communication. In fact, if one does use coercion, one will in the end distance himself or
herself from the truth. For Yoder, truth will speak for itself since it will ultimately be
evident not by one‘s careful and irresistible logic, but by the coherence between one‘s
walk and talk. He argues, ―Ultimate validation is a matter not of a reasoning process
which one could by dint of more doubt or finer hairsplitting push down one story closer
to bedrock, but of a concrete social genuineness of the community‘s reasoning together in
12
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the Spirit.‖14 Since truth must be lived, it is best embodied by witness, vulnerability and
openness, not coercion and domination.
Churches‘ efforts to witness this non-violent truth are largely dependent upon the
people in the churches living consistently with this truth. That is, for example, if the
church preaches ―to love their enemy‖ as a core part of its understanding of ―good news,‖
then in order for this message to be credible, loving their enemy must be a characteristic
of the church‘s internal life. Yoder exhibits this ecclesial testimony as a necessary
condition for the church to demonstrate the visibility of her truth in his interpretation of
the antithesis of Matthew 5:44-48, ―loving your enemy.‖
B. The interpretation of the antithesis “love your enemy” (Matthew 5:44-48)
Yoder constructs his interpretation of the antitheses ―love your enemy‖ (Matthew
5:44-48) from his understanding of the last verse, ―Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly
Father is perfect,‖ (Matthew 5:48). He argues that perfection in that verse is not about
whether and in what sense Christians can and should try to be, or expect to be ―perfect.‖
Loving one‘s enemy to the point of perfection has nothing to do with a goal of absolute
flawlessness or of having come to the end of all possibilities of growth. For Yoder, Jesus
is not saying that one should expect to achieve perfection by loving the enemy. Instead,
Jesus is saying that the reason for loving the enemy is because God does not only love his
friends. Since God is undiscriminating or unconditional in his love, Christians are
expected to imitate this character of love. This command of loving the enemy is not
inconceivable or impossible. As Yoder argues, ―We can stop loving only the lovable,
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lending only to the reliable, giving only to the grateful, as soon as we grasp and are
grasped by the unconditionality of the benevolence of God.‖15 Since loving one‘s enemy
is not a fruit of long growth and maturation, one can do it even today if one trusts oneself
to Jesus in order to obey his commands.
Since this command is conceivable and possible, Yoder further argues that
Christians should not engage in war and legitimate defense, for example, protecting
oneself or significant others by killing the enemy. He qualifies, however, that Christians
cannot require non-Christians to obey this command since they do not follow the nonviolent way of life. In the fallen world, every argument which would permit the taking of
life is in one way or another based on calculations of rights and merits. For nonChristians, they prefer the life of those dearest to them to that of the foreigner; or the life
of the innocent to that of the troublemaker, because their love is conditional and
qualified. Yoder interprets Matthew 5:46-47 to support this. Jesus recognizes the
conditional love of non-Christians and points out that there is nothing new, nothing
special, nothing redemptive or healing about it. In order to show something special,
redemptive and healing about the conditional love in this fallen world, Christians should
practice the command of loving the enemy. The way to practice this command for Yoder
is the origin of the label ―nonviolence‖ comes from.16 Loving the enemy is a love not
limited to those who merit it and it even goes beyond the unjust demands of those who
coerce compliance with their will. This is not to encourage a resignation to one‘s evil
goals. This kind of love does not serve the enemy‘s purposes but the enemy as a person
15
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who coerces. The violence Yoder renounces here is a returning evil for evil. It is not to
promote a complicity in any evil design. Loving the enemy is, in Yoder‘s words,
―creative concern for the person who is bent on evil, coupled with the refusal of his
goals.‖17 It is a special measure of love demanded by concern for the redemption of the
offender. If Christians acts like non-Christians using violence, by engaging in war or
legitimate defense, they would not be able to testify and demonstrate that they are the
followers of Jesus whose love and benevolence knows no bounds.
III. The particularity of the antitheses
Yoder believes that the antitheses are radical because they ―refuse to measure by
the standards of ―common sense‖ or ―realism‖ or ―reason.‖18 By the standards of
common sense or realism or reason he means whether everyone agrees with or if a
majority of people obey the antitheses. War and legitimate defense, for example, is the
majority way of people doing in this fallen world. Christians by living out their love for
the enemy demonstrates their refusal to follow the majority way of the fallen world. For
in the life of Jesus‘ followers there is a radical difference, a quality of something more
than the rest of the world. They are a particular people. The antitheses are the description
of the order of this particular community that Jesus calls into the world.
A. Christians as the recipient of the antitheses
Yoder observes that Jesus follows up what God had done in calling Abraham and
Moses in the Old Testament, namely, he gathers people and gives them his law so that a
society comes into being like no society the world has ever seen. Like the Israel of the
Old Testament which distinguished themselves from the rest of the nations with their
17
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God-given laws, the church of the New Testament should distinguish herself from any
other society in the world with the antitheses. Yoder says:
When He called His society together Jesus gave its member a new way of life to
live. He gave them a new way to deal with offenders – by forgiving them. He
gave them a new way to deal with violence – by suffering…He gave them a new
way to deal with a corrupt society – by building a new order, not by smashing the
old. He gave them a new pattern of relationship between men and women,
between parent and child, between master and slave, in which was made concrete
a radical new vision of what it means to be a human person. He gave them a new
attitude toward the state and toward the ‗enemy nation.‘‖19
The radicalness of the antithesesYoder understands is not like an academic gown or a
clergyman‘s collar which only tells people ―here is somebody doing something distinct,‖
but it does not tell them why or how Christians should be particular or differ from the rest
of the world. For Yoder, the radicalness with the antitheses, the radicalness which says
something, is itself the message. He explains, ―If I am the child of a Father who loves
both good and evil children, if I am witness for a God who loves his enemies, then when I
love my enemy I am proclaiming that love. I am not just obeying it; I am communicating
it. And I cannot communicate it any other way.‖20 Jesus‘ question, ―What are you doing
more than others?‖ (Matthew 5:47) is a refusal to the common discourse of ethics where
one measures oneself by others in order to measure up to the average. The antitheses are
going beyond what could be expected because when one does more as the antitheses
require, the very event of exceeding the available requirements is itself a measure of
one‘s character. When Christians obeys what Jesus tells them to do, like they tell the truth
without oaths, they proclaim the sanctity of the name of God and of truthfulness. When
Christians obey his command of non-retaliation, they preach that Jesus, and not the
19
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sovereign of the most-advanced nation, is the Lord of history. They demonstrate their
particularity by living out the radicalness of the antitheses.
The antitheses are norms for those who confess Jesus as their Lord. They are in
fact a call for a creation of a distinct community which acknowledges the lordship of
Jesus with its own radical set of values in this fallen world. This theological observation
implies that Christians cannot oblige the world to capitulate to the kingdom of God. What
the church can do is to demonstrate its coming by her obedience. As a consequence,
Christians should not expect of the fallen world that kind of moral performance which
would appropriately be the fruit of their faith in Jesus Christ who inaugurated the coming
of this kingdom.
Yoder explains that like in Jesus‘ days, the antitheses correct the mistakes of the
Pharisees and scribes and undercut establishment religion of today. He interprets
Matthew 5:46-47 as Jesus‘ call with a new dimension. He explains, ―We can call people
to the Jesus Christ of the gospel only by calling them away from the ‗Christ‘ they already
know – away from the official, conformist, power-related religion of the West.‖21 Yoder
explains that what Jesus meant by ―fulfillment‖ (Matthew 5:17) is a full accomplishment
of the intent of the earlier moral guides which the Pharisees and the scribes wrongly
interpret by making ―its standards fulfillable.‖22 A conformist religion will say that one
can perhaps still refrain from killing and adultery but one may still cherish lustful and
hateful thoughts. Rigorously keeping an oath in the name of the Lord God himself is
possible, yet one may still leave room to cheat a little when one swears by other things.
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Loving one‘s neighbor is possible, yet one may still hate. As a consequence, one
constructs for himself or herself a manageable morality, which one can handle, without
repentance. Yoder is against this manageable morality. He believes that to assume a
reasonable degree of legitimate self-interest by easily accommodating the moral law to
the needs and desires of humans, such as do not lie – except to save your life or your
country, do not kill – except killers, betrays Jesus‘ commands in the antitheses.
One might argue against this nonviolent interpretation of the antitheses on the
grounds that it is quite unrealistic to expect States to follow this example. In response,
Yoder explains that it does not matter even if States could follow the example since
Christians are called by Christ to be different from the world and they do not wait for the
world to be ready to follow them before they follow Christ.23 Their non-resistant life,
individually and communally as a church, does not depend on whether States are ready to
lay down their weapons or not. ―For Christians,‖ as Yoder further argues, ―to seek any
government‘s interest – even the security and power of peaceable and freedom-loving
democracy – at the cost of the lives and security of our brothers and sisters around the
world, would be selfishness and idolatry, however much glorified by patriotic preachers
and poets.‖24 This does not mean that Christians should not engage in any state affairs.
Yoder argues that, following Paul‘s instruction to pray especially for rulers and all those
in authority so that we may lead a peaceful life (1 Tim. 2:2), Christians should pray and
testify ―concerning the folly of trusting in earthly arms, concerning the undermining of
democratic government by peacetime military establishment, concerning the dangers of
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radioactive contamination…and especially the hideous immorality of the weapons now
being devised.‖25 The ground for this is that the church knows they are called to be
faithful to Jesus. They confess that this same Jesus reigns over the world. The same one
who calls them to deny themselves and follow him, to love their neighbors as themselves
and to love even their enemies, is the One who reigns over all, including the state.
To properly explain how Christians can both obey the radical non-resistance of
the antitheses and engage in the affairs of the State, Yoder makes a distinction between
the orders of redemption and the orders of conservation.26 The church belongs to the
orders of redemption, and the State belongs to the order of conservation. The orders of
redemption entail a radical break with the orders of conservation since the incarnated
Christ breaks with the Jewish national community to be faithful to his mission. His
incarnation proclaims the institution of a new kind of life, not of a new government. The
State does not change with the incarnation of Christ; what has changed is the coming of
the new order that proclaims the destiny of the old one. The consummation will mean the
fulfillment of the orders of redemption and the collapse of the orders of conservation. It is
in the light of this promised fulfillment that life in the new order through Christians,
which seems so ineffective now, is nevertheless meaningful and right.
Because of this, Christians follow the example of the cross by refusing to use
political means of self-defense. At the cross God demonstrates his love which seeks no
effectiveness. Instead, God is willing to suffer any loss or seeming defeat for the sake of
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obedience. Effectiveness and success have been sacrificed for the sake of love, but this
sacrifice is turned by God into a victory that vindicates the apparent impotence of love.
When the New Testament attributes the lordship over history and powers to Christ, it
means that the essential change that has taken place is not within the realm of the old
orders, like the State, where there is really no change; it is rather that the new order
revealed in Christ takes primacy over the old, explains the meaning of the old, and will
finally vanquish the old. Christians witness to the State this new order through their nonresistance way of life.
When Christians posit themselves non-resistantly in their engagement of State
affairs and in their personal life, does it mean they comply with evil or to have a weak
acceptance of the intentions of the evil one? To be precise, how should one interpret the
command ―do not resist evil person, if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them
the other cheek also‖ (Matthew 5:39)? As individuals, the Christians should turn the other
cheek, but how about in a society? Should they not be concerned with the protection of
their neighbors, even to the point of using violent means to protect them? The nonresistant position needs to tackle this question of its contribution to the maintenance of
order and justice in this way.
Yoder‘s response to the question above is twofold. First, he argues that the
doctrine of creation affirms that God made humans free, the doctrine of redemption says
this freedom has been abused and the doctrine of hell lets sin free, finally and
irrevocably, to choose separation from God.27 Leaving humans free to separate
themselves from God is part of the nature of God‘s love itself. His love for human beings
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begins right at the point where God permits sin against himself and against others,
without crushing the rebel under his or her own rebellion. This is not complicity on God‘s
behalf; instead, it is divine patience. This, however, is not the final word. At the
consummation, with judgment and hell, evil comes to its end and the fate of disobedient
ones is exclusion from the new heaven and new earth. Since this final triumph over evil is
not brought about by any human or political means, it also entails that the agent in
judgment and protection against evil is not the church, for the church suffers
nonresistantly. The task of the church is to obey, namely, to act nonresistantly. The
responsibility for bringing about victory over evil is God‘s alone. God‘s intervention, not
human action, is the vindication of human obedience in the face of evil. In fact, Yoder
points out that ―to crush evil adversary is to be vanquished by him because it means
accepting his standards.‖28 The Christian duty for protecting others from evil is to resist
the temptation to meet it on its own terms.
Second, in its most defensible form, the above question implies that if one does
not protect those being attacked, then one should share the guilt for the attack. It assumes
that being guilty of defensive violence against the attacker is less evil than being
passively guilty of permitting offensive violence for one of two reasons: either because
the attacker is the aggressor or because the victim is a friend or relative or fellow citizen
or perhaps a stranger for whom one has more accountability than for the attacker (the
―lesser evil‖ argument). Yoder, however, argues that such contention that it is out love
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for one‘s neighbor that one should protect a victim using violent means when others
attack cannot be a defeater for the nonresistant position. He gives four reasons: 29
a. If one chooses to commit a defensive violence to protect the victim because he
or she is ―one‘s own‖ family, friends, compatriots, then it means one loves
them more than one‘s enemy. On the contrary, Matthew 5:43-48 explicitly
states the preference for the enemy over the friend as an object of the
Christian‘s moral actions.
b. To commit a defensive violence to the attacker means his life is worth less
than that of the victim.
c. The defensive violence against the attacker is perhaps an expression of love. It
is love, however, in the sense of a benevolent sentiment but not of love as
defined by the cross.
d. Letting evil happen is not necessarily as blameworthy as committing it.
If those four reasons appear ―scandalous,‖ Yoder further argues, then it simply
demonstrates that ―how thoroughly the Western Christian mind-set has been
Constantinianized, i.e., influenced by pagan and pre-Christian ideas of particular human
solidarities as ethical absolutes.‖30 The use of violence in this argument is for Yoder not
biblically sound.
In addition, Yoder further points out that the ―lesser evil‖ argument cannot
adequately demonstrate that personal survival, which it tries to protect, would be a
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greater loss than what would be destroyed in the attack of an aggressor.31 This is because
personal survival is for the Christian not an end in itself. The cross is in fact the clearest
evident to the contrary. One cannot be sure that personal survival (by committing the
defensive violence) of one‘s neighbors is better than their personal harm (after doing the
best one can without the authorization of the use of violent methods) due to the limits of
human knowledge and to the distortion of objective truth by human pride.
The antitheses for Yoder are impossible to do only if the antitheses are abstracted
from the new community made possible by Jesus‘ life, death, and resurrection. He says
Jesus‘ moral teaching in the antitheses is ―not only understandable but possible; not only
possible but the most appropriate testimony to the nature of God‘s love and his
kingdom.‖32 Since the character of this particular community is to exemplify their
Savior‘s life, to live up the demands of the antitheses requires the patience that has been
demonstrated in the cross. Yoder argues that the heart of the Sermon on the Mount is the
conviction that ―the key to the obedience to God‘s people is not their effectiveness but
their patience...The relationship between the obedience of God‘s people and the triumph
of God‘s cause is not a relationship between cause and effect but one of cross and
resurrection.‖33 Thus, the patience that exemplifies the cross is the patience to learn to be
part of a community who has the time to take the time to live without resorting to
violence to sustain their existence. By doing that, God‘s people as a particular community
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in this fallen world will indeed live up to the radicalness of the antitheses and, as a result,
they will be able to visibly demonstrate the challenges of the antitheses to the world.
B. Yoder on Christian particularity
This vision of obedience, which is binding only on Christians, implies that their
obedience to witness the kingdom of God cannot be tested whether or not they can ask
everyone else to do the same thing. One of the logical repercussions of this is that, as
Yoder points out, ―we no longer hold ourselves to be morally or psychologically
obligated to tailor our moral standards to the needs of the people who are running the
world.‖34 This is in contrast with Immanuel Kant‘s classic statement of categorical
imperative, namely, ―act only according to that maxim by which at the same time you can
will that it becomes universal law.‖ For Yoder, Christian moral thinking is more realistic
when it is done within the perspective of the kingdom of God embodied in Jesus
incarnate. To base our moral thinking on the calculation that most of the world is going
this way is not realistic because the world does not share Christian faith. Christians must
not, for instance, assume that everyone will be interested in denying themselves and
picking up their crosses. This costly form of ethical living only makes sense, and is only
possible, in light of the resurrection and the empowerment of the Holy Spirit, who is only
available to those who have experienced regeneration.
One might object that Yoder‘s view here of such an ethics which avows its
particularity seems provincial. James Gustafson calls this ―a sectarian temptation‖
because Yoder seems to isolate Christian ethics from critical external points of view in
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order to maintain the unique identity of Christianity.35 For Gustafson, while Yoder‘s
position will provide distinctiveness in behavior and ensures a clear identity which frees
persons from ambiguity and uncertainty, such a position will isolate ―Christianity from
taking seriously the wider world of science and culture and limits the participation of
Christians in the ambiguities of moral and social life in the patterns of interdependence in
the world.‖36 This isolation could happen because Yoder‘s ethics might run the risk of
becoming a descriptive rather than a normative discipline since it only adheres to the
ethos of a particular historic community rather than participation in the patterns and
processes of larger human life and society.
Gustafson‘s protest describes his approval of an old statement by Alasdair
McIntyre: ―Either it [moral theology] will remain within the theological closed circle: in
which case it will have no access to the public and shared moral criteria of our society. Or
it will accept those criteria: in which case it may well have important things to say, but
these will not be distinctively Christian.‖37 As a response to this objection, Yoder
attempts to provide the third option. In his ―On Not Being Ashamed of the Gospel:
Particularity, Pluralism and Validation,‖ he argues that even though Christian ethics is
particular, it is communicable and therefore it still has access to the public and has
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important things to say.38 He begins his defense by showing that Gustafson‘s opposition
to his position also assumes some objectionable standard epistemological contexts:39
1) There is assumed to be ―out there‖ a singly publicly accessible system for
validating statements of fact as being (at least) meaningful and (perhaps,
ideally) as ―true.‖
2) It is further assumed that that system can also validate statements about value
or morality. Accepting the demands of that system is a prerequisite for what
McIntyre has called, with Gustafson‘s approval, having ―important things to
say.‖
3) It is further assumed that in any given setting it is possible to ascertain by
empirical readings, whether scientific or impressionistic, what is the
normative public meaning framework.
4) By definition the notion of ―public and shared criteria‖ is a real cliché. It is
self-validated if trusted by everyone, and it is self-defeated if questioned by
anyone. Thereby it partakes of the same self-confident ambivalence which
regularly marks appeals to ―nature,‖ ―self-evidence,‖ and ―consensus.‖
He then argues why the particularity of Christian ethics is necessary because if ―public
and shared criteria‖ is already present in every culture, then no Christian ethics would be
needed, or possible.40 The particularity of Christian ethics is communicable to the public
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and has important things to say because it is not meant to be esoteric but missionary.41
While its content needs to be faithful to its origin, by its very nature it must be shared,
which invites all who hear it.
In addition, to safeguard against destructive provinciality of this particular
Christian ethics, Yoder argues that such ethics forbids itself either to impose its identity
or desires on others coercively or to withhold it from any as a privilege. He proposes that
the content of this ethics ―includes at its heart its affirmation of the dignity of the outside
and the adversary in such a way that while the dangers of arbitrary narrowness can never
be totally banned, they can at least be warded off.‖42 The loving posture of this particular
ethics, neither imposing nor withholding, arises from its ―election.‖43 What Yoder means
by ―election‖ here is the call of Abraham. With the call of Abraham, a part of the whole
creation is separated from the whole on the basis not of its intrinsic qualities but by the
peculiarly selective wisdom of a distinctively identifiable God. ―If all the world is to be
blessed,‖ Yoder explains, ―it will be through the distinctive response of this man
[Abraham] and his seed to their particular call.‖44
When Yoder argues that the antitheses are only for Christians, his position does
mean to deny the possibility of a universal moral order which applies to everyone. What
he argues here is that in this specific text, namely the antitheses, the particularity of
Christian ethics is most apparent. The antitheses, at the moment of their deliverance, are
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taught by Jesus to his Jewish disciples. This suggests Christians should accept willingly,
rather than grudgingly, as an affirmation rather than as a limitation, their rootedness in
the particularity of Judaism and Jesus. For them to recognize this is to say, as Yoder
explains, ―that despite the possible or imaginable projections of something that might be
‗universally‘ valid, these people are willing to live within the limits of the story of their
faith and even to celebrate their faith in a form that hold its meaning open for others to
join.‖45 Such affirmation should not make Christians embarrassed about the fact that its
particular position is not ultimately subject to irresistible verification (or falsification)
from outside its own system.
For Yoder, therefore, while there might be a universal moral order in place, for
Christians to recognize the particularity of their ethics is to be true to themselves and
their story. He explains, for example, with the teachings of murder (Matthew 5:21-26)
and love for enemies (Matthew 5:43-48): ―The idea that human life is intrinsically sacred
is not a specifically Christian thought. But the gospel itself, the message that Christ died
for His enemies, is our reason for being ultimately responsible for the neighbor‘s – and
especially the enemy‘s – life.‖46 What Christians are required to do is to live up faithfully
to their particularity so that the world can witness their deeds and may join them because
after all this particular community is established by a God who became particular in the
incarnation of Jesus Christ. Yoder says, ―‗Incarnation‘ is not first a concept in
communication theory; it is the code word for the uniquely theocentric Palestinian Jewish
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man Jesus, communicating God to us.‖47 They are not required to tell the world that they
know the right thing to do universally. They are, however, opened to others‘ critics, even
when such critics claim to be based on a universal truth, as far as they will not betray
their own particularity.
Why does Yoder choose to propose for Christians to live up to their particularity
as their testimony to the fallen world instead of suggesting that Christians claim to know
the universal moral order and tell others to follow? To be more specific, why does Yoder
choose to posit the antitheses particularly for Christians, instead of taking them
universally for everyone? One of the reasons is Yoder‘s belief that there is no nonparticular place to stand. He argues, ―The theory of truth exemplified by and assumed
ever since Lessing, which can claim to put the ‗particularity‘ of others in a box only
because it thinks that its own ‗necessary truths of reason‘ are universal, is in fact no less
in a box itself.‖48 This does not mean that since we are all boxed particularly, any critical
discourse is pointless. Critical discourse and dialogue are important because they testify
to ―respect for those to whom one wishes to communicate‖ and ―to the strength of
anyone‘s conviction that what one believes…is not only true for oneself.‖49 What Yoder
argues is the need to recognize one‘s particularity since what is universal has been arrived
at historically, in one‘s own setting and language.
Furthermore, Yoder chooses to be particular because he is against the coercive
nature of the universal validation to which many have been accustomed: ―We want
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people to have to believe us…we are impressed by the power to convince which we see
exercised by demonstrations in mathematics and logic, in the natural sciences, and in
documented history…and we want our claims about God and morality to be similarly
coercive.‖50 One tends to seek for any universal warrants because one wants others to
capitulate to one‘s position. By claiming the antitheses to be particularly Christian, Yoder
does not intend to mean that this acceptance of one‘s own limits implies one‘s position to
disregard the challenge of universality. Instead, he chooses to ―restate the meaning of a
truth claim from within particular identity.‖51 Yoder believes that by virtue of one‘s
uncoerced and noncoercive submission of one‘s own particularity, one will not be easily
tempted to coerce others to join one‘s community because ―rejection…is part of
validation‖ and the price of one‘s particular testimony of truth claim is to be ready to
―suffer at the hands of the addresses.‖52 In taking seriously one‘s particularity, the
readiness to bear others‘s hostility is also part of the risk of such position.
IV. The institutionality of the antitheses
Yoder perceives the antitheses are particularly for Christians. He also
substantiates this claim by showing that Matthew 5:1-2 is akin to Exodus 19-20.53 When
Moses meets God at Mount Sinai and received from him the tables of the law, this law is
for all the children of Israel. When Jesus from another mount proclaims again the statues
of his kingdom, it is to his disciples. The antitheses, specifically, are not a set of moral
standards to be posed on everyone or non-Christians. Jesus does not propose that in order
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to achieve the state of happiness in this fallen world everyone must obey these standards.
They are not ―a prescription of what every man can and should do to be happy.‖54 As a
consequence, non-Christians are not required to obey these standards. They can find their
own way of happiness. Jesus in the antitheses does not address them. His concern is for
his disciples. The precepts he sets forth in the antitheses are binding only upon those
voluntarily enrolled in the band of his followers. They are, as Yoder says, ―a description
of how a man behaves whose life has been transformed by meeting Jesus.‖55 The
antitheses are not a matter of earning a place in the kingdom of God, nor are they a guide
of simple blind obedience. They are the norms by which Christians as a particular
community communicate to the world around the coming of the kingdom of God.
By obeying the antitheses, the deeds of the church are a witness to the world.
Yoder gives the emphasis on the communal aspect of one‘s obedience instead of merely
the personal one. One‘s obedience does not, for Yoder, exist in a mere interpersonal
relationship within private and social spheres, but also in an inter-institutional liaison.
The visibility of the church for Yoder is, however, not an end in itself. The church exists
to give testimony to Jesus Christ. To so testify requires that the church be holy.
Sanctification names the way the church becomes visible because sanctification is not
just something that happens to individuals, but also to the church as a community. In fact,
the reverse in the case of the community of believers as a social group is more aptly
correct. The church must be and is a social group of holiness without which individual
sanctification is impossible. The antitheses serve to spell out and to describe the kind of
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community they require. Jesus is clear that the law needs to be observed (Matthew 7:2127). Murder, adultery, oaths, retaliation and hatred of enemy are therefore prohibited.
This is not to say that the community Jesus calls into existence is merely determined by
what it avoids to do, and as a result, becomes legalistic. On the contrary, it obeys and
avoids what is avoided because its life has been transformed by Jesus and by this
transformation its character is to exemplify his life.
A. Yoder’s response to Reinhold Niebuhr’s social ethics
In his critique of Niebuhr‘s Moral Man and Immoral Society,56 Yoder argues that
Niebuhr fails to properly consider the concept of the church as a social group.57 Niebuhr
sets forth the thesis that human communities are always more selfish and less moral than
individuals, and that what is possible for society is even less good than what is possible
for an individual. Thus even if the law of love were possible for individuals, it would still
be an impossibility for politics and social organization, which remain the realm in which
justice is sought through a balance of power between the various group egoisms which
conflict. Although these egoisms are all to be condemned as contrary to the law of love, it
remains true that some of them are closer to the interests of equal justice than others.
Yoder argues against the inclusion of the community of believers as part of Niebuhr‘s
thesis. ―If being a perfectly loyal American, a freemason, or a bourgeois, identifies a man
with that group egoism in such a way as to make him less loving than he would be as an
individual,‖ Yoder argues, ―the contrary is true of being a member of Christ.‖58 The
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church, as the body of Christ, differs from other social bodies in that it is not less moral
than its individual members.
To be fair, Yoder concedes that Niebuhr‘s thesis has a degree of validity when it
deals with any attempt to derive a general social and political strategy from a particular
Christian ethics.59 The reason is because Christians, who have spiritual resources for
unselfish and rational action, cannot expect of societies, which have no such resources
and make no claim to be fully interested, a Christian degree of unselfishness and love.
Yoder explicitly says that ―the doctrine of regeneration means that ethics for Christians
and ethics for unregenerate society are two distinct disciplines.‖60 The problem arises
when one takes the risk to identify the church with a particular social order of other
societies in the world. Since the church comprises all people of all different races and
nations, Christian ethics cannot be limited to a particular culture, a race or a state. The
church is a super-national society. When any church endorses a political action of a state
where Christians kill Christians, Yoder explains, ―The greatest possible offense against
the unity of the body of Christ takes place.‖61 This shows that the church is a distinct
society governed with her own ethics distinguished from the rest of societies in the world.
B. The antitheses and the church as a community
Yoder argues against the interpretation that Jesus‘ teaching of the antitheses is
merely an ethics for ―face-to-face personal encounters,‖62 in the sense that Jesus only
addresses personal ethics, and as a consequence, one is not allowed to take the antitheses
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as an example of social ethics. While Yoder concedes that the antitheses are ―not a
meditation on how best to guide society‖ in general,63 the fact that Jesus came to establish
a new community – namely, the church – the antitheses are nevertheless the description
of the order of that new community. If the church as a community is to be seen as a
visible alternative to the world, the antitheses should be read in that way. They give the
form of the order of the Christian community‘s upbuilding and constitution. It is only by
striving to live the standard of the antitheses that the church can be the salt and the light
of the world (Matthew 5:13-16). They are laws given for a new society of people who
acknowledge the lordship of Jesus.
The church, as a community, in living out the demands in the antitheses does not
call for social cynicism or for withdrawal. Instead, it is a call for a profound intellectual
reorientation. Yoder says that ―the Christian community is the only community whose
social hope is that we need not rule because Christ is Lord.‖64 Since the church‘s hope is
in Christ, the testimony which the church must represent through her social ethics in the
world is not simply that she has a more sacred cause for the sake of which she can
worthily push people around. For example, the church should not push any society
around with the antitheses of ―Oaths‖ and ―Vengeance‖ (Matthew 5:33-42) nor she
should have an ethical irresponsibility by withdrawing from the society because of such
commands. Instead, three distinct elements explains how the social ethics of the
antitheses show the church‘s engagements in the society:65 first, the non-resistance vision
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is not the prophetic vocation of a few individuals, but that every member of the body of
Christ is called to nonresistance in discipleship and to abandonment of all loyalties which
counter that obedience, including the desire to be effective immediately or to make
oneself responsible for civil justice. Second, the church‘s confession, ―Christ is the
Lord,‖ is a prophetic voice of the church to the State to obey and serve God by
encouraging good and restraining evil, namely, to serve peace, to preserve the social
cohesion in which the leaven of the gospel can build the church and also render the fallen
world more tolerable. Yoder allows a local police action which aims not at annihilation
but at a readjustment of tensions to preserve a proximate justice. Third, through the
church‘s testimony of her social ethics, like honesty (the ―Oaths‖ command) and
brotherhood (the ―love your enemy‖ command), Christianized morality can seep into the
non-Christian society through example and through the education of children with the
hope that the whole moral tone of non-Christian society is changed for the better and
there are honorable and honest people available to run the government. Yet, Yoder
reminds us, even such morality does not ―make men ultimately better in the sight of God
and no better administrators of the talents entrusted to them.‖66 The point Yoder
emphasize here is that as long as the state does not interfere, either through fascism or
through violence which destroys the tissue of society, these moral by-products of
Christianity will make the fallen world more tolerable for living.

66

John Howard Yoder, The Original Revolution, 77.

135
V. Summary and assessments
A. Summary
In the analysis of Yoder‘s interpretation of the antitheses, the mission of the
church constitutes the backbone of social ethics. The demands in the antitheses are not
only for individual Christians but also for the church as a community. They call the
believing community to live a life of discipleship which will be different from the rest of
the world. Such a life is meant only for those who acknowledge the lordship of Jesus over
their life, and thus by nature, the antitheses are only intended for Christians. To receive
such commands, however, does not commend the church to claim a privileged handle on
the social decision process. Nor, should the church retreat from the worldly engagements,
whereby the fellowship patterns of the believing community are interested only in their
own integrity or intensity. Instead, the church or the believing community is seen not as
lordship but as servanthood to testify the kingdom of God to the world, not as privilege
but as pointer of what life in the kingdom should be, not as achievement but as promise
of the coming kingdom of God in Jesus Christ.
By working out the demands in the antitheses, the church‘s presence of her
discipleship constitutes a part of the promise that more is to come since the church
communicates to the fallen world what God plans to do through the church. Yoder argues
that the church is ―pilot project, and podium, pedagogical base.‖67 The effectiveness of
the church‘s attempt to live out her mission as God‘s display to the fallen world,
however, does not depend on the church herself or on her day-to-day faithfulness. That is
one reason why the church imitates her Lord‘s nonresistance attitude. If the fallen world,
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such as States, accepts the church‘s testimony, praise be to God. If they reject her, still
praise be to God since the church follows her Savior‘s path and does not intend to imitate
the way the fallen world deals with her. Part of the grace from which the church lives is
the grace of her not needing to be responsible for the success of God‘s plan. What the
church is responsible for is the consistency and congruence between her ministry and the
kingdom of God which God has begun in her.
B. Assessments
One positive assessment from Yoder‘s account of ethical Christian living is that
he builds his nonviolent ethics on the foundation of Jesus Christ. The life, death and
resurrection of Jesus proclaim and embody the kingdom of God. Yoder perceives
Christians, individually and as a community, as the testimony of the kingdom of God on
earth. By living out the demands in the antitheses, the church testifies the eschatological
hope of the God who brought about his kingdom in the suffering of Jesus. As Yoder puts
it, the church is the ―scaffolding service‖ of the coming kingdom.68 This implies that in
Yoder‘s ethical exhortations the person and work of Jesus is of central importance. In
other words, Yoder‘s ethics stems from his Christology. This is not to say that for Yoder
Jesus is merely a good teacher of ethical ideals. Instead, since for Yoder Jesus is the very
presence of the kingdom of God, his person – encompassing both his life and teachings –
is integral to how one should understand the kingdom of God. The reason Jesus is Lord is
because of his faithful witness to the way of God is, even unto a cruel death. His life is
the very witness of God‘s kingdom. It is what the kingdom looks like. The Sermon on the
Mount, especially the antitheses, is for Yoder not only the espousal of good teachings; it
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is rather the concrete announcement of a new social order in the kingdom of God. The
fact that God‘s kingdom was brought about by a nonviolent witness means that for the
church to be a foretaste of the kingdom, it must also practice nonviolence. It is in this
nonviolent practice that the believing community acknowledges the lordship of Jesus, and
it can be done no other way that the faithful following of Him in whom the kingdom
came.
As stated above, the emphasis of the nonviolent lifestyle for Yoder is in the social
practices of the church or believing community. This specific thrust within Yoder‘s ethics
has both strength and weakness. The strength lies on Yoder‘s Christocentric ethics which
recognizes the importance of Jesus‘ nonviolent lifestyle in Christian discipleship not only
individually but also communally. This understanding is needed in a Christian world that
has for the most part gives emphasis on the idea of the individual as the sole agent in the
faithful Christian life. Yoder correctly sees that even if it is possible for an individual to
live out the demands in the antitheses, it would be necessarily be unfaithful if and only if
it is only individual, for the kingdom of God is inherently communal. He instead argues
not only for an individual faithfulness but also for a communal one. The weakness in
giving emphasis for such communal discipleship, however, lies on the risk that other
important elements of Christian theology seem underrepresented. In this case, though
Yoder states that the kingdom is something that came solely from God in Jesus by the
Holy Spirit, and not by human works,69 the emphasis on the church as the witness for the
kingdom has the risk to imply that the community and not the continuing grace of God is
the sustainer of such a witness. Certainly it is of the believing community‘s volition to
bring the testimony of God‘s kingdom on earth. Still, Yoder should argue more explicitly
69

John Howard Yoder, The Original Revolution, 55.

138
that it is only possible by the continuing grace of God. Otherwise, he would not give an
adequate account of the pervasive nature of sin and the necessity of God‘s grace to even a
communal attempt to live out the kingdom faithfully.

CHAPTER SIX: ROMAN CATHOLIC INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTITHESES
I. Introduction
The previous chapters deal with theologians from different theological traditions
in their interpretation of the antitheses. While one‘s theological background influences
one‘s biblical interpretation, it should not be assumed that such interpretation is the
interpretation of the given theological tradition. For example, it is not correct to say that
Calvin‘s interpretation of the antitheses is the Reformed interpretation of the antitheses.
His interpretation is indeed part of the Reformed tradition but it is not to say that other
Reformed theologians must follow the way Calvin interprets the antitheses in order to
demonstrate their adherence to Reformed tradition. One should not look at Calvin as the
exclusive standard by which to judge subsequent Reformed theology and biblical
interpretation. To do that is to revive the setback of ―Calvin vs. the Calvinists.‖ Propping
up Calvin as the one measure by which later Reformed thought must be assessed is
troublesome in many respects, not least of which is the theological variety evident
already in the earliest years of the formation of the Reformed tradition distinct from
Lutheranism within the broader Protestant orbit.1
The aim of this chapter is to formulate a churchly interpretation of the antitheses.
One way to achieve this purpose is to look at the Roman Catholic interpretation of the
antitheses. The enduring hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church (RCC)
makes this attempt doable. The Catechism and the encyclicals of the RCC generally
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exercise authority over the doctrine and life of her people.2 The official Catechism itself
is a source on which to base other catechisms and other expositions of Catholic doctrine.3
It is given, as stated in the Apostolic Constitution ―Fidei Depositum,‖ with which its
publication is ordered, ―that it may be a sure and authentic reference text for teaching
catholic doctrine and particularly for preparing local catechisms.‖4 Within the RCC itself
there are also some individual comments on the antitheses.5 This chapter will only
indirectly consider them as far as they can make some allusions or comments pertinent to
the interpretation of the antitheses set forth in the Catechism or the encyclicals.
There are six antitheses found in verses 21-48 of Matthew 5 and the Catechism, in
its exposition of the Decalogue,6 always juxtaposes any antithesis with a corresponding
commandment in the Decalogue. The fifth antithesis (on Oaths) is put together with the
second commandment (―You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain‖) and
the eighth commandment (―You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor‖). The
2
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first (on Murder), the fifth (on Eye for Eye) and the sixth (on Love for Enemies) are with
the fifth commandment (―You shall not kill‖). The second (on Adultery) and the third (on
Divorce) are with the sixth commandment (―You shall not commit adultery‖).
By relating the antitheses to the Decalogue, the Catechism of RCC teaches two
things. First, it argues that in the antitheses Jesus is not throwing down a gauntlet and
relentlessly contrasting the instructions of Moses in the Decalogue with his own
demands. Instead, Jesus is functioning here as the Old Testament prophets did and calling
his countrymen to a faithful living out of the demands of the Mosaic Torah. Through the
antitheses, Jesus is challenging contemporary Jewish rabbinical misinterpretation of the
Decalogue. Second, the RCC considers that the antitheses are derived from the universal
moral order – through which the Decalogue is also derived – and revealed to Christians to
govern their individual moral conduct.
II. The antitheses and the Decalogue
The RCC does not judge the antitheses to challenge the adequacy of the
Decalogue in the texts themselves. This is evident in the teaching of the Catechism on the
relationship between Jesus and the Law and on the correction Jesus gives through the
antitheses to the corrupted interpretation of some commands in the Decalogue by the
Pharisees and scribes of his time.
A. Jesus and the law
The RCC‘s position on this matter, that Jesus and Torah are in complete harmony
when both are properly understood and interpreted, involves the broader question of
Jesus‘ attitude toward the Mosaic Law, not only in general, but specifically in light of his
strong remarks reaffirming its authority immediately before presenting his antitheses
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(Matthew 5:17-20). The RCC assumes that Jesus derives his commands in the Decalogue
and intends his six antitheses to be reaffirmations of the Decalogue. As the Catechism
explains:
In Jesus, the same Word of God, that had resounded on Mount Sinai to give the
written Law of Moses, made itself heard anew on the Mount of the Beatitudes.
Jesus did not abolish the Law but fulfilled it by giving its ultimate interpretation
in a divine way: ―You have heard that it was said to the men of Old…but I say to
you…‖ With this same divine authority, he disavowed certain human traditions of
the Pharisees that were ―making void the word of God.‖7
With the antitheses, as the RCC posits in the Catechism, Jesus is not contrasting an old
Law with a new one. Instead, he is contrasting a Jewish interpretation of the Law with his
own. This implies the targets of Jesus‘ antitheses. If Jesus‘ teaching is consistent with the
Mosaic and prophetic revelation of old and yet is also against something, the only proper
target of his argument is the rabbinical or popular interpretation of his day.
The RCC‘s view is that the Pharisees and the scribes in Jesus‘ day have lapsed
into ―hypocritical casuistry.‖8 They relentlessly try to determine a moral response
appropriate to a particular case to the point that they only produce meticulous rules for
outward actions to keep, forgetting the more important matters of the law. For example,
Jesus condemns their teaching of giving a tenth of the spices which disregards justice,
mercy and faithfulness (Matthew 23:23). They interpret and apply the Decalogue to fit
their situation. While this practical approach to morality is laudable, they take it too far in
that their interpretation of the law replaces the law itself. With the antitheses, Jesus
presents with divine authority the correct interpretation of the Law. Specifically, he
makes it more explicitly internal as well as external conduct.
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The RCC understands the antitheses as new normative covenant Law: ―At the
beginning of the Sermon on the Mount Jesus issued a solemn warning in which he
presented God‘s law, given on Sinai during the first covenant, in light of the grace of the
New Covenant.‖9 The antitheses preserve the continuity with the old Mosaic Law. Both
express the implications of belonging to God through the establishment of the covenant.
―Moral existence is,‖ the Catechism propounds, ―a response to the Lord‘s loving
initiative.‖10 The Israelites of the Old Testament responds to God‘s loving initiative in
their obedient observance of the Decalogue. In the same way, as their response to their
Lord‘s loving initiative the Christians of the New Testament observe the New Law.
The antitheses, as the New Law, do not replace the Old Law. They are new in the
sense that Jesus is stressing the transformation in the life of his followers. The Catechism
expounds in this way: ―The Lord‘s Sermon on the Mount, far from abolishing or
devaluing the moral prescriptions of the Old Law…does not add new external precepts,
but proceeds to reform the heart, the root of human acts, where man chooses between the
pure and the impure, where faith, hope and charity are formed and with them the other
virtues.‖ 11 The new Law set by Jesus in the antitheses points toward the complete inner
renewal and transformation in the life of the believer as the goal. It is a total shift of the
balance, of the point of view. Jesus‘ followers are not confronted with the tablets telling
them what to do. Mere external observance of the Old Law may bring people to lapse
into hypocritical casuistry. This is evident in the rabbinical interpretation of the
Decalogue in Jesus‘ time. In contrast, the antitheses demonstrate that Jesus brings the
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Mosaic Law to its fullness by means of internal and external observance of the law. It is
internally motivated as a response to the divine generosity and encouraged to imitate the
perfection of the heavenly Father. This internal motivation expressed itself through
external moral actions such as forgiveness of enemies and prayer for persecutors. Jesus‘
followers are to obey the antitheses and the Decalogue because they still need, by the
grace of God, to perfected (―Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect,‖
(Matthew 5:48).
The view of life transformation that the RCC has in the antitheses further
demonstrates Jesus‘ teaching on the totality of morality in the lives of his followers. The
Catechism does not regard the antitheses mainly as teaching an ethic of disposition, that
is, an ethic which only emphasizes internal attitudes over against external acts. In this
view, what matters is not the action but the motivation. One proponent of this ethic, for
example, is Ernest F. Scott. He interprets the ethical teaching of Jesus in the antitheses as
mere true inwardness: ―Hence he [Jesus] declares that the good or evil of an act consists
wholly in its motive and that the moral task is nothing else than the right ordering of the
inner life.‖12 For Scott, to have the right motive or a good attitude is the most essential
element in evaluating the morality of an action The RCC is against this over-emphasized
inwardness in interpreting the antitheses
In ethics, as the Catechism explains, motivation is concerned with the goal of an
action. Motivation or attitude, theoretically, is a movement of the will toward an end and
since it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, the motive
resides in the acting subject. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken.
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Since motive is not only limited to directing individual actions, it can also guide several
actions toward one and the same purpose.13 In other words, one action can be inspired by
several motivations. For example, a service done with the end of helping one‘s neighbor
can be inspired by the love of God. One and the same action, however, can also have the
motive of obtaining favor or the desire to boast about it.
The problem with an ethic which over-emphasizes motives over deeds, as Scott
does, lies in the motives themselves. The RCC argues that a right motive does not make
behavior that is intrinsically wrong, such as slander and murder, good or just. The end
does not justify the means.14 Obviously, Jesus also intends his followers to develop a new
attitude in his teaching of the antitheses. But Jesus does not stop there. He also requires a
new obedience, which includes the entirety, both motives and actions, of the life of his
followers. A true attitude or motive should manifest itself in right behavior or moral
deeds such as reconciliation with a neighbor and love for an enemy.
The RCC recognizes this totality of morality in Jesus‘ teaching of the antitheses
since the Catechism defines the New Law, which finds its expression in the antitheses, as
a law of love, a law of grace, and a law of freedom.15 The New Law is a law of love
because the motive of love, infused by the Holy Spirit, inspires the moral action. The
right motive, in contrast to a wrong one such as fear, is the basis of the moral action in
this law of love. It is a law of grace because it bestows the strength of grace to act. This
law does not leave humans on their own to act but instead gives humans the grace and
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strength needed to perform the moral action. It is a law of freedom because it sets humans
free from the ritual and juridical observances of the Mosaic Law. This law of freedom
also sets them free from the status of servants who ―do not know what their master‘s
business‖ to that of a friend of Jesus, ―For everything that I learned from my Father I
have made known to you,‖ (John 15:15), even to the status of children and heir (John
1:12). In summary, Jesus in the antitheses overcomes the wrong interpretation of the
Mosaic Law which prevails in his era. The problem, however, is not with the Mosaic Law
itself. The problem is with a kind of casuistry that builds up around the Mosaic Law and
concentrates on finding or closing loopholes in the exterior observance of the law. In the
antitheses, Jesus shifts the attention to human heart, the root of human acts, without
simply doing away with the exterior moral precepts. The antithesis of ―oaths‖ discussed
below will demonstrate this.
B. Jesus’ correction to the erroneous interpretation of “oaths” (Matthew 5:33-37)
In the fourth antithesis (Matthew 5:33-37), Jesus mentions some of typical oath
takings. Taking an oath by heaven, the earth or Jerusalem is a typical of Jewish practice.
According to Deuteronomy 6:13 and 10:20, oaths are to be taken in the name of God, but
by the time of Jesus, pious Jews evidently would not utter that name. The oblique terms
―heaven,‖ ―earth,‖ and ―Jerusalem‖ are used in oaths as metonymies, circumlocutions
associated with God. Such oaths are mentioned in the Mishnah16 (eg., Sebi‘it 4.13 and
Sanhedrin 3.2) and viewed as not binding by at least some authorities (for example,
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Mishnah Nedarim 1.3).17 If it was claimed by some of his era that oaths by heaven or
earth or Jerusalem or one‘s head were not binding, then Jesus shows that an oath is an
oath regardless of how oblique the reference to God (Matthew 5:34-36) by linking
heaven and earth and Jerusalem to God.
The Catechism interprets Jesus‘ teaching in Matthew 5:33-37 by looking at the
fourth antithesis – ―oaths‖ – from the perspective of the second commandment (―You
shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain‖) and of the eighth commandment
(―You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor‖). It juxtaposes the fourth
antithesis with the second commandment to demonstrate that ―Jesus teaches that every
oath involves a reference to God and that God‘s presence and his truth must be honored
in all speech. Discretion in calling upon God is allied with a respectful awareness of his
presence, which all our assertions either witness to or mock.‖18 And the eighth
commandment and fourth antithesis expose the same implication, which is, to call the
members of God‘s people to ―live in truth‖ in order to ―bear witness to their God who is
the truth and wills the truth.‖19 The Catechism does not interpret Jesus‘ saying: ―All you
need to say is simply ‗Yes‘ or ‗No‘‖ to mean his followers should never take an oath.
Instead, the saying is about living in truthfulness and sincerity.20 Offenses against the
truth by word or deed express a refusal to commit oneself to moral uprightness. Those
offenses toward others are fundamentally offenses to God himself.
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In the Old Testament, oaths are permitted as long as irreverence and falsehood are
not involved (e.g. Genesis 14:22; Joshua 2:12). If one‘s heart is right with God, upright
speech will transparently represent what is in one‘s heart. Perjury and false witness will
not occur. Oaths are to ensure the truthfulness of one‘s word and of one‘s resolve to
follow through on obligations (Exodus 20:7; 1 Kings 8:31-32). The problem emerges
when oaths are taken to distinguish two classes of utterances, one with a vow committing
the speaker to veracity and the other without a vow, implying no such commitment. In
Jesus‘ era, subtle casuistic distinctions between binding and non-binding oaths have
further messed up things (cf. Matthew 23:16-22).
Matthew 23:16-22 reveals a highly developed Jewish casuistry in oath-making.
Where verbal oaths provide the assurance, the precise location and accessibility of that
assurance becomes important. If one swears by the temple, it is not binding, but if one
swears by the temple‘s gold, it is. If one swears by the altar of sacrifice, it is not binding,
but if one swears by the gift on the altar, it is. One set of oaths is not binding presumably
because if a debtor cannot pay the debt, his creditor cannot place a lien on the assurance.
The other set of oaths is binding because the gold or the gift on the altar can be seized in
compensation for broken pledges. Jesus is against this wrong interpretation of taking an
oath. As in Matthew 5:33-37, Jesus expounds that all oaths directly or indirectly appeal to
God. All are therefore binding since they call on him to guarantee their fulfillment. Any
deviation from truthfulness in speech, any desire to use speech, even an oath, to deceive
another is prohibited.
Both Matthew 5:33-37 and Matthew 23:16-22 demonstrates that Jesus is
concerned with the common oaths that were abundant in his society. He is not addressing
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judicial oaths. Jesus himself did not refuse when he was put under judicial oath by the
high priest: ―I charge you under oath by the living God: tell us if you are the Messiah, the
Son of God‖ (Matthew 26:63). Whether the words ―I swear‖ were in his response or not,
Jesus was still making a statement under oath when he responded, ―You have said so‖
(v.64). This is the reason that the Catechism understands the fourth antithesis does not
exclude ―oaths made for grave and right reasons (for example, in court).‖21 It explains
that since an oath is the invocation of the divine name as a witness to truth, one can take
an oath only in truth, in judgment and in justice: ―When it is truthful and legitimate, an
oath highlights the relationship of human speech with God‘s truth. A false oath calls on
God to be witness to a lie.‖22 The Catechism sets forth at least two conditions which
explicitly prohibit one taking an oath.23 First, one should not take an oath and use it for
trivial affairs. And secondly, one may refuse to take an oath required by civil authorities
when it is required for purposes contrary to the dignity of humanity.
In sum, the RCC does not understand the ―Oath‖ antithesis to mean a refusal to
take court oaths. By connecting the antithesis with the second and the eighth
commandments, the RCC argues for the importance of truthfulness. Although in the Old
Testament the practice of oath taking was encouraged, or at least allowed, as a means of
testifying God‘s truth in one‘s personal interactions with others, as it evolved, especially
in Jesus‘ era, it apparently often became a way by which many have avoided
responsibility. Perhaps no one plans to corrupt the law, but the rabbis spoil the goal of
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verifying truthfulness and substitute it with deceitfulness. Jesus is against this
misappropriation and denies the subtle distinctions that some used to invalidate their
oaths. Yet at the same time, the RCC understands that Jesus instead demands here a
person‘s word which can be relied upon without qualification and without need of the
further guarantee an oath might afford. Jesus shifts the attention to human heart, the root
of human acts without all together abolishing all actions of taking oaths in different
occasions or contexts. Where oaths are not being used evasively and truthfulness is not
being threatened, it is a mistake to understand the antithesis to disallow people from
taking an oath in a court of justice. For the RCC, the issue is nothing less than and
nothing more than truthfulness which should be expressed either in everyday speech or
even in an oath taking.
III. The extent of the antitheses
The previous section on Oath is an example showing that the starting point for the
RCC‘s discussion of the antitheses is typically their relationship to the Decalogue and
that the RCC does not understand the antitheses to supersede the Decalogue. The
Catechism teaches that the New Law, which is expressed particularly in the Sermon on
the Mount, ―refines, surpasses and leads the Old Law to its perfection.‖24 This means that
for the RCC there is no abrupt discontinuity between different epochs of the law. There is
rather a progressive penetration of the law into the human person, beginning at creation
with the natural law, proceeding through the covenant at Sinai, reaching its summit in the
Sermon on the Mount. The Catechism explains in this way: ―The New Law or the Law of
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the Gospel is the perfection here on earth of the divine law, natural and revealed.‖25 The
New Law does not abrogate the Old Law but instead perfects it. The natural law is not
superseded any more than the old law is. Here one can see the RCC‘s doctrine of the
natural law in play. At this point, the RCC‘s teaching on the natural law will be briefly
explored in order to understand appropriately the extent of the antitheses, whether they
are universal and whether they are intended to govern the conduct of individuals.
A. RCC’s teaching on natural law
The Catechism explains that there are different expressions of God‘s law and all
of them interrelated: 1) eternal law – the source, in God, of all law; 2) natural law; 3)
revealed law, comprising the Old Law and the New Law, or the Law of the Gospel; and
finally, 4) civil and ecclesiastical laws.26 On the natural law, the Catechism teaches that it
is a participation on the part of human beings in the eternal law since through the natural
law a human person participates ―in the wisdom and goodness of the Creator who gives
him mastery over his acts and the ability to govern himself with a view to the true and the
good.‖27 All humans receive their being from God since they are created in the divine
image. They participate in divine reason by being created in God‘s image. As a result,
they possess the natural light of reason and know the primary precepts of the natural law
through the natural light of reason. The natural law is expressed in the original moral
sense which enables humans to discern by reason the good and the evil, the truth and the
lie. This law is therefore called ―natural‖ because it properly belongs to human nature.
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Humans are enabled to understand that God commands the precepts of natural law
because of the way in which God has created humanity.
According to the Catechism, the natural law has the following characteristics: 1) it
is universal; 2) it is immutable; and 3) it is established by God for the common good of
humanity:28
1. It is universal and ―present in the heart of each man and established by reason.‖29
Its authority extends to all people since it expresses the dignity of a human
person, created in the image of God. It lays down universal principles for human
action that all humans recognize as binding. Application of the natural law may
differ greatly. It can demand reflection which should consider conditions of
human life according to places, times and circumstances. Nevertheless, in the
diversity of cultures, the natural law remains as a rule that binds humans among
themselves and imposes on them, beyond the inevitable differences, common and
cultural principles.
2. It is immutable and ―permanent throughout the variations of history.‖30 It does not
change over time or from culture to culture. It still subsists under the change of
thoughts and traditions. It remains substantially valid and cannot be removed
from the heart of humans even when it is rejected in its very principles.
3. It is established by God for the common good of humanity and it ―provides the
necessary basis for the civil law with which it is connected, whether by a
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reflection that draws conclusions from its principles, or by additions of a positive
and juridical nature.‖31 As the natural law prompts humans to pursue the common
good, they discover that the good to be pursued is the good in itself, God. The
Catechism explains that the natural law ―shows man the way to follow so as to
practice the good and attain his end…It [the natural law] hinges upon the desire
for God submission to him, who is the source and judge of all that is good.‖32 It is
the natural law that directs human beings toward God as the goal of all their
activities.
By the natural law, humans could know moral truth. They have the ability to
perceive the basic moral principles necessary for peaceful coexistence. The Fall,
however, has damaged and weakened this ability, though it was not utterly destroyed or
obliterated or incapacitated. The Catechism teaches that because of the Fall sinful
humans need grace and revelation so that moral and religious truth may be known ―by
everyone with facility, with firm certainty and with no admixture of error.‖33 Because of
the Fall humans need the revealed law in order to properly understand the natural law
which is written and engraved in the heart of every person. Even though the Fall has
caused the precepts of the natural law cannot be perceived by everyone clearly and
immediately, through the natural law God has prepared a foundation for human beings to
receive his revealed law and grace, namely, the ability to discern the good and the evil,
the truth and the lie. This kind of relationship between the revealed and the natural
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demonstrates that the revealed law, like the natural law, expresses many truths naturally
accessible to reason which humans have been hindered to recognize because of their
sinful nature.
Summing up the RCC‘s position on the natural law and the need of the revealed
law, John Paul II in his encyclical letter, Veritatis Splendor, teaches that the natural law is
simply the eternal law implanted in rational beings. Since the Fall has damaged the
faculty of human reason, reason must be enlightened by revelation, beginning with the
commandments on Sinai, or the Decalogue.34 The Catechism concurs in this way: ―The
commandments of the Decalogue, although accessible to reason alone, have been
revealed. To attain a complete and certain understanding of the requirements of the
natural law, sinful humanity needs this revelation.‖35 In other words, the Decalogue
discloses a privileged expression of the natural law. Even though it is revealed
specifically to the Israel of the Old Testament, they are universally binding because they
express the natural law. They teach all people the true humanity of human beings. They
bring to light the essential duties of what it means to be a human being, which implies
they show the fundamental rights inherent in the nature of the human person.
B. The antitheses are universal and individual
The RCC understands the New Law, expressed in the antitheses, perfects the Old
Law, which expresses the natural law and is articulated in the Decalogue. Again, the
Catechism says, ―The New Law or the Law of the Gospel is the perfection here on earth
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of the divine law, natural and revealed.‖36 The encyclical letter of John Pope II confirms
this position by stating: ―The ‗Sermon on the Mount‘ – a sermon which contains the
fullest and most complete formulation of the New Law (cf. Mt. 5-7), clearly linked to the
Decalogue entrusted by God to Moses on Mount Sinai.‖37 The Decalogue obliges all
people, not only Israel, because even though it is privilegedly expressed to Israel, it also
expresses the natural law. In the same way, even though the antitheses, which are part of
the New Law, are privilegedly revealed to Christians, they are universally binding since
they are also the expression of the natural law.
The RCC also considers the antitheses are for individual Christians in their daily
activities. The Catechism never considers making them into laws for a State. In every
discussion of an antithesis and its counterpart in the Decalogue, the Catechism thinks of
the lives of individual Christians and not of States. This is evident, for example, in its
teaching on the sixth or last antithesis: ―love for enemies‖ (Matthew 5:43-48).
C. Love for enemies (Matthew 5:43-48)
The Catechism contrasts between Jesus‘ teaching on love for enemies with hatred
of the neighbor.38 Hatred of the neighbor is when one intentionally wishes others evil.
The Catechism links love for enemies with the fifth commandment of the Decalogue
because when anger reaches the point of an intentional desire to murder or seriously
injure others, it is against the command of love, including love for enemies. The
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command on love for enemies, like the fifth commandment, forbids the denigration of
human life and dignity of human persons.
While love for enemies forbids the intentional destruction of human life, the
Catechism explains that public authorities ―have the right and duty to impose on the
citizens the obligation necessary for national defense.‖39 The Catechism here
distinguishes between individual moral conduct expressed in the antithesis‖ loving your
enemies‖ with the State obligation to establish justice. The antithesis ―loving your
enemies‖ is not a moral obligation for the State to comply. This explanation is not for the
RCC an exception to the prohibition against denigration of human life and dignity of
human persons which the command on love for enemies calls for individuals to practice.
There are two reasons. First, the RCC recognizes the doctrine of legitimate defense; and
secondly, the doctrine of just war.
The Catechism argues that love toward oneself is a fundamental principle of
morality.40 It is legitimate to insist on respect for one‘s own right to life. Someone who
defends his or her life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his or her
aggressor a lethal blow. Thus, it is a legitimate defense. For the RCC, this doctrine is not
only a right but also a duty for one who is responsible for the lives of others. The
Catechism further explains that the defense of the common good requires that an unjust
aggressor be rendered unable to cause harm.41 This is the reason for those who
legitimately hold authority also have the right to use arms to repel aggressors against the
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civil community entrusted to their responsibility. It is also called a legitimate defense by
military force or a just war. This leads to the second reason, the doctrine of just war.
The Catechism gives four ―rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy‖ at one and
the same time in order for a State to engage in a just war.42 Those conditions should be at
one and the same time because such a decision to engage in a just war is only the last
resort. The doctrine of just war gives four painstaking conditions: 1) the damage inflicted
by the aggressor on the defender must be lasting, grave and certain; 2) all other means of
putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective; 3) there must
be serious prospects of success; and 4) the use of arms must not produce evils and
disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.
The RCC also argues that even individuals can still practice the command on love
for enemies while they are having a legitimate defense or participating in a just war. The
Catechism explains that the command is incompatible with hatred of one‘s enemy as a
person, but not with hatred of the evil one does as an enemy.43 Love for enemies only
calls for charity towards humans as a person and not towards their evil deeds. One can
therefore, as a soldier, engage in a just war to kill the aggressors because of their evil
deeds but still love them as fellow human beings.
The Catechism further recognizes that ―public authorities should make equitable
provision for those who for reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms; these are
nonetheless obliged to serve the human community in some other way.‖44 In the RCC‘s
teaching, a State or nation should allow some of its citizens, because of their conscience,
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to refuse to be enlisted in a military draft. The command on love for enemies
demonstrates charity towards humans as a person and not their wicked actions. Because
of this charity, for some people, whether they are Christians or not, their conscience
forbids them to engage in killing others in a war. By suggesting that the state should not
draft those who refuse to kill because of this command, the RCC understands the
command on love for enemies is intended to govern the conduct of individuals and not of
States.
IV. Summary and assessments
A. Summary
The RCC understands that Jesus‘ view of the law as valid until the end of time
means that his teaching of the antitheses is in true continuity with the past. The antitheses
do not abolish the Decalogue. Jesus alone and not the Pharisees can interpret the Mosaic
Law finally and authoritatively. This is the explanation of the teaching of Jesus in the
antitheses which cuts through the casuistry of the scribes and Pharisees. Jesus‘
commitment to the whole law is no less serious than theirs, but he alone in a position to
properly demonstrates the intended meaning of the Mosaic Law. The RCC therefore
contrasts Jesus‘ exposition of the true and ultimate meaning of the Decalogue with the
more common, rabbinic understanding of the commandments. The antitheses indeed
involve no annulment of the law but represent the goal and fulfillment of its intended
meaning. In this way the RCC demonstrates the significance of the antitheses which
involves a departure from common understandings of the law in Jesus‘ era.
By relating the antitheses to the Decalogue in the Catechism, the RCC also
demonstrates the extent of the antitheses. They are universal (binding on all people) and
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individual (intended to govern the conduct of individuals). As the Decalogue contains the
privileged expression of the natural law, the antitheses also express the natural law. In
this matter, even though the New Law is privilegedly revealed to Christians, they are
universally binding. While they are binding universally, RCC further recognizes that the
antitheses are ethics directed more to the conduct of persons, rather than States. That is,
these demands are to govern the conduct of individuals and not intended to guide the
conduct of States.
B. Assessments
Roland H. Worth, Jr. in his book, The Sermon on the Mount: Its Old Testament
Roots, lays out two basic approaches to the question of Jesus‘ intent in the antitheses.45
The first approach is that Jesus and the Mosaic Law are in complete harmony when both
are properly understood and interpreted. The second is that Jesus contrasts the Mosaic
Law and gives a new and contradictory teaching. The position of the RCC in this matter
is clear. The RCC approaches the question of Jesus‘ intent in the antitheses from the first
perspective. When Jesus offers his contrasts (―But I say to you‖), he is not contradicting
the Law but offering his own interpretation over against the interpretation of scribes and
Pharisees in his era.
The RCC has also maintained the universality of the antitheses by way of the
natural law doctrine. Even though the antitheses are revealed to Christians, they are
universally binding. This position implies that one should not claim the antitheses to be
exclusively Christian in the sense that they are something revealed only from the context
of Christianity. In fact, for example, the command on love for enemies, as John Nolland
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points out, ―has in one form or another wide province and a long history.‖46 The ancient
Babylonian text Counsels of Wisdom, lines 41-45, teaches: ―Do not return evil to the man
who disputes with you; requite with kindness your evil-doer…smile on your
adversary.‖47 The antitheses are indeed distinctively Christian since they are revealed and
recorded in Christian Scripture, but they are not exclusively Christian.
When the RCC argues for the universality of the antitheses, they also demonstrate
the antitheses are precepts to govern individual moral conducts. The RCC still recognizes
the distinction between precepts-counsels.48 The distinction is established in relation to
charity, the perfection of Christian life. The purpose of precepts is to remove whatever is
incompatible with charity. The counsels are intended to remove whatever might hinder
the development of charity, even if it is not contrary to it. Precept has as its object an
unconditional obligation. Counsel is an invitation or suggestion which does not oblige,
but leaves the decision up to the one invited. In their teaching of the antitheses, the RCC
do not encourage their members to understand that some of the antitheses are precepts
and others are counsels. Nowhere in the Catechism there is the teaching that, for
example, loving enemies is not a command but only a counsel. They consider the moral
demands in the antitheses are precepts which oblige everyone to obey.
There is here a development approach taken by the RCC in their interpretation of
the antitheses throughout history. In the era of Reformation, as Chapter 3 of this
dissertation on Calvin shows, that the RCC of his time interprets the antithesis of loving
enemies as a counsel. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to trace the development
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of the RCC‘s interpretation of that antithesis from the Reformation era to the present day.
At least here, as the chapter demonstrates, according to the Catechism of the Catholic
Church the distinction of precepts and counsels in the interpretation of the antithesis of
loving enemies no longer exists.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE ANTITHESES ARE BINDING ON ALL PEOPLE
I. Introduction
The interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, as Graham Stanton points out,
may be divided into five sets of overlapping questions.1 One of those five sets is the
question of audience: to whom is the Sermon on the Mount addressed? To women and
men in general, or only to those committed to the way of Jesus?2 The introduction and
conclusion (Matthew 5:1 and 7:28) imply that Jesus addressed the sermon to the crowds,
but Matthew 5:2 notes that when the disciples had gathered around him, Jesus began to
address them.
Especially with the antitheses (Matthew 5:21-48), the question of audience
involves some ethical issues. While the question of audience is not determinative (since
Jesus may address the disciples with the crowd in his mind or vice versa), it can become a
factor in how to interpret the sense of oughtness in the antitheses. If Jesus only intended
the antitheses for his disciples, then his demands would only be binding on those
committed to the way of Jesus. If Jesus intended the antitheses for the crowds, however,
then his demands would be binding on everyone, regardless of whether they were
committed to the way of Jesus or not.
The study of previous chapters has shown that there is no one voice with respect
to the answer of how to interpret the sense of oughtness in the antitheses. Here I will offer
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a brief summary of each to demonstrate the different voices in the interpretation. A more
detailed analysis will come later.
Leonardo Boff‘s concern for the reality of the socially oppressed seems to cause
him to dismiss the scriptural teaching of the antitheses as moral norms binding on all
people, rich and poor alike. While Boff argues that the antitheses should not bind
especially the poor to obey, both John Calvin and Helmut Thielicke argue that the
antitheses are binding on all people. Against the interpretation that the sixth antithesis
(Matthew 5:41-48) is exclusively for the monks, Calvin argues instead that the command
to love one‘s enemies ―had formerly been delivered to all the Jews‖ and then ―delivered
universally to all Christians.‖3 Calvin is suggesting here that the antitheses are like the
Decalogue. While the Decalogue is delivered to the Israelites, they are binding on all
people, Israelites and non-Israelites. Commenting on the Decalogue, Calvin says: ―This
law has been admitted by men, without knowing that ever Moses spoke it. For indeed
Our Lord had printed the things in men‘s hearts, which he did set forth in writing to his
people.‖4 Similarly, Calvin suggests, while the antitheses are delivered to Christians, it is
binding on all people, Christians and non-Christians. While Calvin employs an argument
by analogy,5 Thielicke employs the usus elencthicus of the law to apply the demands of
the antitheses to all people. As I have shown in chapter 4, Thielicke argues that for nonChristians the antitheses call for their qualitative justification and for Christians the
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antitheses focus on their quantitative justification. The similarity lies in its indictment the
antitheses have for both Christians and non-Christians of their fallen nature and their
need of redemption. The difference lies in that while for non-Christians the indictment
may bring them to despair, for Christians it may help them to advance in their spiritual
life.
Similar to Calvin, the Romans Catholic Church also believes that the antitheses
are not something only for Christians, even though they provide moral norms for the
Christian life. The Roman Catholics also employ an argument of analogy, – arguing that
the antitheses affirm the same general moral precepts of the Decalogue, which are
binding on all people. The chapter on John Howard Yoder, in contrast, has shown that for
him the antitheses are Jesus‘ teachings only for Christians. In this specific text, namely
the antitheses, the particularity of Christian ethics is most apparent. Yoder chooses not to
make the argument that they can be binding on everyone, even though he may think so.
The antitheses, at the moment of their deliverance, are taught by Jesus to his Jewish
disciples. Clearly they are given to Christians. Yoder is therefore going with what is
explicit in the original setting.
Later in this chapter I will consider the study of previous chapters in a more
detailed way as I argue that the antitheses are binding on all people. I will first explain
two premises which, if shown to be true, establish the thesis of this chapter: (1) what is
moral is binding on all people and (2) the antitheses are moral; therefore, the antitheses
are binding on all people. I will then compare and contrast the thesis with the study of
previous chapters. Finally, I will provide a specific example, the sixth antithesis, to
illustrate what it means to say that the antitheses are binding on all people.
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II. Morality and the antitheses
This section consists of two parts. Each part explains one premise of the thesis.
First, what is moral is binding on all people. Second, the antitheses are moral. Therefore,
the antitheses are binding on all people (the thesis).
A. On “what is moral is binding on all people”
In order to explain the first premise I will elaborate one the word ―moral‖ used
here. By definition, it is true that something moral is binding on all people. Below is the
explanation.
A1. On morality
The word ―moral‖ is derived from the Latin word mos (the plural is mores, the
adjective is moralis), which is interrelated with metiri, to measure. The Latin mos has the
same meaning as the Greek ethos.6 The Latin mores has come into the English language
without modification. English dictionary speaks of the mores of a group, meaning
thereby, as the Oxford English Dictionary says: ―The shared habits, manners, and
customs of a community or social group.‖7 It expresses how people do conduct
themselves locally.
In this chapter I will distinguish the sense of the word ―moral‖ with small m from
the word ―Moral‖ with the capital M. The term ―moral‖, with small m, refers to local
norms imbedded in local mores. In English usage the Morals of a people or the Morality
of a group, is not the same as its morals or morality. The Morality of an individual or a
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group is not the way a person or a community does act locally, but the way a person or a
community thinks all people ought to act universally. The word ―Moral‖ and ―Morality‖
has reference not in the first place to local practice, but to the universal norms and
standards that govern local practice, particularly to proximate norms and standards. The
Oxford English Dictionary recognizes this distinction when it defines Moral and Morality
in this way:
―moral, adj.‖: of or relating to the distinction between right and wrong, or good
and evil, in relation to the actions, desires, or character of responsible human
beings.
And
―morality, n.‖: the quality or fact of being morally right or wrong; the goodness or
badness of an action.8
The noun and the adjective in the English use show that the word ―Moral‖ deals with
universal norms for behaviors.
From the study of the origin of the word, the English word ―Morals‖ deals with
universal codes of behavior and is used much as a synonym for ―Morality.‖ In contrast to
the small letter m of ―morality‖ as a local norm, ―Morality‖ with the capital M stands for
universal precepts and principles. It is evident, however, that the practices of an
individual or group may be either better or worse than the individual or group‘s Morality.
A person may on occasion fall into immorality and even for a period live an immoral life
and yet have high Morals or be committed to a high type of Morality.
I would also like to draw attention to the fact that not every action has a Moral
property. I classify this kind of actions which are differentiated from Moral as non-Moral
or amoral. Non-Moral or amoral actions also differ from immoral actions. Committing
8
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massacre is said to be immoral but the question whether it is immoral is in fact a Moral
question; it is one of the questions in the domain of ethics. It is different, however, with
an action such as whether one puts his right foot or his left foot down first when he gets
out of bed in the morning. This kind of action is non-Moral or amoral and is no concern
of this dissertation.
Another example is a student who writes a chapter of her dissertation. The advisor
evaluates such an action, in the first place, in terms of defensible and indefensible. When
the student makes all sort of mistakes and shortcomings, the advisor does not yet say,
―That is immoral and evil,‖ but, ―That is indefensible and needs improvement.‖ A person
may falter intellectually without having to be reprimanded ethically. A mistake or even a
blunder in a chapter of a dissertation is still not immoral or in the same class as a
massacre. Or take some children who do their arithmetic exercise. The teacher would
judge such an action, in the first place, in terms of correct and incorrect instead of in
terms of Moral and immoral. When those children make all sorts of mistakes in their
calculation, the teacher would not say, ―That is immoral,‖ but ―That is incorrect.‖
The above examples show that while Morality simply puts a question or issue into
the category of ethics as opposed to other questions which are not in this domain, one
should recognize that there is a limit to what kind of actions ethics will deal with. Where
is the line, then, between Moral and non-Moral/amoral questions to be drawn in ethics?
This is a difficult question to answer, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation.9 At
9
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least this dissertation is concerned with the study that when an act-type, for example
lying, is to be considered as a Moral question, this usually means that one needs to refer
the act of lying to standards or rules according to which an action should be regulated, in
this case the standard of telling the truth.
From the etymology of the word, Morality is often used to refer to universal
action-guides to prescribe behavior, that is, Moral precepts. This is also to recognize the
broad scope of the concept Morality and how pervasively it may be infused into the
expectations one has for proper individual and social practices. This recognition is
pertinent for this dissertation project as it attempts to demonstrate a systematic study of
Morality. In this case, this dissertation limits its studies to Morality from Christian
perspectives. It especially attempts to reflect on the universal action-guides to prescribe
behavior in the antitheses (Matthew 5:21-48). In this chapter, this dissertation will
attempt to establish that they are binding on all people and not only Christians.
In addition, I would also like to point out that from Christian perspectives, there is
a distinction between Moral and spiritual.10 A spiritually good action understood here is
an action which is pleasing to God, in this case, the triune God Christians have faith in.
On the one hand, a human being might act Morally to other human beings but this act
might not be spiritually good or pleasing to God. This might be the case because
Christians believe that one can be Morally good but still spiritually corrupt. All humans

Ethical Principles,‖ Journal of Religious Ethics 5 (Spring 1977): 39-68; and Tom L. Beauchamp,
Philosophical Ethics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), chap. 1. Even if none of those three criteria is either
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essential marker.
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are sinful and alienated from God (cf. Romans 3:23). This implies that there is nothing
humans can do to please God unless their fallen status is first elevated. On the other hand,
a person might think that his or her action pleases God while such an action might also be
immoral. For instance, a Christian in a crusade for his or her religion might think that he
or she is doing something pleasing to God while ending up participating in killing many
innocent people.
To be more specific, the Heidelberg Catechism Q&A 91 explains that a good deed
arises out of true faith, conforms to God‘s law, and is done for his glory.11 For a Christian
the goodness of a good deed has both a Moral and a spiritual dimension. Truly spiritually
good deed can be done only by Christians. They cannot be done by non-Christians since
non-Christians lack the true faith in God. This implies that even doing a Moral action
according to the norms prescribed in the Decalogue is sin when it lacks faith and God‘s
glory. While it is still Moral, it does not please God. For Non-Christians, they can be
Moral (vs. immoral) specific to conduct, even apart from faith. This distinction between
Morality and spirituality is relevant to this dissertation project since it allows me to limit
the discussion of the demands in the antitheses (Matthew 5:21-48) to the realm of
Morality, in this case, the realm of inter-human relationships and not to expand itself to
the realm of spirituality, the realm of the relationship between humans and God.
A2. On the nature of morality
Morality, with the capital M as defined above, refers to a universal standard of
right or wrong for human conduct. Not everyone accepts this axiom, of course. Gilbert
Harman, at the beginning of the 21st century, even claims that the question whether there
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is a single true Morality is ―an unresolved issue in moral philosophy.‖ 12 There will
always be two camps. On one side are relativists, sceptics, nihilists, and noncognitivists.
On the other side are those who believe in a Morality that applies to everyone. To argue
for moral relativism is to argue something like this: that the dictates of morality arise
from some sort of convention or understanding among people, that different people arrive
at different understandings of what constitutes morality, and that there are no basic moral
demands that apply to everyone. In this view there are no universal Moral truths and also
everyone ought to follow the dictates of his or her own group. In other words, moral
relativism believes that there are only many moralities but there is no one Morality.
In this section, I will delineate first moral relativism, its advantages and
disadvantages. Then I will argue for Morality, also recognizing its advantages and
disadvantages. What I am trying to do is that while I admit that I do not belong to the
relativistic camp, I would like to recognize their position and attempt to fairly present
their argument.
A2a. On moral relativism
People do sometimes talk about Christian morality, Nazi morality, or about the
morality of the Greeks. When morality is used simply to refer to a norm of conduct put
forward by any actual group, including an entire society, then it is being used relatively.
Moral relativism appeals to this observable fact of moral diversity. People at different
places and times have widely divergent views about right and wrong. As George, one of
the main characters in the play Jumpers, says: ―Certainly a tribe which believes it confers
honour on its elders by eating them is going to be viewed askance by another which
12
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prefers to buy them a little bungalow somewhere.‖13 Gilbert Harman also argues that
members of different cultures often have different beliefs about right and wrong and
often act differently on their beliefs: ―Some societies allow slavery, some have caste
systems, which they take to be morally satisfactory, others reject both slavery and caste
systems as grossly unjust.‖14 In this sense, moralities can differ from each other quite
extensively in their content and in the foundation that members of the society claim their
morality to have.
This diversity is also evident even on those matters of morality where one would
expect people to agree with each other. Ruth Benedict illustrates this in her Patterns of
Culture, a classic introduction to the understanding of anthropology:
We might suppose that in the matter of taking life all peoples would agree on
condemnation. On the contrary, in the matter of homicide, it may be held that one
is blameless if diplomatic relations have been severed between neighbouring
countries, or that one kills by custom his first two children, or that a husband has a
right of life and death over his wife, or that it is the duty of the child to kill his
parents before they are old. It may be that those are killed who steal fowl, or who
cut their upper teeth first, or who are born on a Wednesday. Among some peoples
a person suffers torments at having caused an accidental death, among others it is
a matter of no consequence. Suicide also may be a light matter, the recourse of
anyone who has suffered some slight rebuff, an act that constantly occurs in a
tribe. It may be the highest and noblest act a wise man can perform. The very tale
of it, on the other hand, may be a matter for incredulous mirth, and the act itself
impossible to conceive as a human possibility. Or it may be a crime punishable by
law, or regarded as a sin against the gods.15
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These examples show that what is right in the eyes of one people may not be so in the
eyes of another, and moral relativists argue neither side can claim real truth for its
particular standard of moral norms. A different way of putting it would be that any
particular set of moral standards is purely conventional (like the example of taking life
should be considered condemnable above); where the idea of convention implies that
there are other equally proper ways of doing things. The moral relativist camp employs
these diverse examples to demonstrate their case for moral relativism. According to this
position, morality only refers to a norm of conduct put forward by a society or some other
group, such as a religion, and accepted by an individual for her own conduct. In this
view, morality is always relative to some culture and society and there is no such thing as
universal right and wrong for all people.
So instead of having anything to do with Moral universals, moral relativism
simply asserts that there are only different moralities of different communities. This camp
often gets a very bad caricature. Simon Blackburn observes that the ―freshman‖ moral
relativist is ―a nightmare figure of introductory classes in ethics, rather like the village
atheist (but what‘s so good about village theism?).‖16 David Wong wryly points out that
those in the moral relativism camp are even sometimes portrayed as having committed a
crime such as ―falling but a few slippery steps short of collaboration with the Nazis.‖17
Yet there is an attractive side to moral relativism. There are at least two ways in which
moral relativism can be appealing.
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First, moral relativism encourages toleration of different ways of living. By
definition moral relativism cannot make judgments of others outside the group, so those
who defend this view should be less arrogant and intolerant of other groups. This view
can make one less judgmental of others since it makes one disposed to accept without any
verdict the moral conduct of others. Moral relativism motivates one to have a permissive
attitude toward moral opinions and moral practices that differ from one‘s own. It may
even free one from bigotry, a stubborn and complete intolerance of any belief or practice
that is different from one‘s own.
Second, moral relativism rules out moral imperialism. Most people are not
comfortable with the blanket of moral imperialism that there is only one way of doing
things morally right, and that other people need to be forced into that way. For example,
female circumcision, the partial or total cutting away of the external female genitalia, has
been practiced for centuries in parts of Africa, generally as one element of a rite of
passage preparing young girls for womanhood and marriage. Critics of this practice
abhorrently call it female genital mutilation (FGM).18 On the surface, female
circumcision sounds like sexual abuse: it is the removal of a young woman's clitoris
practiced by some African cultures as an initiation ritual. While FGM has been roundly
condemned by many Western women, several African female scholars are arguing in
favor of the ritual. Dr. Fuambai Ahmadu of Sierra Leone is one of the scholars who are
pro-FGM, and even had her own clitoris cut with fellow members of the Kono ethnic
group as an adult. Ahmadu says that some of her Western feminist sisters ―insist on
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denying us this critical aspect of becoming a woman in accordance with our unique and
powerful cultural heritage.‖19 The moral relativist camp would agree with Ahmadu that in
this FGM debate many Western women have imposed their moral values on African
moral values. Moral relativism believes that if one culture does something moral in its
own way, then in any event no other culture should impose different moral values from
outside and force them to submit and to give up their own way of doing things. In the
thought of moral relativism a more pluralistic and relaxed appreciation of moral diversity
is often a welcome antidote to an embarrassing moral imperialism.
As appealing as moral relativism is in encouraging tolerance and dispelling moral
imperialism, it suffers some serious drawbacks. There are at least two: theoretical and
practical. Theoretically, recognizing the fact of moral diversity does not strictly entail
moral relativism. Practically, taken to its limit moral relativism can become moral
subjectivism, even moral nihilism.
Theoretically, there should be a distinction between any universal requirement
and its local enactment.20 Moral relativists base their claim that there is no universal
moral standard on the fact there is a multiplicity of moral codes. But moral diversity does
not prove that there are no moral universals. A universal standard can be locally enacted
in different ways. It is conventional, for example, to drive on either the right (the
American way of driving) or the left (the Indonesian way of driving). While moral
relativism might argue this example shows there is no universal standard, it is not

19

Fuambai Ahmadu, ―‗Aint‘ I a Woman Too?‘: Challenging Myths of Sexual Dysfunction in
Circumcised Women,‖ in Transcultural Bodies: Female Genital Cutting in Global Context, eds. Ylva
Hernlund and Bettina Shell-Duncan (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2007), 308 (278-310).
20

Calvin Van Reken, ―Basic Christian Ethics‖ (classnotes, Calvin Theological Seminary, Grand
Rapids, MI, 2005).

175
necessarily so. Certainly, from the example, there is here only the law of custom. But in
each country there has to be one universal rule to drive safely, or chaos would reign on
the street and traffic would grind to a halt. One culture may implement this universal
standard differently from others, but the universal standard is still there and remains the
same.
To be fair, the theoretical response to moral relativism does not necessarily also
entail Morality or moral universalism. It is because the standards do not have to be
fundamentally the one and the same. In other words, there is not necessarily one true
universal Morality. It is possible that there are instead many universal Moralities. This is
another version of moral relativism.21 Moral relativism can still argue for a pluralistic
morality, that there is more than one actual morality and no one set of moral standards
that can be properly considered the one true Morality. David Wong expresses this kind of
relativistic view.22 Different societies have different moral standards and they are deeply
influenced by their own culture and background.
Even if one concede with Wong and Harman that different moral practices in
societies may demonstrate many universal moral standards, this view, though it denies
that there is one true Morality, does not entail the impossibility of Moral knowledge or,
especially, of justification for Moral claims. As a result, this moral relativistic view still
leaves open the possibility that there might be only one true Morality, expressed in
different ways relative to the people and culture of the time. One may even use empirical
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evidence proposed by Benedict, quoted above, to support the claim that differences in
moral standards are indeed minor. While one may need not condemn the local enactment
of how a society conducts in taking its member‘s life (like one kills by custom his first
two children, or that a husband has a right of life and death over his wife, or that it is the
duty of the child to kill his parents before they are old), one may certainly question
whether taking one‘s life pointlessly is morally right or wrong. This shows that in all the
differences of the way in taking the life of others within different societies and cultures,
there might be an underlying universal moral principle, namely, that one should take the
life of others pointlessly.23 As Patrick Nowell-Smith once argued, that the more one
studies moral codes, the more one finds that they do not differ in major principles.24
Behind all those differences, it is possible that they are in accord with and give
expression to the one true Morality.
The practical response to moral relativism might be more appealing than the
theoretical one. Moral relativism argues that the only moral standards against which a
society's practices can be judged are its own. Such a position may indeed commend
tolerance and promote non-judgmental attitude toward others. As a theory for justifying
moral practices and beliefs, however, moral relativism would leave unresolved moral
disputes or even fail to recognize that some societies may have better reasons for holding
their views than others. This is evident when one considers some serious moral
dilemmas.
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There is this saying, ―when in Rome do as the Romans do.‖ But what if the
Romans go in for some rather horrid doings? For example, there are societies whose
norms allow the systematic oppression of many groups within their own: societies that
tolerate sati (a Hindu custom in India in which the widow was burnt to ashes on her dead
husband‘s pyre), societies that methodically deny education and other rights to women
and children, societies where there is no freedom of political expression, societies where
distinctions of religion or language bring with them distinctions of legal and civil status,
or even societies which abuse children and even toddlers by forcing them to do manual
labor. Can moral relativism still think ―if those societies do it that way, it‘s OK for them
and in any event none of my business?‖ If the answer is positive, then moral relativism is
basically saying, ―right or wrong is relative to a particular moral code.‖
The problem is that while a statement like ―doing X is right‖ or ―doing Y is
wrong‖ is clearly a judgment or normative statement (how things ought to be), a moral
relativist statement like ―doing X is right or doing Y is wrong is relative to a particular
moral code‖ is only a descriptive statement (how things actually are) that carries no
evaluation, judgment or normative import whatsoever. It just characterizes what is
claimed by a particular moral code. This is evident because everyone, regardless of their
views about doing X or doing Y, will agree on the statement that doing X is right or
doing Y is wrong relative to a particular moral code actually put forward and accepted by
some society, group or individual. If one is not a member of that society or group, and is
not that individual, then accepting a descriptive statement like this has no implications for
how one should behave. For example, ―taking other‘s life pointlessly is wrong‖ is a
normative statement. It does not only describe the pointless act of taking other‘s life, but

178
also evaluates it. ―Taking other‘s life pointlessly is wrong relative to Chinese-Indonesian
people,‖ however, is only a descriptive statement and has no normative or evaluative
sense. Everyone will not have any objection to this statement and it will not have any
implication for how everyone should behave. Moral relativists can embrace such an
argument which has no normative content because they reject Moral universals. They
believe everything moral is relative to a particular people. This rejection of Moral
universals by moral relativism would lead to moral subjectivism and eventually to moral
nihilism.
Suppose moral relativism recognizes this point and has to admit that there have to
be some universal Moral norms in order to avoid moral subjectivism and moral nihilism –
the position David Wong takes, that there is more than one actual morality and no one set
of moral standards that can be properly considered the one true Morality. They could still
ask, ―Why couldn‘t everyone say that, with respect to any morally pertinent question,
what one ought to do should depend on what the local conventions are?‖ In other words,
moral relativists can argue that even though there are Moral universals, they are still
always relativized locally. The problem with this position is that once moral relativists
recognize that there are some universal Moral norms, this will eventually lead them
straight out of relativism and back into the quest for the Moral universals. They cannot
maintain their pure moral relativism, free of any commitment to Moral universalism,
since this position is basically moral nihilism. Otherwise, there would not be any
philosophical significance whatever. The following example will show how moral
relativism could be like that.
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Consider this example. Imagine someone X argues, ―Torturing children for fun is
wrong.‖ In moral relativism she should be understood to be saying ―Torturing children
for fun is wrong relative to (my) moral framework X.‖ Her husband, Y, might reply by
saying ―Torturing children for fun is not wrong‖ (that is, it is permissible relative to (my)
moral framework Y). In this example anyone who is sincere is of course voicing their
own opinion . But the point here is that for an opinion to be authentic, it should be put
forward in order to be agreed with, or at any rate to be taken seriously or weighed for
what it is by the audience. X, in this example, is basically saying, ―This is my opinion,
and here are the reasons for it, and if you, my husband, have reasons against it we had
better discuss them.‖ If X‘s opinion is to be overruled, the next move by Y should be, ―I
don‘t think you should say that because…‖ If X thinks torturing children for fun is
wrong, but Y thinks otherwise, they had better talk it through and do what each can to
persuade the other or find a compromise. The alternatives may be force or divorce, which
are a lot worse. This is what a practical ethical conversation which has a philosophical
significance should be. Moral relativism, however, tends to dismiss such conversation. If
a moral relativist should be consistent with his or her framework of moral relativism, he
or she can imagine X shrugging at Y‘s remark that there is nothing wrong with torturing
children for fun, ―Well, that‘s just your opinion‖ and that is all. It is like a conversation
such as ―I like cheesecake,‖ ―I don‘t,‖ where the difference does not matter. Even
Harman admits that in his proposal how to express basic disagreement in moral
relativism, such as ―X is WRONG if and only if X is wrong in relation to the morality
relevantly associated with my current values,‖ his critics might claim that ―it only allows
such people to appear to disagree with each other!‖25 Indeed, they might. And in my
25
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reflection, if not in reality, X and Y‘s conversation will not be like that. In their
conversation the difference is a real disagreement and does matter. Unfortunately, this
kind of conversation involving moral disagreements cannot occur between people who
are moral relativists.
This reflection on the above imaginary example is not to deny that there are hard
cases where it is not easy to find what the correct answer to a moral question is. I also
recognize that while at one moment moral relativists might shrug their shoulders and say,
―Well, it is just an opinion,‖ at other moments they might demonstrate the most intense
attachment to a particular opinion, especially when the issue is something they care
about, like child abuse, abortion, rape, murder etc. I do not want to use my reflection to
caricaturize moral relativism as something which only belongs to ignorant and uncaring
people. Moral relativist scholars like Gilbert Harman and David Wong are not only
passionate about their view but also respectful toward others. While their passionate
attachment to some Moral standards may itself be evidence against their relativist stance,
my point here, instead, is to emphasize that there seems to be no good substitute to
thinking that when one is in bewilderment about what the answer to a hard moral
question is, one is in bewilderment about what the correct universal Moral answer is.
Unless, of course, one is a pure moral relativist.
But even if moral relativism is rejected, one should acknowledge that this view
raises important issues. It implies that being tolerant with other cultures should encourage
one to explore the reasons underlying moral practices that differ from one‘s own. It also
challenges one to examine one‘s own reasons underlying one‘s morality. With this note, I
will continue to the next section to argue for Moral universalism.
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A2b. On moral universalism
Moral universalism, which this dissertation adopts, argues for Morality that
applies to all people, regardless of culture, sex, religion, and nationality. In this view
Morality is binding on all of humanity and transcends culture and personal whim. This
does not imply that Moral universalism merely means a universal acceptance of Morality.
For example, the prohibition on torturing children for fun is a valid universal Moral rule
because it is based on a conception of what is worthy of human beings. In particular the
states of affairs in question here are the states of children as human beings. The validity
of this rule does not depend on whether or not it is universally accepted. Morality is
binding on all humans not because everyone accepts it but, as Alan Donagan asserts, by
virtue of their nature as rational beings and because Morality can be known to human
beings by the exercise of natural human reason.26 This view allows one to speak in the
public square. For example, Christians can make moral judgments about non-Christians.
There is another meaning of Moral universalism which deserves attention,
namely, to say that Morality is universal is to say that it has no exceptions. If the Moral
rule ―it is wrong to lie‖ is a universal Moral norm in this sense, then one must never tell a
lie no matter what the circumstances. It follows that it is one‘s obligation to keep not
lying, even if doing so brings suffering to innocent people. It means, for example, that a
head of a family who is hiding some Jews should say, ―Yes,‖ to Nazis who ask if he is
hiding Jews. According to this kind of Moral universalism, if one sees a child run into an
alley to escape a serial killer who is trying to kill her and the killer asks the person,
―Where is she?‖ then the person should not send the killer on a wild goose chase to
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protect the child, but tell the truth about the child‘s whereabouts.27 Extreme cases like
these show that, at least in ordinary unreflective moral judgment, the Moral rule ―it is
wrong to lie‖ has exceptions and therefore Moral universalism, in the sense of no
exceptions, is not true of that particular Moral rule. In fact, this case is often cited to show
that there are exceptions to Moral rules or that some act-types can be right in one
situation but wrong in another.28
Are there any Moral rules or principles which are universal in the sense of no
exceptions? It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to answer this question and to
figure out which Moral rules or principles are absolute, having no exceptions at all.29 For
the present purpose it is important to notice the rational independence of the two
meanings in Moral universalism. The first holds that Morality is binding on everyone, no
matter what norms are actually accepted in a given society. The second claims that at
least some Moral norms allow for no legitimate or justifiable exceptions. The first
meaning does not necessarily entail the second. In this dissertation Moral universalism is
understood in the first sense. This dissertation only attempts to establish that the
antitheses in Matthew 5:21-48 are binding on all people and it is not concerned with
whether or not any moral norm in the antitheses is without exception in practice. It may
27
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be that all Moral norms valid for everyone in any society are norms that allow for
legitimate exceptions in special situations, whenever those situations occur.
One problem for Moral universalism is in the area of epistemology. How does one
know what it is? What is its content? What are its boundaries? One should admit some
epistemological hesitance as to the depth or resolution of one‘s familiarity with the entire
contents of Morality, but the basic contents are knowledgeable. The knowledge which
humans have of this Morality may vary with their place in history and with their
background, but at least some knowledge of this Morality all humans do possess. Moral
universalism should not be understood as an attempt to establish self-evident contents of
Morality. Instead, it attempts to argue that the contents of Morality are capable of being
known by all human beings.
Human beings are capable of knowing the basic contents of Morality because this
knowledge is founded in ―the way things are,‖ in ultimate structures of creation order that
are explicitly contrasted with the human conventions that find expressions in ordinary
rules and customs. The justification for Moral universalism in ―the way things are‖ in the
creation order is called the Natural Law theory.30 The Natural Law theory is an
ontological ground for Moral universalism, evident in the conviction that there is a
criterion, beyond the rules and conventions of human societies, by which these may be
judged. For example, one may see this in court appeals. There is always, so to speak, a
higher court of appeal, a hierarchy of justice. There may be appeals through a whole
series of courts, but even when the highest court of appeal has pronounced its ruling, it
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still makes sense for someone to say that its verdict is unjust. It would be hard to see how
this could be the case if justice has a purely empirical origin, explicable merely in terms
of sociology, anthropology, psychology, biology and similar sciences.
The Natural Law theory argues that Morality belongs to the very nature of things
in the creation order and is not just superimposed on an amoral reality by the human
mind. The Nazi regime should remain as a terrible warning against the complete slide
into relativism and nihilism in which Morality has been entirely cast adrift from an
ontological basis. The notion of human responsibility and accountability implies an order
which humans do not create but which rather lays a demand on a human person. While
science can explain the actual empirical forms in which Morality appears
psychologically, sociologically, and anthropologically, it does not explain the ultimate
demand of Morality. As an ethical concept, the Natural law theory is distinct from any
scientific law of nature, such as the law of gravity and the law of inertia.31 It is true that
some moral philosophers, especially those belonging to evolutionary and naturalistic
schools of thought, try to derive Moral laws from biological laws.32 The problem with
such an approach is that one may confuse the ought and the is. One cannot just proceed
from statements of fact to value judgments, unless one may have already assumed a
31
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value-judgment in the alleged statement of fact. If science is able to demonstrate that
some DNA in humans cause a homosexual orientation, it does not necessarily entail that
homosexual activity is natural for human beings and therefore encouraged. Theodosius
Dobzhansky is correct in saying that what can be established biologically is not the
content of an ethic but simply ―the capacity to ethicisize.‖33 It is a fundamental mistake to
understand the Natural Law theory as if, as John Finnis remarks, the argument runs from
―natural‖ to ―therefore reasonable and right,‖ rather than from ―reasonable and right‖ to
―therefore natural.‖34 The foundation of Morality is not bound within the data of
scientific discoveries but is ontologically imbedded in the creation order so that, as
Richard Hooker has expressed it, humans are not so much the maker of laws as their
discoverers.35
The acknowledgment of a Natural Law that judges every human law does not
necessarily imply a definitely theistic understanding of the world. It is possible to hold a
Natural Law theory without basing it on a theological formulation. Alan Donagan‘s
discussion of the fundamental principle of Morality that it is impermissible not to respect
every human being, oneself or another, as a rational creature is a case in point. He asserts
that such a principle is independent of any theological presupposition even though it has
been expressed in Scripture in the command ―Love your neighbor as yourself‖ (Matthew
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22:39).36 Likewise, David Copp argues that ―it is natural to hold that our moral
‗convictions‘ are beliefs in just the way that beliefs about the weather are beliefs –
although, obviously, they have a different subject matter.‖37 In this sense, every ethics
which is based on an objectively valid rational order, which grounds moral values just as
it does logical values, belongs to the Natural Law theory tradition.38 Nevertheless, the
Natural Law theory also points to an ontological interpretation of Morality which has at
least some kinship with the religious interpretation. For example, the Stoics argue for a
Natural Law theory based on somewhat pantheistic terms, as the demand of the logos
dwelling both in humans and in the cosmos. In his theological interpretation of Natural
Law, viewed within the context of Stoic philosophy, Cicero writes: ―There is indeed a
true law, right reason, agreeing with nature, diffused among all men… the same law,
everlasting and unchangeable, will bind all nations at all times; and there will be one
common lord and ruler of all men, even God, the framer and proposer of this law.‖39
Another example is the Chinese tao. Even though it is not necessarily derived from a
transcendent deity, it is universal in the sense that it is everywhere and consists of
impersonal principles which permeate human life.40 In each case, theologically or non-
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theologically, it is supposed that the foundation for Morality is taken to have an ultimacy
and objectivity about it. Morality is not just human convention.
Christianity also recognizes this ontological interpretation of Morality or the
Natural Law theory. Paul teaches in Romans 2:14-15 that all humans everywhere do have
by nature an awareness of this Morality, and not only of its existence, but also in some
measure of its content and provisions. He says, ―Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have
the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves even
though they do not have the law. They show that the requirements of the law are written
on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts now accusing,
now even defending them‖ (Romans 2:14-15). Douglas Moo interprets ―things required
by the law‖ as ―a general way of stating certain of those requirements of the Mosaic law
that God has made universally available to human beings in their very constitution.‖41 By
this Paul does not mean that Gentiles need nothing to guide them, but that they attest to
knowledge of Morality. Paul‘s point that those without special revelation still have the
capacity (through conscience) to distinguish right from wrong is illustrated in the
appendix to C. S. Lewis‘s Abolition of Man: moral codes of many cultures across the
ages are similar at key points – honoring parents, being faithful in marriage, not stealing,
not murdering, not bearing false witness and so on.42 Lewis further supports this
knowability of Moral universalism in his writing, The Case for Christianity, by pointing
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out ―right and wrong as a clue to the meaning of the universe.‖43 When disagreements or
quarrels develop between people, the thing to be determined is who is in the right and
who is in the wrong. The parties may differ radically as to their respective positions on
this issue, but they have a clear sense of what is right and what is wrong. Similarly,
despite the great differences in laws and customs among peoples around the world,
according to Lewis, what unites them in a common humanity is the recognition that some
things are right and others are wrong.
Everett Harrison supports the above interpretation of Romans 2:14-15 and argues
that Paul can say that Gentiles, who do not have the written law, have the basic
requirements of Morality in their hearts because even though humans are fallen, they are
made in the image of God.44 Because they are made in the image of God but now fallen,
Paul declares that the conscience of humans ―bears witness‖ to a Morality recognizably
binding on them (Romans 2:15), and accuses when they act contrary to the light available
to them (Romans 2:16). With reference to Romans 2:15-16, C.A. Pierce writes, ―That the
everyday language of the Gentiles contains a word for confessing to feelings of pain on
commission or initiation of particular acts – feelings which carry with them the
conviction that the acts ought not to have been committed – is first hand evidence that the
Gentiles are subject, by nature, to a ‗natural law‘ as the Jews, by vocation, are to the
Torah.‖45 Whether they are revealed in the Torah for the Jews or written on their hearts
for the Gentiles, Scripture teaches the view that there are Moral requirements widely
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recognized and honored in humankind generally. This is not to say that the contents of
the Moral order are self-evidently known to all, but to assert that these content are
capable of being known by all. God has made universally available the knowledge of
Morality to human beings in their very constitution since they are created in the image of
God.
Two objections are raised against the idea that Morality is grounded in the
creation order – a theoretical one and a practical one. On the theoretical level, Christian
ethics is the Christian view of a universal and objective Moral order. To study Morality
from Christian perspectives using the Natural Law theory may have the risk of
eradicating the distinct and particular Christian contribution. On the practical level,
religion often employs the Natural Law theory to justify its inhuman elements, practicing
cruel and degrading rites.
Theoretically, since the natural law theory argues for a common ontological basis
for Morality, it implies that any person can reason with any other, regardless of the
person‘s cultural formation, religious beliefs, or political allegiance. H. L. A. Hart states
that ―there are certain principles of true morality or justice, discoverable by human reason
without the aid of revelation even though they have a divine origin‖46 and Edward Collin
Vacek even observes that the Natural Law theory ―can proceed under a rubric of
‗methodological atheism.‘‖47 For this reason, some Christian theologians are hesitant to
accept that the Natural Law theory can become the basis for Christian study of Morality
since it may eradicate the distinctiveness of the Christian contribution to such study. In
46
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his debate with Emil Brunner, Karl Barth argues that there is a radical discontinuity
between secular ethics based on natural reason and Christian ethics based on Scriptural
revelation. He argues that Christology and revelation make no room for natural reason in
comprehending God‘s will for proper human living.48 Alistair McGrath even contends
that Christian morality should not be based on a universal Morality since it is only for
those belonging to the Christian faith, and to apply such a morality to those outside of the
community is useless unless they first join the Christian faith.49 Stanley Hauerwas also
claims that the content of Christian morality is fundamentally different from that of nonChristian moralities. He argues that Christian morals are not for non-Christians but only
for the church and as such Christian ethics is not concerned with providing Moral
guidance for humanity in general but instead it intends to build a genuinely Christian
community as an alternative society.50 This objection needs to be considered since
equating the content of Christian ethics with that of the Natural Law theory would seem
to imply that Christians have nothing distinctive to offer.
While it is an understandable objection, to overemphasize the uniqueness of
Christian ethics can give way to moral relativism. James Gustafson argues that when
Christians give up interactions with secular moral points of view in order to maintain its
pure religious identity, they run the risk of sectarianism in which Christian ethics escapes
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accountability to secular criticism and inevitably abandons its mission to responsibly
relate to the secular world.51 Taken to its limit, in order to be consistent with its own
paradigm of ethics such a position requires one to admit that one‘s own morality bears no
significance for others. It may be relevant within one‘s own community, but not
necessarily relevant to other communities. Why should people think that other people‘s
moral life is better than their own? As a consequence, Hauerwas‘s project to have an
alternative Christian community which provides a moral life capable of influencing this
world is not convincing. Why should other communities think, in the first place, such a
moral life is better than their own?
To be fair, in Hauerwas‘s objection to the Natural Law theory, he admits that
there are commonalities between Christian morality and other moralities but he goes on
to add that these ―are not sufficient to provide a basis for a ‗universal‘ ethic grounded in
human nature per se. Attempts to secure such an ethic inevitably result in a minimalistic
ethic and often one which gives support to forms of cultural imperialism.‖52 Certainly,
one can disagree about the extent to which Christian ethics might be compatible with a
secular one. Yet, Hauerwas‘s disagreement is based on the fundamental presupposition
that Scripture and the Natural Law theory must represent two opposing sources for
Christian ethics. This is where Hauerwas seems to be mistaken. While a secular ethics
might be incompatible with Christian ethics epistemically (considering the noetic effect
of sin53 in humanity), the ontological sources of both ethics might not be necessarily or
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fundamentally contradictory. The Natural Law theory and Scripture may ideally
complement each other as two distinct sources for Christian ethics which reveal the
existence of a universal and objective Morality. Jean Porter explains in this way:
―Revelation [Scripture] does not just confirm our independently established theories
about natural law; rather, it reveals the existence of a natural law in and through
indicating its significance within a more comprehensive theological framework.‖54 Seen
in this context, the ideal of the truly human person and the ideal of the uniquely Christian
person, and correlatively, between an ethic centered on the church community and an
ethic that is open to a pluralistic world are not necessarily contradictory. With this
understanding one may call into question Hauerwas‘s proposal of the dichotomy between
Scripture and the Natural Law theory.
Furthermore, properly human forms of moral goodness should reflect the divine
goodness so that they are not wholly alien to God‘s goodness. On this basis, one can have
confidence that God‘s call and judgment will not be wholly at odds with the best ideals
for humanity. This is to say that there is some congruence between human Moral ideals
and God‘s Moral will for humanity, even after the fall.55 Otherwise, one may begin to
project one‘s own moral standard onto God and in the process lose the sense of the
absolute qualitative distance between God‘s goodness and one‘s own. Those who
order remains; it is simply that humanity‘s capacity to know it has been impaired by the Fall. In the case of
moral knowledge, the Fall confronts humans with the fact that they do not want to hear of moral order. On
the one hand, humans cannot fully ignore it, because its first letters are written in human hearts. On the
other hand, humans resist the inscription, and the letters burn, so to speak. Even when humans are looking
for the moral order, they will be looking in the wrong place.
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completely confine morality within their own community and sever it from any universal
Morality run the risk of overemphasizing the uniqueness of their own community‘s
morality. Taken to its limit such a position seems to judge God by human standards since
it may encourage one to think that his or her own community is the only one which
knows what God wants for humanity. This is where the second objection to the Natural
Law theory, the practical one, begins.
It is practically understandable for Hauerwas, as mentioned earlier, to object to
the Natural Law theory based on this bad record, which causes one to have a minimalistic
ethic and encouraging one to become a cultural imperialist. The Natural Law theory may
indeed cause one to be arrogant, judgmental, and intolerant. For example, if Chinese or
American moral norms allow for something against the universal Morality, then such a
particular norm is unjust and wrong. This kind of judgment often makes everyone very
nervous. To claim that there is a right and wrong that is binding on everyone runs the risk
that one is either labeled as judgmental, intolerant, and arrogant or that one even becomes
judgmental, intolerant and arrogant. The debate on FGM (Female Genital Mutilation)
previously addressed can be claimed by the moral relativists to be an example of such
moral imperialism by American women against African ones. Yet a Christian
maximalistic ethic (in contrast to Hauerwas‘s objection to a minimalistic ethic), so to
speak, in overemphasizing its Christian uniqueness may also encourage moral and
cultural imperialism. The same bad rapport has also been attached to those who confine
morality to Christianity. Adolf Hitler once said that only Christianity can shape one‘s
moral character: ―A general moral instruction without a religious foundation is built on
air; consequently, all character training and religion must be derived from faith…we need
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believing people.‖56 Those words came out of a person who authorized the genocide of a
nation.
The practical objection to the Natural Law theory demonstrates that in its practice
the noetic effect of sin in humans is so pervasive that either one can reduce the Natural
Law theory to a mere humanitarian campaign or transform it into a violent religious
crusade. But it should not be so. It is false to assume that people without religious faith
always lack an understanding of Moral rights and wrongs and that people of religious
faith are more virtuous than atheists and agnostics. It is also mistaken to assume that
religious people are always abusive and that they often think they are the only holders of
the correct Morality.
While it would be mistaken for religious people, in this case Christians, to be
overly confident by thinking they know what God wants for humanity, Christians have
reason to hope that through Scripture God has begun to reveal which of many different
configurations of human nature are to be preferred, or at least, which are most congruent
with the life of the church. Again, this does not mean that other ways of human living are
necessarily immoral and evil, but it does mean that an appeal to human nature alone as
the basis for Morality is not sufficient to determine God‘s will in Moral matters. Human
nature indeed offers a set of starting points for action and reflection, as the Natural Law
theory asserts, and these are not simply averted by theological considerations.
Nonetheless, the fallen nature of humanity requires that such starting points must be
given direction and shape by theological reflection in order to be translated into an
adequate study of Morality.
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When the Christian study of Morality through Scripture confirms the existence of
the Natural Law, this need not imply that the knowledge of the Natural Law depends
solely on special revelation. Conversely, however, it would be a mistake to conclude that
Scripture simply confirms the best independently established theoretical formulations of
the Natural Law. Scripture not only confirms and supplements what one knows or thinks
one knows about Morality, it also indicates the proper significance of God‘s existence
with respect to one‘s understanding of Morality and in the process transforms even those
elements that could be independently established. It is here, in the process of moving
from a reflection on a Morality based on the Natural Law theory to a theological
Morality, that Christian study of Morality will have its most immediately apparent
practical impact. Since Christian study of Morality recognizes its starting point from the
natural givens of human life, it will not be wholly discontinuous or unintelligible, seen
from the standpoint of other moralities. At the same time, however, insofar as this study
of Morality from Christian perspectives assumes a theologically informed construal of
human nature, set in the framework of a particular understanding of the meaning of
human life, it will not simply be equivalent with a naturalistic, anthropological,
evolutional or even biological morality. This is the reason why Christians may argue,
albeit in gentleness and respect for others (cf. 1 Peter 3:15), that the nature of their study
of Morality, its binding force, extends not only to its own community of faith but also to
everyone.
B. On the morality of the antitheses
In this section, I will first argue that the Decalogue is Moral and then by
comparing the antitheses with the Decalogue, I will show that the antitheses are Moral.
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For Christians, the Decalogue conveys the basic content of God‘s will for human life. A
survey of more than 25 catechisms of the fifteenth century discloses that the Decalogue
was the basis for Moral teaching of the church.57 The underlying principle in those
catechisms is that the Decalogue is taken as the point of departure for an exposition of
Christian understanding of Morality. While the Decalogue is hardly all one needs to
know about the rule of God in one‘s lives, it is a starting point for one to discover, or to
rediscover, just what it is God‘s will in one‘s life.
As God‘s will for human life, the Decalogue has been associated with or seen as a
kind of Natural Law. John Calvin argues that the Decalogue is stamped on the human
heart and thus can be naturally known.58 In agreement, K. Owen White explains that in
the Decalogue are found ―the great basic principles which underlie the whole structure of
human morals and ethics.‖59 Patrick Miller observes that the Decalogue, especially the
second table, is ―present in various ancient Near Eastern legal codes and widely assumed
as normative in all societies.‖60 The equation of the Decalogue with some kind of Natural
Law, or Moral law available to humankind, allows one to focus on it beyond its function
within the community of faith, whether Jewish or Christian. Unlike the specific
commandments of Judaism, such as the ceremonial laws in Leviticus 1-7, the Decalogue
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represents a universal Moral law which has not been superseded with the coming of Jesus
Christ.
Calvin also says that the first table ―teaches us how to cultivate piety, and the
proper duties of religion in which his worship consists‖ and the second table ―shows, how
in the fear of his name, we are to conduct ourselves towards our fellow-men.‖61 Calvin
evidently further prefers to discuss Morality in terms of one‘s relationships in society
rather than in terms of one‘s standing before God. One reason he gives is that while all
the commandments of the Decalogue can be considered as Moral, in terms of
representing ―conformity to the character and will of God,‖ 62 fallen humans are
spiritually dead. Calvin argues with respect to the second table ―there is considerably
more knowledge of them, inasmuch as they are more closely connected with preservation
of civil society,‖ but this is not the case with respect to the first table since fallen humans
are deprived of spiritual knowledge.63 Here Calvin recognizes that because of the Fall
humanity cannot mend their standing before God but they can still do something about
their relationship with one another.
Calvin‘s distinction between one‘s relationships in society and one‘s standing
before God can also be stated in terms of Morality and spirituality. This is because fallen
humans cannot mend their standing before God by only doing Moral actions apart from
faith in the true God. There is a distinction between immorality and sin. Moral actions, in
distinction from spiritual ones, represent the Moral obligation binding upon all people by
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virtue of their common humanity and accountability to God. Because of this, even though
the Decalogue was given to Israel, its content, especially its second table, was not binding
exclusively on Israel. The universal Morality prescribed in the Decalogue is indeed
binding on all people. Even the first coming of Jesus Christ did not alter the content of
this universal Morality. It is binding on Abraham and Abraham Lincoln. But doing what
is Moral is not all that is required to please God.
In the New Testament, Jesus' teachings and other provisions of the New
Testament do contain laws which embody the Decalogue of the Old Testament. There is
continuity between the Moral law taught in the New Testament and the Decalogue of the
Old Testament. This does not mean that in the New Testament there is any passage which
cites the entire Decalogue word for word. Lidija Novakovic observes that the New
Testament never quotes the entire Decalogue verbatim, but only the commandments from
the second table that deal with interpersonal relationships.64 The only references to the
Decalogue as a whole are through the double commandment to love God and one‘s
neighbor (Matthew 22:34-40). The point here is, nevertheless, that the New Testament
accentuates ethical relationships that should be informed by the Moral laws of the
Decalogue, especially the second table which deals with interpersonal relationships.
According to Dan Lioy, this is evident when one compares the antitheses of the Sermon
on the Mount (Mathew 5:21-48) with the second table of the Decalogue.65 The Moral law
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taught in the antitheses is in accordance with the Moral law in the Decalogue of the Old
Testament.
The antitheses have a series of statements from the law, introduced by such words
as ―You have heard that it was said to the people long ago‖ (Matthew 5:21, 33) or, more
simply, ―You have heard that it was said‖ (Matthew 5:27, 38, 43) or ―it has been said‖
(Matthew 5:31). There then follows a comment by Jesus introduced by the words ―But I
say to you‖ (Matthew 5:22, 28, 32, 34, 39, 44). The topics are murder, adultery, divorce,
oaths, retaliation and love for enemies.
The first two can be seen as a straightforward deepening of the commandments to
include the corresponding attitudes of anger (which leads to murder) and lust (which
leads to adultery). In this way, the requirement of the law is directed not only towards
outward behavior but also is a matter of the heart. The sixth commandment (Exodus
20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17) is a prohibition of murder. Likewise, in Matthew 5:21, Jesus
makes specific reference to this injunction. He goes to the heart of the matter by stressing
that even the presence of malice against someone else is a violation of the commandment.
The seventh commandment is about adultery (Exodus 20:14; Deuteronomy 5:18). In
Matthew 5:27, Jesus refers to this commandment. He stresses that a man who looks at a
woman with lust has already committed adultery in his heart with her. He also
emphasizes the importance of eliminating all sources of sin in a person‘s life (Matthew
5:28-30). The understanding of adultery is deepened to include not only sexual acts but
also sexual desire. Adultery is not only the transgression that undermines the marriage
relationship; divorce could also destroy marital union, fidelity and stability (Matthew
5:31). Also the comments that a husband divorcing his wife makes her an adulterous
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woman and a man who marries a divorcee is himself an adulterer are further applications
of the seventh commandment. Marriage to an improperly divorced person is an act of
adultery (Matthew 5:32). Prohibition of adultery is frequently linked to the prohibition of
divorce because divorce and remarriage in the gospels are regarded as special forms of
adultery (cf. Mark 10:2-12; Matthew 19:3-12; Luke 16:18).
The topic of oaths in Matthew 5:33 (―Do not break your oath, but fulfill to the
Lord the vows you have made‖) draws on Leviticus 19:12 (―Do not swear falsely by my
name and so profane the name of your God‖), Numbers 30:2 (When a man makes a vow
to the Lord or takes an oath to obligate himself by a pledge, he must not break his word
but must do everything he said‖) and Deuteronomy 23:21 (―If you make a vow to the
Lord your God, do not be slow to pay it, for the Lord your God will certainly demand it
of you and you will be guilty of sin‖). In this antithesis Jesus stresses the importance of
maintaining the integrity of speech, Matthew 5:34 (―But I tell you, do not swear an oath
at all‖). While Jesus‘ antithesis on oaths may be taken to refer to the third commandment,
against taking the divine name in vain, it may also be taken to refer to the ninth
commandment, the prohibition of false witness, for both the ninth commandment and the
antithesis on oaths enjoin the integrity of truth telling. Here Jesus‘ antithesis on oaths
reflects the ninth commandment by summoning one to practice truth-telling. This practice
is also invoked throughout the New Testament. In John, for example, the devil is called
―a liar and the father of lies‖ because ―there is no truth in him‖ (John 8:44). Paul appeals
to God, who ―knows that I am not lying,‖ in 2 Corinthians 11:31. In Colossians 3:9 Paul
summons Christian readers to ―not lie to each other.‖
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The antithesis on retaliation follows a quotation (―Eye for eye, and tooth for
tooth‖) from either Exodus 21:24, Leviticus 24:20 or Deuteronomy 19:21 that sought to
limit retaliation to that which had been suffered. This antithesis of Matthew 5:39, ―Do not
resist an evil person,‖ is not directly based on the Decalogue. This does not mean,
however, that Jesus makes up a completely new Moral law. The antithesis on retaliation,
as Reginald H. Fuller points out, is in fact an articulation of the antithesis that follows,
love for enemies (Matthew 5:44), which in turn is an interpretation of the love
commandment (Leviticus 19:18).66 These two final antitheses, in which Jesus gives
greater force and meaning to the command to love one‘s neighbor, reveal the tendency
evident in the New Testament toward generalization and the use of Leviticus 19:18 as a
summation of the second table of the Decalogue. There are three examples for this:
Romans 13:8-10, James 2:8-11 and Jesus himself.
In the first example, Romans 13:8-10, Paul addresses the question of mutual love
and explains that loving one‘s neighbor is the fulfillment of the law. He exemplifies the
requirements of the law by quoting the seventh, the sixth, the eighth and the tenth
commandment of the Decalogue. He then concludes by asserting that these, and any other
commandment, are summed up in the requirement of Leviticus 19:18, ―Love your
neighbor as yourself‖ (Romans 13:9), because ―Love does no harm to its neighbor‖
(Romans 13:10). Paul‘s list of individual requirements is therefore not exhaustive but
illustrative of a more general principle of neighborly love found in Leviticus 19:18.
David Flusser notes here that the command to love one‘s neighbor is ―on the one hand
presented as a summary of the whole Torah, and on the other hand, it is called a summary
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of the second half of the Decalogue.‖67 Paul‘s general conclusion that ―love is the
fulfilling of the law‖ (Romans 13:10) is also found in Galatians 5:14, where he asserts
that ―the entire law is fulfilled in keeping this one command: ‗Love your neighbor as
yourself.‘‖
The second example of the use of Leviticus 19:18 as a summation of the second
table of the Decalogue is from James 2:8-11. The author calls Leviticus 19:18 ―the royal
law‖ (James 2:8). He then argues that the entire law should be kept and not just a few
commandments at the expense of others and further illustrates this with the seventh and
the sixth commandments of the Decalogue: ―For he who said, ‗You shall not commit
adultery,‘ also said, ‗You shall not murder.‘ If you do not commit adultery but do commit
murder, you have become a lawbreaker‖ (James 2:11). Not unlike Romans 13:8-10, these
two individual commandments serve the purpose of illustrating the neighborly love
mentioned at the beginning of the passage.68 In this letter the author also emphasizes that
violating one commandment is equal to violating them all.
The final example is Jesus himself. He seems to recognize this use of Leviticus
19:18. Both Mark 12:28-34 and Matthew 22:34-40 record Jesus‘ response to the question
of one of the scribes concerning the great commandment of the law, which appears in the
context of Jesus‘ final days in Jerusalem. In Mark, the scribe asks Jesus, ―Of all the
commandments, which is the most important?‖ (12:28). Jesus answers by first citing
Deuteronomy 6:4, ―Hear O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one,‖ and Deuteronomy
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6:5, ―Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your
mind and with all your strength‖ (Mark 12:29-30). In Mark‘s version, this joined
quotation represents the first commandment. Jesus then adds the charge, ―Love your
neighbor as yourself‖ (Leviticus 19:18) which denotes the second commandment (Mark
12:31). In Matthew‘s version, Jesus quotes only Deuteronomy 6:5 and declares that
loving God is ―the first and greatest commandment‖ (Matthew 22:37). As in Mark, Jesus
continues by asserting that loving one‘s neighbor (Leviticus 19:18) represents the second
commandment. Lidija Novakovic explains the basic function of this double
commandment of love: ―loving God represents the summation of the commandments that
regulate the human-divine relationship, while loving one‘s neighbor represents the
summation of the commandments that regulate interpersonal relationships.‖69 In other
words, for Jesus Leviticus 19:18 stands as a summary of the second table of the
Decalogue.
These three above examples demonstrate that Jesus employs the last two
antitheses to illustrate the neighborly love in Leviticus 19:18. Yet it is not only that. Jesus
deepens and broadens the extent of neighborly love in his antitheses. In the fifth
antithesis Jesus underscores the importance of people‘s dignity in his teaching of
reconciliation and not seeking revenge. This is not necessarily advocating a purely
passive response to aggression. Steve Moyise argues that turning the other cheek
(Matthew 5:39) can be a form of passive resistance, by reversing the balance of
superiority.70 One may use the example of Matthew 5:41 to illustrate this. The person
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who forces one to go one mile – such as a soldier ordering one to carry his or her bags –
wishes to end the transaction as the superior. By offering to go another mile, the balance
changes, for the person is now in one‘s debt, even if it goes unacknowledged. Whether
Jesus intends to encourage passive resistance or not, the point of the fifth antithesis here
is that one should not return evil with evil even when one has the opportunity and the
means to accomplish it. One instead should be patient even when unjustly treated. This
patient love is also not limited to one‘s own circle of friends and relatives. The final
antithesis broadens the fifth where one is to be kind and conciliatory even toward his or
her enemies (5:38-48). One‘s love toward others must extend beyond one‘s immediate
family or work colleagues (tax collectors in the example). By using these two antitheses
as a comment on Leviticus 19:18, Jesus shows that he does not come to abolish the
Decalogue (cf. Matthew 5:17), in this case its second table, but instead he gives the
proper interpretation of what it means to love one‘s neighbor as the Decalogue obliges
one to do.
The comparison between the Decalogue and the antitheses confirms that the
antitheses are Moral. Just as the Decalogue constitutes the Moral law in the Old
Testament, so too the antitheses restate the Moral law in the New Testament. C.H. Kang
explains that ―As Moses proclaimed the law for the new life in the promised land, so
Jesus manifested his law for the life in the Kingdom of Heaven.‖71 Some also hold that
the Moral law in the Sermon on the Mount provides Christians with ―missionary ethics‖
by which they are to act in the world so that ―by their extraordinary living men are
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attracted to the saving message of Jesus.‖72 This ethics is only possible when the Moral
law lived out by Christians is also binding on others, non-Christians. J. Phillips, reflecting
this sentiment, observes that ―even the greatest of the world‘s moral, religious and
philosophical statements blush and stammer in the presence of this sublime
declaration.‖73 This does not mean that the entrance into the kingdom depends upon
personal Moral attainments. The larger context of the antitheses (e.g., the grace of the
beatitudes) forbids such a conclusion. Entrance into the kingdom is God‘s gift; but to
belong to the kingdom means to follow Jesus‘ teaching. David Holwerda explains that if
Jesus‘ own fulfillment of the Moral law is essential for both understanding and obeying
the Moral law‘s righteousness, then the focus falls on Christ, and the Moral law is
relevant for his disciples only in the form and manner by which it achieves fulfillment in
him.74 The Christological focus on the Moral law is the remedy for legalism and the
suggestion that the entrance into the kingdom of God is based upon personal Moral
attainments.
Matthew 5:19-20 is evidence of this Christological focus. Before his teaching on
the antitheses, Jesus had warned his hearers that ―unless your righteousness surpasses that
of the Pharisees and the teachers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of
heaven‖ (Matthew 5:19-20). John Nolland comments that the passage ―is not designed to
encourage specific calculation or measurement. It is rather more likely that the desire is
to encourage an exuberant engagement with the demands of the will of God made known
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through the Law as unveiled by Jesus.‖75 Jesus clearly calls people to a way of
righteousness, but it is a way that rests upon the proper interpretation of the Moral law
now delivered by Jesus, the Messiah.
This call underlines the importance of living out in practice the righteousness to
which the Moral law directs. The righteousness Jesus speaks of, however, does not come
through a greater preoccupation with the minutiae of the Moral law that outdoes even the
Pharisees and the scribes. The ethical teaching presented by Jesus in the Gospel can
hardly be said to do that. Instead, Jesus expects, as the antitheses to follow show, a new
and higher kind of righteousness that finds its definition and content in his authority as
the Messiah who has the definitive and authoritative exposition of the Moral law.
With the antitheses Jesus shows that God‘s will for humans remains one and the
same, that is, righteousness and not wickedness. The antitheses, just as the Decalogue in
the Old Testament, are the Moral law which reveal God‘s will in the New Testament for
human beings. They reveal the knowledge of universal Morality to human beings, which
obscure this knowledge by their fallen nature.
III. A reconsideration of previous chapters
Now is the time to compare this understanding of the antitheses as Moral, binding
on all people with the studies of the previous chapters. I will revisit Leonardo Boff, John
Calvin and Helmut Thielicke, the Roman Catholic Church, and John Howard Yoder. I
will first provide a short summary of the study done for each and then analyze their
interpretation of the antitheses, especially the question of whether the antitheses are
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Moral, or something only meant for Christians. I will also attempt to provide an objective
comparison whenever a disagreement arises.
A. Leonardo Boff
The chapter on Leonardo Boff shows that in his contextualization of the Sermon
on the Mount for the poor and the oppressed, Boff depicts Jesus as saying: ―You are all
blessed, all you who are poor, hungry, sick and without hope. You are oppressed and
victims of a corrupt society, so how can I expect you to live a life of perfect virtue or
upbraid you for all your imperfections?‖76 Boff also interprets the antitheses as ―a
catechism of comportment for a disciple of Jesus, for one who has already embraced the
good news and is seeking to construct norms that conform to the tidings brought by
Christ: divine sonship.‖77 As a catechism of comportment, the antitheses only provide
guidance or a model for one to practice his or her love to God and others in each given
moment. Boff believes that it is easier to live within laws and prescriptions that determine
everything than it is to create a norm inspired by love for each moment.78
By giving some guidance in the antithesis, and not Moral laws, as the source to
find the will of God, Boff believes that Jesus is able to treat humans as human and help
them to be true to themselves. As he explains, ―In the important questions of life, nothing
can substitute for the human person: neither law, nor tradition, nor religion. People must
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decide from within, before God and before others. Because of this they need creativity
and liberty.‖79
The above summary demonstrates that for Leonardo Boff in the antitheses Jesus
does not teach Moral laws which demand people, especially the poor and the oppressed,
to obey. Instead of Moral laws, he argues that the antitheses should only constitute a
catechism or serve as guidance for disciples of Jesus (Christians) to practice their love.
The poor and the oppressed have been burdened by poverty and oppression all their life.
For Boff, it is unreasonable that Jesus should burden them anymore with the demands of
Moral laws. As a consequence, the antitheses are limited in whom they bind: in this case,
they are not binding on the poor and the oppressed, so they cannot be Moral. An event in
Boff‘s life demonstrates this.
Boff regrets his refusal to make love once with a poor woman who begged him to
give her that pleasure. He records the woman‘s plea in this way: ―You are a well-fed,
handsome, strong, and attractive man. I have just known ugly, sick, and mal-nourished
men. Give me this happiness. Make love with me! Just once.‖80 He regrets his refusal
because he believes that in order to treat her as a human being and to relieve her of her
burden of poverty at least temporarily, he should have cared for the life of this poor
woman by making her desire come true. His consent to her plea would somehow have
enhanced her psychological-emotional life.
By interpreting the antitheses not as Moral laws but instead as some guidance for
one‘s love in action, Boff seems to understand that Morality only consists of one absolute
79
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law: the law of love. Boff‘s emphasis on love to inform Morality is not wrong in itself.
Jesus himself says, summarizing the Decalogue, that the greatest law is to love God and
one‘s neighbor (see Matthew 22:37-40). Nevertheless, the problem with Boff‘s view is
that it seems for him the law of love is the only Moral law there is, especially love for the
poor and the oppressed. Love for the poor and the oppressed is the only Moral law. Love
and law here unite. To be more specific, although he does not actually deny any Moral
law, he really disposes of it by identifying it only with love for the poor and the
oppressed. When Jesus explains that to love God and one‘s neighbor is the greatest law,
he does not mean that this law disclaims other moral laws such as those in the Decalogue
and the antitheses. In contrast, Boff appears to argue that the love for the poor and the
oppressed absorbs other Moral laws and virtually removes them from sight. This one law
relativizes all others. As a consequence, Boff does not seem to view the antitheses as
Moral laws, binding on all people, regardless of their status in life, rich or poor.
His emphasis that love for the poor and the oppressed is the only Moral law rests
on his belief that if the antitheses are meant to be taken as Moral laws which demand
obedience, then Jesus would put an extra burden on the poor and the oppressed. Jesus
would not do such a thing for those who are already burdened with their poverty and
oppression. This belief seems to lead Boff to play Jesus off against himself in order to
maintain the consistency of the socio-political liberation agenda. He appears to
contradict what Jesus explains in Matthew 5:18, ―Truly I tell you, until heaven and earth
disappear, not the smallest letter, nor the least stroke of a pen, will by any means
disappear from the Law, until everything is accomplished.‖ Boff‘s determination to
liberate the poor and the oppressed seems to obscure the Moral laws of the antitheses
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which are binding on the rich and the poor alike. The second antithesis (Matthew 5:2733), for example, is a Moral teaching not only for the rich but also for the poor.
Regardless of one‘s stature in life and society, Jesus commands everyone to practice
sexual purity and not to commit adultery. For Boff, however, committing adultery with a
poor woman is allowed. He does not take the antitheses to be Moral laws even for the
poor. His concern for the reality of the socially oppressed seems to cause him to dismiss
the scriptural teaching of the antitheses as Moral laws.
Boff‘s interpretation of the antitheses does not threaten the thesis of this chapter.
He opts to obscure the universal sense of oughtness in the antitheses in order to relax the
Moral demands on the poor. He seems to be mistaken, however, in his interpretation. His
denial that the antitheses are binding on all people is based on a truncated view of
Morality, which is clearly inconsistent with Jesus‘ teaching. His position presents no
valid obstacle to the truth of the thesis of this chapter.
B. John Calvin and Helmut Thielicke
Calvin and Thielicke support the thesis of this chapter. They both argue
the universal bindingness of the antitheses on all people. While Calvin argues the
antitheses reveal God‘s Moral will for all people, Thielicke explains that the antitheses
posit a challenge for all people of their Moral shortcomings.
In relation to the thesis that the antitheses are Moral, I would like to further
analyze Calvin and Thielicke‘s use of the antitheses in individual Christian life. There are
three basic uses of the Moral law: (1) the political or civil use; (2) the elenctical or
pedagogical use; and (3) the didactic or normative use.81 The civil use (usus politicus sive
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civilis) of the Moral law serves the commonwealth or body politic as a force to restrain
sin. The elenctical or pedagogical use (usus elenchticus sive paedagogicus) shows
people their sin and points them to mercy and grace outside of themselves toward Christ.
In Muller‘s summary, this is ―the use of the law for the confrontation and refutation of sin
and for the purpose of pointing the way to Christ.‖82 The didactic or normative use (usus
didacticus sive normativus) is for those who trust in Christ and have been saved through
faith apart from works. It ―acts as a norm of conduct, freely accepted by those in
whom the grace of God works the good.‖83
In terms of the use of the Moral law, Calvin puts the emphasis on the third use of
the law for the antitheses. They provide a norm of conduct, freely accepted by those in
whom the grace of God works the good. Thielicke lays stress on the second use of the
law. The antitheses provide a norm of conduct for the confrontation and refutation of sin
and for the purpose of pointing the way to Christ.
In terms of the third use of the law, the antitheses address the fruit of good works
which the regenerate life must spring forth and bear. For Calvin, while the antitheses are
part of Christian Moral life, this does not mean that the antitheses are only binding on
Christians. In his comment on Romans 2:14-15, Calvin argues that all people are culpable
for breaking God‘s Moral will for human beings because their conscience dismisses any
ground for rationalization based on ignorance of the written law‘s demands. All people
are obligated to act in accord with the written law because of the engraved knowledge of
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what it requires of them.84 Calvin also states that the Decalogue and this engraved
knowledge of God‘s Moral will (the inward law) teach essentially the same general
Moral precepts: ―Now that inward law, which we have above [II.2.22] described as
written, even engraved, upon the hearts of all, in a sense asserts the very same things that
are to be learned from the two Tablets.‖85 With this understanding of Morality, Calvin
can argue that the antitheses and the Decalogue teach essentially the same general Moral
precepts.
In terms of the second use of the law, for Thielicke the antitheses primarily intend
to tear open and lay bare the great Moral need of humanity. He believes that one should
understand the antitheses less on ―the piercing radicality of its directions‖ and more on
―the definite purpose‖ Jesus had in view when ―he speaks in these radical terms.‖86 He
explains this ―definite purpose‖ of Jesus in the antitheses as follows: ―At the very
beginning and as a kind of introduction to discipleship Christ makes us feel the
implacable severity of the law and thus leads us to death.‖87 Thielicke does this to
impress upon one‘s conscience the permanent realization that one‘s battle with sin is not
a battle with something alien to oneself. ―I myself am the antagonist,‖ says Thielicke,
alluding to Romans 7, ―That’s why the law must remain in all its severity! It must remain
like gauze in the deep wound in our heart to keep it from healing too easily and forming
an invisible scar that would fool us into thinking that we are not wounded and sick at all
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and that we do not need anyone to die for us and to forgive and to heal us as a Savior.‖88
For Thielicke, the interpretation of the antitheses needs to take into account the fact that
while Jesus intended his demands to be fulfilled, fallen humans cannot fulfill them. To
this Moral predicament he applies a theological solution that provides the framework for
affirming Christianity without being embarrassed by Jesus‘ Moral teaching. As a result,
Thielicke seems to say that in the interpretation of the antitheses one does not need to
obey Jesus‘ demands, but instead one is only required to understand that the purpose of
the antitheses is to tear open and lay bare the great Moral need of human beings.
Thielicke‘s emphasis on the second use of the law in his interpretation of the
antitheses is indeed warranted. It has been true in the past and remains true today, as
Harvey K. McArthur points out, that those who read the Sermon on the Mount with
seriousness are overwhelmed with the awareness of their inadequacies.89 Even though
repentance may not be part of the original purpose of the antitheses, it can remain a
function which the antitheses perform. Beneath the antitheses‘s scrutiny, human
complacency and self-assurance disappear and one comes to know oneself for what he or
she is, a person who needs God‘s grace.
As chapter 4 has delineated, the basis of Thielicke‘s emphasis on the second use
of the law in his interpretation of the antitheses is his distinction between Gebot (the
command of God) and Gesetz (the law of God). With respect to Moral universalim stated
above, one can see that Thielicke‘s distinction causes him to have a limited view of
Morality. While the antitheses are Moral, they are only Moral in the fallen world but they
88
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do not bind Adam and Eve before the Fall. This distinction assumes that the Moral law
has significance only for a particular historical time, namely that of the fallen world over
against the law of another time, the original state of creation. He argues that to apply the
laws within the original creation before the fall to the completely different world after the
fall is unreasonable. One should instead regard, in Thielicke‘s understanding, the fall as a
reality which characterizes human existence in its totality. The imperfection of this
existence is a complete qualitative revolt against God and not just some quantitative
failures to reach any norm.
There is a problem with Thieliecke‘s limited view of Morality. He is right about
the fallen nature of humanity, but it only leads to sin and not necessarily immorality. One
can be a moral person but still sinful. Thielicke, however, seems to coalesce immorality
and sin. If this is correct, Thielicke‘s interpretation of the antitheses does not accept the
distinction which this dissertation recognizes between immorality and sin. To coalesce
immorality and sin could lead one to deny that humans are capable of any Moral actions.
If this is also correct, Thielicke may contradict Jesus himself. In Matthew 5:46 Jesus
shows that even a tax collector can love others whom he or she also loves. Moral actions
between those who love one another are possible even for non-Christians.
Thielicke himself seems to recognize the problem that he may contradict Jesus in
this way. This is evident in the way he treats the guilt of his parishioners for their role in
the holocaust or World War II. He hesitates to be consistent with the theological loci of
the usus elencthicus pattern he employs. His parishioners were haunted by the ongoing
denazification trials. The whole world seemed to stand in judgment of the Germans for
having fought under the wrong banner, and people were depressed by the awareness of
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collective guilt for the world tragedy.90 Facing this situation, Thielicke preached that ―life
can begin again‖ on the foundation of God‘s Word (Matthew 7:24-25) and emphasized
that ―it is not the Word of God as such that becomes this rock foundation for us but only
the Word of God that we do, the Word that we take seriously in our life.‖ He explains that
to take seriously the Word in life and to do it means ―to live‖ with it, ―to dare to be
obedient,‖ and ―to anchor, fasten, and moor the Word of God in every situation of my
life.‖91 His adamant sermon on obedience demonstrates that Thielicke still recognizes
that people can do some Moral good, even though they are sinners. This recognition
seems to undermine his belief on human incapability to do any Moral good. As Bauman
points out, Thielicke‘s call to his refugee parishioners to rebuild their broken lives is
somehow ―confused‖ by his unresolved ambivalence in neither denying that humans are
able of any Moral good nor acknowledging that humans could do the Moral good if they
would and therefore should. 92
C. The official Roman Catholic Church and the antitheses
The official position of Roman Catholics also supports the thesis of this chapter.
They argue that the Decalogue and the antitheses are binding on all people. The
encyclical letter of John Pope II states that ―The ‗Sermon on the Mount‘ – a sermon
which contains the fullest and most complete formulation of the New Law (cf. Mt. 5-7),
is clearly linked to the Decalogue entrusted by God to Moses on Mount Sinai.‖93. John
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Paul II further teaches that since the Fall has damaged the faculty of human reason,
reason must be enlightened by revelation, beginning with the commandments on Sinai, or
the Decalogue.94 The Catechism concurs in this way: ―The commandments of the
Decalogue, although accessible to reason alone, have been revealed. To attain a complete
and certain understanding of the requirements of the natural law, sinful humanity needs
this revelation.‖95 In other words, the Decalogue discloses a privileged expression of the
natural law. Even though it is revealed specifically to the Israel of the Old Testament,
they are binding on all people because they bring to light the essential duties of what it
means to be a human being.
Since the Decalogue is binding on all people, the antitheses, which express the
same Moral laws, are also binding on all people. The Catholic Catechism calls the
Decalogue the Old Law which is not superseded by the New Law in the New Testament.
The Catechism explains that the New Law, which is expressed particularly in the Sermon
on the Mount, ―refines, surpasses and leads the Old Law to its perfection.‖96 This means
that for the Roman Catholics there is no abrupt discontinuity between different epochs of
the law. There is rather an incessant revelation of the Moral law to human beings,
beginning at creation with the natural law, proceeding through the covenant at Sinai and
reaching its summit in the Sermon on the Mount.
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D. John Howard Yoder and the particularity of the antitheses
Yoder‘s particular interpretation of the antitheses does not necessarily contradict
the thesis that the antitheses are binding on all people. He seems to recognize the
possibility that the antitheses can be Moral, binding on all people. Yoder, however,
chooses not to make the argument that the antitheses are Moral, even though he may
think so. The antitheses, at the moment of their deliverance, are taught by Jesus to his
Jewish disciples. According to Yoder, this suggests Christians should accept willingly,
rather than grudgingly, as an affirmation rather than as a limitation, their rootedness in
the particularity of Judaism and Jesus. For them to recognize this is to say, as Yoder
explains, ―that despite the possible or imaginable projections of something that might be
‗universally‘ valid, these people are willing to live within the limits of the story of their
faith and even to celebrate their faith in a form that holds its meaning open for others to
join.‖97 Such an affirmation should not make Christians embarrassed about the fact that
its particular position is not ultimately subject to irresistible verification (or falsification)
from outside its own system. As a result, Yoder chooses to argue for the particularity of
the antitheses instead of arguing that the antitheses are Moral, binding on all people. For
him, the antitheses are given to a particular people, in this case Christians. This fact for
Yoder implies that their obedience to the antitheses in order to witness to the kingdom of
God cannot be tested from without the Christian system. Christians have no way of
determining whether or not they can ask everyone else to obey the antitheses as they do.
One of the reasons which prompts him to choose to interpret the antitheses as only
binding on Christians is his dislike of the attempt by people to dominate others by means
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of the coercive nature of something universal. He says, ―We want people to have to
believe us…we are impressed by the power to convince which we see exercised by
demonstrations in mathematics and logic, in the natural sciences, and in documented
history…and we want our claims about God and morality to be similarly coercive.‖98
Yoder believes that one tends to seek for any universal warrants because one wants others
to capitulate to one‘s position. By claiming the antitheses to be particularly Christian,
Yoder does not intend to say that this acceptance of one‘s own particularity implies that
one‘s position disregards the challenge of universality. Instead, he chooses to ―restate the
meaning of a truth claim from within particular identity.‖99 Yoder believes that by virtue
of one‘s acceptance of one‘s own particularity, in this case the acceptance of the position
that the antitheses are meant for Christians, one will not be easily tempted to coerce
others. Instead, they will be willing to suffer at the hands of those who oppose the
position. Yoder says, ―[R]ejection…is part of validation‖ and the price of one‘s particular
testimony of a truth claim is to be ready to ―suffer at the hands of the addressees.‖100 The
readiness to bear others‘ hostility and rejection are part of the risk of taking seriously
one‘s particularity.
It is fair to question Yoder‘s approach to the antitheses at this point. He chooses to
interpret the antitheses as exclusively for Christians. This choice, however, tends to
promote a sectarian approach to Morality. Although Yoder does not intend to do this, his
interpretation that the antitheses are only for Christians inevitably tends to promote a
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non-universal view of morality. This view of morality will in one way or another hinder
Christian participation in the public discourse of Morality. Voices as diverse as Gilbert
Meilaender,101 Lutheran theologian Carl Braaten,102 and Roman Catholic social critics
George Weigel103 and David Schindler104 offer a useful assessment of the sectarian
approach to morality, which in its practice, they worry, wittingly or unwittingly
discourages responsible Christian participation in society. Yoder is quite sensitive to the
criticism from the outside that his sectarian approach engenders social withdrawal (see
chapter 5 of this dissertation in the section of the debate between him and James
Gustafson). However forceful Yoder‘s protest, his sectarian approach, in its practice, has
tended to engender social withdrawal from precisely those social institutions that need the
leavening effect of Christian participation. This does not mean that Yoder is a total social
withdrawer. At least, his debate with Gustafson demonstrates his willingness to
participate in public discourse. But since he does not admit to any universal norm when
he participates in public discourse, his argumentation lacks persuasive power outside his
own circle. One lesson to be learned from Yoder‘s approach is that Christian participation
in public discourse of Morality must rest upon universal norms – norms which are
binding on all people. Apart from the conviction that basic Moral principles, assumed by
and standing in agreement with biblical revelation, are accessible to all people by virtue
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of God-given reason, secular people may easily dismiss and challenge Christian
participation in public Moral discourse.
IV. The moral teaching of the sixth antithesis
The comparison of the thesis with the studies of previous chapters shows how the
thesis that the antitheses are binding on all people stands up when compared with some
major interpreters of the Sermon on the Mount. The antitheses of Matthew 5:21-48
consist of six test-cases of Moral instructions – murder, adultery, divorce, taking an oath,
retaliation, and loving enemies. In relating to murder, Jesus commands people to practice
reconciliation toward others. Concerning adultery, Jesus commands sexual purity. And
this prohibition of adultery is linked to the prohibition of divorce because divorce and
remarriage are regarded as special forms of adultery (Mark 10:2-12; Matthew 19:3-12;
Luke 16:18). The prohibition against adultery takes precedence over the permission to
divorce, which is viewed as a temporary concession.105 In the case of taking an oath,
Jesus demands one‘s honesty in talk. Concerning retaliation, Jesus requires one to be
patient. And in the final test-case of loving enemies, Jesus stipulates positive actions
towards them. I will now explain the Moral teaching of the sixth antithesis as a test-case
to further support the thesis.
Jesus‘ teaching on the love of enemies is framed in terms of the traditional
command to love neighbors (Matthew 5:43), taken from Leviticus 19. To recognize this
framework in Jesus‘ teaching is edifying. J. Daryl Charles points out that not infrequently
the ―ethics of Jesus‖ is approached from a presumed discontinuity between the Old and
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New Testaments.106 A closer examination of Jesus‘ teaching dispels this presupposition.
Jesus‘ indebtedness to the Jewish tradition is apparent. M. Bockmuehl even argues that
―all the main features of Jesus‘ ethics are deeply conversant [and in continuity] with
Jewish moral presuppositions.‖107 This demonstrates that Jesus‘ teaching on loving
enemies does not simply appear out of nowhere. Romans 2:14-15, quoted in the previous
section, warrants this conclusion since the parallel between Jesus‘ command on loving
enemies and the ethical teachings of non-Christian antiquity testifies that this Moral
principle is already written on the hearts of all people. William Klassen argues that
alongside with Jesus, ancient Greek wisdom and Judaism have recognized the obligation
to extend love or to show positive actions to enemies.108 Luise Schottroff further points
out that the parallel between Jesus‘ command and the ethical teachings of non-Christian
antiquity eliminate any attempt to demonstrate the novelty and uniqueness of Jesus‘
command.109 One may imply, as Charles does, that because this Moral teaching is
common knowledge to people, loving enemies is an abiding Moral law, ―woven into the
very fabric of creation.‖110 The conscience of the writers of non-Christian antiquity
testifies to the Moral law of loving enemies. Their teachings clearly express this Moral
law.
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Jesus‘ Moral teaching to love one‘s enemies also contrasts with certain rabbinic
investigations of the law of love (Leviticus 19:18) which conclude that ―love your
neighbor‖ implies ―hate your enemy.‖ Neither Leviticus 19 nor any other Old Testament
passage, however, commands hate for one‘s enemy (eliminated by Leviticus 19:17;
Exodus 23:4-5; Proverbs 24:17-18; 25:21-22). The reference here (Matthew 5:43) to a
command to hate is to a misinterpretation and restriction of the neighbor command from
Leviticus 19:18. The misinterpretation probably reflects typical human behavior as well
as debates about the identity of a neighbor. Those who do not fulfill the roles of good
neighbors are understood to be enemies to whom love is denied.111 Jesus‘ command in
Matthew 5:44 on the love of enemies rejects such treatment of enemies. Jesus defines
―neighbor‖ to include enemies.
The theological justification for such treatment follows in Matthew 5:45. God‘s
indiscriminate goodness is the basis for this command. God‘s goodness is expressed by
continually making available to all the blessings of creation that sustain life – the sun and
the rain. This account of the relation of Morality to God‘s activity in creation shows that
there is an epistemological connection between Moral obligation and creation. For if the
Moral law is attested in the creation, such testimony will influence the ethical thinking
and Moral decisions even of those who do not acknowledge the Creator. All people are
somewhat likely to recognize it, whether or not they recognize the lawgiver.
Both Calvin and the Roman Catholic Church have also argued that the Moral
obligation of loving enemies is binding on all people. Calvin argues that this command
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―had formerly been delivered to all the Jews‖ and then ―delivered universally to all
Christians.‖112 The Roman Catholics argue that all human beings enjoy an equal dignity
by virtue of being created in God‘s image. This entails respect for the rights of humans
based on their dignity as creatures. The respect for the human person proceeds by way of
respect for the principle of ―the duty of making oneself a neighbor to others and actively
serving them,‖ including enemies.113 As God has revealed his love to all people
indiscriminately in creation, Jesus also expects one to love others, including enemies.
V. Summary
Some theologians answer differently the question whether the antitheses are
binding on all people. Leonardo Boff opts to obscure the universal sense of oughtness in
the antitheses in order to relax the moral demands on the poor. John Calvin and Helmut
Thielicke both argue the universal bindingness of the antitheses on all people. While
Calvin argues the antitheses reveal God‘s Moral will for all people, Thielicke explains
that the antitheses posit a challenge for all people of their Moral shortcomings. Yoder‘s
particular interpretation of the antitheses does not necessarily contradict the thesis that the
antitheses are binding on all people. He seems to recognize the possibility that the
antitheses can be binding on all people. Yoder, however, chooses not to make the
argument even though he may think so. For him, the antitheses are given to a particular
people, in this case Christians. By relating the antitheses to the Decalogue in the
Catechism, the official Roman Catholic Church argues that the antitheses are binding on
all people. As the Decalogue contains the privileged expression of the natural law, the
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antitheses also express the natural law. In this matter, even though the antitheses are
privilegedly revealed to Christians, they are universally binding.
In this chapter, by comparing and contrasting different approaches by some
theologians above, I have demonstrated that the antitheses are universal, binding on all
people. Even though the antitheses, as the rule of daily life, are revealed to Christians,
they are at the same time, as Carl Henry explains, ―the moral claim of the Creator
addressed to humans on the basis of creation, the Decalogue, and the future judgment.‖114
The antitheses mark neither departure from the natural law theory, nor from the law of
the Old Testament. The Natural Law theory and the Decalogue testify that what is Moral
is binding on all people. The antitheses are also Moral and therefore they are binding on
all people too. They are binding on all people even though the context from which they
come from is particularly Christian.
Obviously, the antitheses do not contain ―thou shalt not‖ commandments as their
characteristic pattern. Some negations do appear (for example, ―do not swear‖ and ―do
not resist an evil person,‖ Matthew 5:34, 39). This does not mean, as Carl Henry points
out, that the antitheses are not relevant as the Moral standard for human life.115 The
antitheses are merely not using the prohibitory form, as in the Decalogue. They indeed
have some hard sayings, such as bodily mutilation (Matthew 5:29-30) and turning the
other cheek (Matthew 5:39). These hard sayings and their extreme impressions are Jesus‘
way of asking one to do more than one thinks one can do. Just as an athletic trainer
expects his trainees to exercise even though they are unfit, Jesus expects all people to
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obey the antitheses even though they are spiritually unfit. Duncan Derret says that
Matthew‘s listeners were like athletes, seventy –five percent of whom were unfit.116
According to this view, Jesus is calling many people by means of the antitheses to join an
exercise class. Jesus indeed means for his hearers to obey the Moral teaching of the
antitheses. They have in view God‘s rule over human life. It is due to the human
predicament as a sinner that one thinks one cannot practice them.
Moreover, to speak of ―the ethics of‖ something in Scripture is to imply a
theological affirmation. To speak of the ethics of the antitheses (Matthew 5:21-48) is to
analyze a portion of Scripture from an ethical perspective in which one must interpret the
passage of the divinely revealed truth under investigation. To use the word ―ethics‖ in the
interpretation of the antitheses, in this case, is to focus upon the sense of oughtness that
flows out of the Christian‘s relationship with God through Jesus Christ. This relationship
is further illuminated by the text of the antitheses. Since the antitheses are binding on all
people, Christians should practice them to testify to the world what it means to live out a
Moral life according to God‘s will. This testimony, however, is not merely a universal
humanitarian endeavor to impress the world but it is also particularized within a Christian
context. One needs to remember that the antitheses are recorded in the context of the
―Gospel‖ according to Matthew. One should not forget that Jesus‘ Moral teachings in the
antitheses are the words of the crucified and risen Lord. The ethics of the antitheses are
not works salvation but ―salvation ethics,‖ which is ―the underside of the biblical doctrine
of atonement and mediation and of the work of the Holy Spirit in the sanctification and
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glorification of the believer.‖117 A Christian, though redeemed, still is required to
determine between right and wrong directions of love in action through an objective
Divine outline. The biblically revealed ethic of antitheses provides such content.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE ANTITHESES ARE FOR INDIVIDUALS
AND NOT FOR STATES
I. Introduction
In the previous chapter, the analysis of the antithesis of loving enemies (Matthew
5:43-48), as a test case, has demonstrated that the antitheses are binding on all people,
and not something only for Christians. In this chapter, I will argue that the antitheses are
intended to govern the conduct of individuals and not of States or political institutions.
An institution, as Oxford Dictionary defines, is a group of people established for a
particular purpose.1 From this definition, even a group of two people, such as a husband
and a wife with the purpose of establishing a family in a marriage, is an institution. Since
institutions can range from two people to many, many more, such as business, education,
charity, and religious organizations, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to argue
whether or not the antitheses can be a prescription of moral conduct for each different
institution existing on this vast globe. I will limit the discussion of this chapter to one
single large institution which can be called the epitome of secular human institutions on
earth, namely, the civil and political government or the State. The thesis of this chapter is
a response to the question which surfaces as soon as one moves out from individual
moral discipline to contemplate the roles and responsibilities of the person as a member
of a State. Does this individual moral discipline have a civil-political dimension? If it
does, of what kind? To be more specific, does the moral teaching and practice of the
antitheses necessarily have any civil-political sphere of reference, in this case, the
conduct of States? Below is an illustration of such a question.
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Suppose X and Y are States and not individuals. X prepares to attack Y. When Y
holds a parliamentary meeting to determine its policy in the face of this aggression, one
individual Christian parliament member urges non-resistance on the basis of the
antitheses in Matthew 5:38-48 (non-resistance and love of enemy). The Christian assures
the fellow doubting statesmen that the spiritual gain will offset any other loss. If they
refuse to heed this advice, then it is no longer possible for the aggression of State X to be
met with a policy based on Matthew 5:38-48 and the Christian will now have to decide
how to act in this new situation. The Christian would even agonize if it is clear that his or
her decision to participate or not to participate is going to affect the outcome of the
struggle of State Y. Regardless of the choice the Christian makes, it is clear that the
decision to meet the aggression of State X with a policy based on the antitheses of
Matthew 5:38-48 is a very different thing from the individual decision of a Christian to
withdraw from State Y‘s struggle to defend itself when State Y has decided to meet the
aggression of State X with force.
The above illustration shows the struggle this chapter is wrestling with. This
chapter will deal with the question whether or not the antitheses are intended to govern
the conduct of States. As for the second question, while an individual may not practice
what he or she believes, at least how an individual understands the antitheses will inform
the decision whether or not to participate in the defense of State Y using force against
State X‘s aggression. For the purpose of this dissertation, however, this chapter will not
further discuss the second question. I will instead show that the focus of attention in the
antitheses is on the individual X-to-Y relationship. They do not deal with the conduct of
States. I will then reassess the chapters on three theologians with whom I disagree,
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comparing and contrasting them with the thesis of this chapter. Acknowledging the
contribution from the study of Calvin and the Roman Catholic Church done in the
previous chapters, I will finally close with a reflection on the antitheses and the place of
social ethics in Scripture.
II. The antitheses and their ethical scope
The thesis of this chapter, that the antitheses are for individuals and not for States,
rests on two premises. The first premise is that the relationship between individual human
beings, which is based on love, is a direct personal relationship rather than a relationship
which is based on justice. Love deals with the person qua person. Justice deals with the
person representing an institutional-structural realm, such as a State. For example, a
judge as a person should love the defendant who is also a person but a judge as the bearer
of court and social order of the State should also treat the defendant, who is the offender
of structural order, according to the principle of justice. The highest requirement of
judicial systems in the States is that they should be just, although it is also required of any
person representing the State that the person, as an individual, should meet his or her
fellow human beings in love.
The second premise is that the antitheses are moral teachings on the relationship
between human beings which is based on love. Since the first premise is that the
relationship between individual human beings, which is based on love, is a direct
personal relationship, then the antitheses are therefore personal, that is, they govern
individual personal conduct. To argue for the thesis, I will first explore the distinction
between love and justice. I will then argue that the antitheses are moral teachings based
on love and therefore for individuals. I will also employ the specific example of a
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political government or the State to make the case that the antitheses are a prescription of
moral conducts for individuals and not for States.
A. Love and justice
There are things which an individual would never conceive of doing in a personal
capacity, but which suddenly become thinkable, even obligatory, when he or she assumes
official responsibility representing the State. For example, one should never conceive of
killing another person by electrocuting them to death. But an executioner, appointed by
the State, is obliged to make sure that the death sentence via the electric chair is
performed successfully. Can there be any theological justification for this? While one
may insist that the Christian faith has as many implications for the way society is run as
for the way a Christian lives his or her personal life, the possibility of a legitimate
distinction between different spheres of activities should not be discounted. I will present
this distinction in terms of the differentiation between love and justice. Love deals more
with the realm of private or individual morality, while justice deals with public or State
morality. To recognize this differentiation does not mean the severing of the bond
between them. Instead, this differentiation recognizes that while there is a bond between
love and justice, in the sense that they are related, they are not the same. In this section, I
will first delineate the understanding of love and justice employed in this dissertation and
I will then show how these terms are related and yet different.
A1. Understanding love and justice
Love is complex because there are many different kinds of love, and the word
―love‖ has many different meanings. There are many different kinds of love. Love of the
child for the mother or of the mother for the child, for example, differs from the kind of

231
love one has for the nation one belongs to. There are also many different meanings of the
word ―love.‖ When people speak of ―making love,‖ they do not mean the same thing as
when they speak of ―falling in love‖ or ―being in love‖ with someone. It is beyond the
scope of this dissertation to make an exact definition of what love is. For the present
purpose, this dissertation will argue that at least there is a kind of love which Scripture
portrays as divine love.
The prophet Hosea in Scripture portrays this kind of love. His own human
experience is a parable or description of divine love. Hosea loved his unfaithful wife,
who had given herself up to whoredom. Though his wife might deserve to receive a
divorce sentence, Hosea did not divorce her and did not give up on her. That was God‘s
way of revealing to Hosea the nature of divine love. As Hosea loves his wife who has
become utterly unworthy of his love, God loves those who have become utterly unworthy
of his love. He loves them not for their lovableness or worth, but in spite of their being
what they are.
According to this kind of love, one does not love because of the quality of the
beloved. One loves the other in spite of the other being so and so. A particularly clear
example of this love is found in the antithesis of ―loving one‘s enemy‖ (Matthew 5:4148). If one loves those whom one would naturally hate, then it is obvious that it is not the
quality of the beloved that motivates love. Here is clearly love for an individual, not
because of what the individual is, but in spite of what the individual is. Loving one‘s
enemy is giving to the enemy positive actions and attitudes he or she does not deserve to
get.
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Justice is also as complex as love. William Werpehowski argues that
―specification of justice requires specification of criteria appropriate to the nature of the
relationship in question.‖2 In the economic realm, for example, justice based on merit
must play a significant role in an individual‘s effort to maintain and increase productivity.
Without effort and productivity human need is not met, and justice is not rendered. When
it comes to political rights, housing, and educational opportunities, however, an
egalitarian justice seems to be most appropriate. Justice is not rendered when one group
occupies a disproportionate amount of political power for the sake of securing that
group‘s interests. For example, the apartheid system which prefers the Europeans and
denigrates the Africans is clearly an unjust system. Such an approach clearly stereotypes
a given group in society as having only one set of perspectives or interests and hence
destroys the dignity of each individual. It may be helpful therefore to recognize that
different senses of justice may apply to different activities and spheres of reality. Karen
Lebacqz recognizes this complexity and offers at least six different theories of justice.3
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to delineate all the different senses of
justice. At its most basic meaning, this dissertation understands justice as rendering to the
other what is his or her due, as classically defined by Aristotle suum cuique, ―to each his
due.‖ This formal notion is widely accepted in both theological and philosophical circles.
As Emil Brunner points out, ―From time immemorial the principle of justice has been
defined as the suum cuique – the rendering to each man of his due.‖4 This definition is to
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be distinguished from justice as a personal virtue, namely, as one of those habits which
are part of the character of a person. As a personal virtue, justice is one of the four
cardinal virtues, the others being prudence, fortitude and temperance.5 It is also beyond
the scope of this dissertation to specifically discuss the relation between justice as a
personal virtue and justice as classically defined. For the present purpose, while justice
can also be a personal character trait, it points to a dimension of social relationships. In
this sense, a social practice or arrangement as well as a specific social interaction may be
just or unjust. In fact, this understanding of justice is the more fundamental concept, as
Nicholas Wolterstorff argues, ―For the just person is the person whose habit it is to
pursue justice in social relationships.‖6 Justice may prevail in a certain regard within a
certain group of people, or it may fail to prevail. Justice is present among persons, groups
and institutions when their rights, their legitimate claims, are honored. Justice is all about
human rights. This shows that human rights exist before justice does. The very idea of
justice occurs only because humans already have rights. And the fact of justice, in real
life, occurs only if human beings receive whatever their rights are.
Scripture also recognizes justice in this way. It describes, for example, God ―who
executes justice for the oppressed‖ (Psalm 146:7) and is especially concerned for the
plight of all those unable to ensure their own fair treatment (Exodus 22:21-27). Oliver
O‘Donovan claims that the Hebrew word misphat, often translated into English as justice
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and paired with tsedega or righteousness, refers to judicial performance.7 Nicholas
Wolterstorff concurs that talk about misphat in the Scripture rarely leaves judicial
contexts and decisions behind. He further adds that God‘s demand for justice has to do
both with appropriate judgments and with a deeper notion of justice. In other words,
human rights are based on the dignity of human beings as created in the image of God,
and when these rights are not honored, injustice is present.8 While it is beyond the scope
of this dissertation to develop a biblical conception of justice, I agree with Wolterstorff.
God‘s demand for justice in Scripture gives a powerful reason for Christians to confirm
the existence of human rights. Human beings are all created in the image of God. For this
reason, when one talks of justice, one is talking about an enduring human reality, the
reality of human rights.
Since justice deals with human rights, the debates about justice can be boiled
down to the question: what does one actually owe people in a given situation of life? Or,
what is due other people? The detailed answer to this question is again beyond the scope
of this dissertation. For the present purpose, the nature of such questions demonstrates
that justice has to do with arranging things in human society so that individuals and
groups or institutions respect each other‘s rights. There are different kinds of social
relationships in which people can press their rights on each other. I will describe some
instances below.
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Sometimes, justice can be individual. For example, one may make a contract to
paint a portrait, for which the payment would be $500 when the job is done. Justice is
honored when the portrait is finished and the payment of $500 is made. Other times,
justice can be institutional, either the relationship between an institution and an individual
or between an institution and another institution. For instance, a State should treat its
citizens justly by giving a fair share of the many goods that it distributes to its members,
like the country‘s natural resources, life, land, air and water. Justice is done when
everyone gets a fair share of these kinds of wealth. Just as a citizen has a right to share in
a State‘s goods, a State has a right to some of a citizen‘s goods. A citizen owes a share of
taxes, respects public property and obeys laws. Justice is done when every citizen gives
to the State what is due. An example of justice between institutions is evident in export
and import treaties between States. Justice is done when each State gives to one another
its due.
These examples show that justice is somehow impersonal in that it does not
depend on one‘s personal attitudes toward other individuals. Justice is honored when one
gives to others their due whether they are acquaintances or strangers, even regardless of
whether they are friends or enemies. Lewis Smedes further explains that this impersonal
nature of justice has an advantage since it means justice can be measured.9 For example,
a spouse may bicker interminably with her husband about whether or not he really loves
her and nobody could step in to adjudicate the dispute. But if the wife starts to claim that
her husband has done her an injustice, an outsider could help arbitrate whether or not an
injustice has been done.
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More importantly, the impersonal nature of justice gives more weight to the first
premise of the thesis, namely that love is individual and justice is institutional. Justice can
indeed be individual. For example, one can ask other individuals the question of how just
they are. The impersonal nature of justice, however, tends to take justice beyond the
individual scope to the institutional one. Because of this, one can also ask an institution
such as the State the question ―how just is a State or nation.‖ This question is legitimate
since one can measure whether or not a State or nation is pursuing justice among its
citizens and with other States. But one cannot ask of an institution how loving it is. To
ask of an institution the question ―how loving is a State or nation‖ is meaningless because
it is difficult to recognize and measure the love, which a State is required to show. It is
more appropriate to ask the question of justice with regard to a State. The question about
loving others is more individual in its scope.
A2. When love and justice embrace one another
In theological discussion, love and justice are often compared and contrasted with
one another. In this dissertation, love has been defined as giving people something they
do not deserve to get, and justice as giving people their due. To focus the discussion of
how justice and love relate to one another in this dissertation, I will specifically analyze
the thinking of Reinhold Niebuhr. By looking at the strength and the weakness of his
view, I hope to demonstrate that love and justice, while they are different, can
complement one another. Let love and justice begin to embrace one another.
Reinhold Niebuhr recognizes that love and justice are distinct. They are distinct in
the sense that love is individual and justice is institutional. But he also points out that
love and justice are often in tension with one another. In the last chapter of his Moral
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Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr argues that the ethics of love, especially Christian
love, could never be a guide in rough human social life.10 The reason for this is that
human social life consists of competing claims and interests between institutions,
societies and even nations. Love cannot be a guide in such bitter competitions and for
Niebuhr even the agape love which Scripture prescribes, which he understands as a selfsacrificial love, might actually do harm. Only justice can be a guide in such competition
in human social life. This is especially true in the quest for a just balance of power among
competing interests.
According to Niebuhr, Christian love, self-sacrificial love, is an ―impossible
possibility‖ and never achievable in human social life of this fallen world. He says, ―[I]t
is not even right to insist that every action of the Christian must conform to agape, rather
than to the norms of relative justice and mutual love by which life is maintained and
conflicting interests are arbitrated in history. For as soon as the life and interest of others
than the agent are involved in an action or policy, the sacrifice of those interests ceases to
be ‗self-sacrifice.‘‖11 Justice is all one can hope for. It is only through justice that a
tolerable harmony between the competing claims of a sinful world is achievable. This
implies that institutions must strive for justice even if they are forced to use means, such
as resistance, coercion and even resentment, which cannot gain moral sanction from the
standpoint of agape love in individual relationships.
Reinhold Niebuhr is therefore satisfied to let love and justice stand in tension. The
strength of this position is in his distinction between the nature of individual and
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institutional morality. Justice is the norm which is more likely to receive practical
application in the sphere of institutional morality, while love, agape, is the norm which is
to be practiced in the arena of individual morality. Here Niebuhr is certainly correct to
highlight the centrality of love and justice for Christian ethical thinking.
Niebuhr‘s position is not without problems, however. One problem surfaces when
one begins to assume love and justice as totally compartmentalized because they are in
tension with one another. In other words, there is a danger of separating love and justice
to the point where they are not related at all, and perhaps even contradictory. As a result,
institutions, like States and business organizations, could claim a disturbing amount of
license to use questionable means to achieve a desired end in the name of justice. An
example from Niebuhr‘s treatment of the problem of war may illustrate this danger.
With regard to the bombing of enemy cities in the Second World War, Niebuhr
wrote in the summer of 1943: ―It is not possible to engage in any act of collective
opposition to collective evil without involving the innocent with the guilty…Once
bombing has been developed as an instrument of warfare, it is not possible to disavow its
use without capitulating to the foe who refuses to disavow it.‖12 While Niebuhr admits
that the bombing policies can be carried out without rancor or self-righteousness,
recognizing that ―no man has the moral freedom to escape from these hard and cruel
necessities of history,‖13 his position seems to display a thrust of ―the end justifies the
means.‖ This becomes evident when later in 1944 Niebuhr appeared to be open in
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principle to the use of indiscriminate means in warfare: ―The necessity follows from the
possibility, because once the instruments of a total war are unloosed they will guarantee
defeat for the side that fails to use them, whether from want of resolution, or failure of
organization, or moral scruple.‖14 While Niebuhr is supporting a war fought in the name
of justice, in pursuing it he seems to tolerate the injustice of allowing the killing of
innocent non-combatants because the end justifies the means.
To be fair, Niebuhr is not a consequentialist ethicist where everything goes as
long as the end is achieved. While he seems to allow injustice to be done to the innocent
non-combatants, he rejects the use of nuclear weapons in any actual battle, though not the
possession of such weapons, because he believes to use such a means of warfare would
inflict a heavy burden of moral guilt on the nation which has deployed it.15 This talk of
actions which are tainted with guilt shows that Niebuhr still retains his moral scruples or
conscience. It appears that for him the use of certain weapons does have something
intrinsically objectionable about it, even when such use might be justified on purely
consequential grounds. The yardstick by which the moral guilt is being measured is
presumably a non-consequentialist one. This shows that Niebuhr is perhaps confused in
his ethical methodology, especially in his application of the ethical principles of love and
justice in the problem of war.
Niebuhr‘s apparent inconsistency in his dealing with the problem of war is an
example of the risk in making love and justice strangers to one another. For Niebuhr, love
14
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and justice seem always in tension and cannot be sufficiently interrelated. Love and
justice, however, should not be complete strangers. In the case of war, a just war may be
interpreted as an ―in-principled‖ application of Christian agape.16 To engage in a war can
be an expression of one‘s love in defending others who are under attack by evil forces.
Also in terms of protecting innocent non-combatants, Niebuhr may employ the principle
of double effect as an attempt to ensure that justice is done when love for one‘s neighbor
seems to demand drastic measures.17 During a fight in the battlefield, it may be hard to
avoid harming innocent non-combatants. However, such harm should never be the
intention. But the indiscriminate bombing of cities involves the intentional killing of
innocent non-combatants. That Niebuhr can defend such intentional indiscriminate killing
reveals the weakness of his position – a weakness caused by Niebuhr‘s failure to
sufficiently relate love and justice to each other.
The discussion on the strength and weakness of Niebuhr‘s view on the
relationship between love and justice is illuminating. While love and justice are distinct,
even perhaps sometimes in tension, they should not be mutually exclusive. In fact, they
should complement one another. Love needs justice and justice also needs love. Love
without justice can become a mere sentimentality (whenever one feels love, the thing one
does is therefore a loving action). Justice without love can become a mere
consequentiality (whenever one thinks of a just end, use of any means becomes a just
thing to achieve that just end).
16
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One way to show the mutual relationship between love and justice is through the
distinction Niebuhr points out. Love is individual and justice is institutional. But unlike
Niebuhr who seems to emphasize the tension between love and justice, love and justice
must actually embrace one another. An example from the issues of race relations could
make this evident. Recall how the dissertation understands love and justice. One loves the
other in spite of the other being so and so. Love is giving the other what is not the other‘s
due. Justice is giving the other his or her due. A State may call for procedures and
policies that warrant no racial discrimination in jobs, education and political positions in
society. Justice calls for this and ensures that policies, laws and structures render to
people their due, regardless of their ethnic background, simply because they are created
in the image of God. Justice can even be sensitive to past wrongs and seek to overcome
them through better policies and laws. This role of justice is institutional. But such justice
may not improve actual relations among the individuals of various ethnic or racial
groups. Stopping at just policies, laws and structures will not achieve God‘s vision for
humanity, for God desires that in human racial differences people may learn empathy,
understanding, and mercy. This is where love, which is personal, plays its role. Love calls
for individual engagement among the various ethnic groups so that prejudices might be
overcome and reconciliation might occur. A person should learn to love others even
though the others with their prejudices have mistreated that person. But again, to stop
only at loving interaction between ethnic groups will not bring the justice required for
addressing the wrong done in the past or the mistreatment continuing in the present. Love
and justice should embrace one another. When they do, they nurture each other and guard
against the excesses of pursuing only one or the other.
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B. The antitheses, their institutional implications, and the state as a test case
From the previous section on the understanding of love and justice, this
dissertation understands love as giving to others things not their due or what they do not
deserve to receive, and it understands justice as giving to others their due or what they
deserve to receive. This does not mean that love and justice are contradictory. Instead,
they should be complementary. One way to understand how they complement one
another is to recognize the roles of love and justice in human life. Love personally deals
with the individual-to-individual relationship, while justice impersonally handles the
relationship between human beings in the State through structural arrangements or social
establishments.
A cursory reading of the antitheses demonstrates that the focus on the antitheses is
about love. In fact, some of them are about giving others what they do not deserve to get.
Jesus commands people how to personally handle their individual relationships even
when the person at the other end of the relationship does not deserve to get the treatment.
For instance, he commands that one should not retaliate even when the other individual
deserves retaliation (Matthew 5:39). He even gives an example of doing more than the
other asks or deserves to get: ―If anyone forces you to go one mile, go with them two
miles‖ (Matthew 5:41). Love for enemies (Matthew 5:44) is perhaps the clearest
expression of love in terms of giving others what they do not deserve. The focus on love
in the antitheses therefore demonstrates that the antitheses are intended to govern the
conduct of individuals and not of States.
A close reading of the antitheses also reveals that loving others is not in tension
with justice, because love complements justice. The first antithesis on murder includes
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the example that one should express love to others through reconciliation without an
appeal to the court of justice (Matthew 5:25). An example of the fifth antithesis shows
that an expression of love is giving others more than they deserve to get through the
justice system (Matthew 5:40). One reason God gives for loving enemies is egalitarian
justice. We are to treat human beings, good and evil, in the same way that God deals with
human beings. God treats human beings in terms of natural or earthly order because all
human beings are fundamentally equal – they are all created in the image of God
(Matthew 5:45).
All these examples show that in the antitheses Jesus does not intentionally
separate love and justice. There are times when love informs one to let go of justice as in
Matthew 5:25. Other times love encourages one to treat others more than they deserve to
get with justice (Matthew 5:40). Also in individual relationships, Jesus‘ command to love
one‘s enemy, to give one‘s enemy something the enemy does not deserve to get, is
modeled on God‘s just action toward his creation (Matthew 5:45). The connection of love
and justice in the antitheses demonstrates that love and justice, while they are distinct, are
complementary to one another. But since the focus of the antitheses is love, it appears
that here Jesus teaches how love supplements justice in moral actions, especially in
individual relationships.
The teaching of the antitheses on how love should supplement justice can help
answer the question concerning the institutional implications of the antitheses, especially
for the conduct of States. The antitheses are indeed for individuals. Since love and justice
are related, however, individuals should consider how the antitheses should govern a
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person‘s actions toward other persons even when the person represents the State. I will
use a specific example to show how this can be done.
An institutional moral conduct of the State is, for example, how State Y acts
morally toward State Z. State Y acts morally toward State Z when Y does justice to Z,
namely, Y gives Z its due, whatever the due is. Now, a male-president of Y acts justly
toward a female-president of Z when he, as a leader of Y, gives her, as a leader of Z, the
due of Z as a State. If Y has a financial debt toward Z, for example, then the malepresident should pay the female-president the debt when it is due. Imagine that the two
leaders are still young. The male is handsome and the female is beautiful. While the
male-president acts justly as the leader of Y in giving the female-president of Z what is
due her State in terms of financial debt, is the male-president allowed to commit adultery
with the female-president as long as justice is done between their States? In their
individual relationship, love provides the needed direction. The second antithesis on
adultery, especially, obliges both leaders as individuals not to commit adultery, even not
to look at each other lustfully (Matthew 5:28). Jesus forbids that kind of immoral action.
However, one cannot stretch this immoral-individual conduct to imply an institutional
one. If a male-president of state Y looks lustfully at a female-president of state Z, does it
also imply that State Y is looking at State Z lustfully? This kind of logical conclusion
seems absurd.
When Leonardo Boff, Helmut Thielicke, and John Howard Yoder argue that the
antitheses are not only for individuals but also something for the State, they do not come
to such an absurd conclusion. Boff believes that the antitheses are a call to engage in a
socio-political liberation from oppressive social, political or economic structures of
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States, particularly within the Latin America context. Thielicke argues that the antitheses
are a reminder or mirror for States to see their shortcomings. Yoder insists that the
antitheses are a model for States to emulate. Each supports his argument with reasons.
They seem, however, to be mistaken in this case, and I will show what kind of mistake
they may have made.
III. An evaluation of Leonardo Boff’s socio-political liberation agenda of the
antitheses
The chapter on Leonardo Boff‘s interpretation of the antitheses has shown that for
Boff, Jesus, by means of the antitheses, displays a conscience liberated from the
oppression of legal prescriptions. The antitheses pave the way for liberated people to be
able to make creative decisions in their lives with love for the oppressed and the poor as
their principle guide. The antitheses are samples of Jesus‘ creative love, and they invite
people to be true to themselves and marshal their creativity to imagine ways to love one
another, including their enemies. The antitheses do not exemplify a new morality.
Instead, they are an exposition of how people, liberated from the oppression of
exclusivism and from the authoritarianism of the law, should engage in social liberation.
The antitheses are a call to participate in a political-institutional agenda to liberate the
oppressed from their oppressors.
How Boff interprets the antitheses highlights his Christological reflections.18 One
overall theme of these reflections is that Jesus gives privileges to the marginalized, who
are nearer the kingdom than all others and who follow Jesus because they have nothing to
gain from an established order that cannot save them from their oppression and
18
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alienation. In Boff‘s formulation, Jesus‘ preferential option for the marginalized does not
mean that they are ―special‖ or ―more,‖ but rather means that those who are marginalized
must be loved first. Boff argues: ―to make a preferential option for the poor, then, means
to love the poor primarily, as Jesus does – and then, starting with the poor, to love
everyone, calling all of the others to deliver themselves from the mechanisms that
produce the wealth of some and the poverty of others.‖19 This understanding of
preferential option underlies Boff‘s approach to the antitheses. In the antitheses, Boff
attempts to see the meaning of the person of Jesus in terms of his identification with the
marginalized.
The marginalized exist in relation to the institutional structures of exploitation.
This implies that the question of the specific function of Scripture (hermeneutics) for the
church can only be answered in terms of the primacy of the social over the personal or
the institutional over the individual. As Boff argues:
The question [of hermeneutics reflections] cannot be posed merely within the
dimensions of a personal conversion. There are structural evils that transcend
individual ones. The church, whether it likes it or not, is involved in a context that
transcends it….Like Jesus, it ought to give special attention to the nobodies and
those without a voice. It ought to accentuate particularly the secular and liberating
dimensions contained in the message of Christ.20
How Boff accentuates the institutional-political liberating dimensions contained in the
message of Christ is evident when he interprets the antitheses as a call to social liberation.
He means that Jesus loves the marginalized by combating not simply the people who are
controlling and powerful, but the socioeconomic mechanisms that make these powerful

19

Leonardo Boff, When Theology Listens to the Poor, trans. Robert R. Barr (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1970), 25. Emphasis added.
20

Boff, Jesus Christ Liberator, 46.

247
people exploitative at the expense of the marginalized. The antitheses are a call to engage
in this struggle to liberate the marginalized from the structural-institutional evils within
the State.
The preferential option for the marginalized appears to predispose Boff to
interpret the antitheses as a whole in a way which will illumine and build on this
paradigm. He seems to use the antitheses to support an ethical argument defined by the
paradigm, that is, the call for institutional-political liberation. Theologians do not indeed
live in the ―clouds,‖ as Boff himself argues.21 They are social actors with a particular
place in society. They are indeed framed within the overall social context. In that sense,
the emphases of a given biblical interpretation flow from what seems relevant to the
theologian on the basis of his or her social standpoint. For Boff, it is Latin America social
oppression. While it is not wrong to be relevant to one‘s own context in interpreting
Scripture, what is decisive is whether one gives the last word to one‘s own paradigm or to
Scripture. The fact that one accepts all of Scripture as the Word of God does not mean
that one would not do any selecting. But selecting scriptural data to advance one‘s agenda
is a methodology which is unfaithful to Scripture as God‘s Word. The way Boff handles
the antitheses is perhaps what Douma describes as ―[Scripture] texts made room for
themes or – formulated in more contemporary fashion – for paradigms.‖22 The problem
with Boff‘s selection of the antitheses to support his institutional-political liberation
paradigm or agenda is that Boff seems to ignore any scriptural data which is irrelevant to
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his own agenda, without advancing from Scripture itself well-grounded reasons for his
decision.
Here is an example to clarify this point. Boff argues, ―The God of Jesus is no
longer the God of Torah, the Law. He is the God of mercy, of unlimited goodness, and of
patience for the weak who recognize that they are weak and start on the road back to
God.‖23 He then further argues that in the antitheses Jesus reveals himself as one who is
liberated from a conscience oppressed by the law of the Old Testament and is now free to
bend the law to the higher purpose of love, even loving enemies (Matt.5:43-48). The
lesson of the six antitheses from Matt.5:21-48 is the ―liberty and nonconformity‖ of Jesus
with regard to the law.24 As a consequence, while one may understand that Jesus is not
completely against the law, one must realize that Jesus considers the law something
which can easily be discarded, in Boff‘s term, as ―a crutch,‖25 once a person, like Jesus,
no longer needs it. Boff‘s interpretation contradicts what Jesus says in Matthew 5:18,
―Truly I tell you, until heaven and earth disappear, not the smallest letter, nor the least
stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear from the Law, until everything is
accomplished.‖ This interpretation makes Boff play Jesus off against himself in order to
maintain the consistency of the socio-political liberation agenda. His interpretation of the
antitheses appears to pass only through the lens of liberation for the socially oppressed.
Other biblical passages which are not related to the reality of social oppression are left
out and not taken into account.
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Boff believes that the antitheses are without doubt an authoritative source for his
paradigm of a socio-political commitment to deal with the situation of the oppressed and
to liberate them from the structural evils of the State which perpetuate the situation. But
to say that the antitheses are authoritative for socio-political liberation practice does not
of itself assure that Boff has arrived at an appropriate theological-ethical formulation.
Even if a theologian were to agree with Boff that the antitheses are authoritative, the
given interpretations of the authoritative text could still lead to different theologicalethical proposals. An analysis of Boff‘s mistaken interpretation of the antitheses teaches
an important lesson.
The lesson is that what a struggle theologians must go through to distance
themselves as much as possible from the cultural background which they bring to
Scripture so they can hear every biblical message clearly. In Boff‘s case, his move from
interpretation to application, from Christology to ethics, should also be guided by a
faithfulness to give the last word to Scripture. It seems, however, that he allows the
cultural background of Latin America‘s oppressive situation to become the paradigm
which excessively controls his interpretation of the antitheses. Boff respects the authority
of Scripture, but his interpretation of the scriptural text of the antitheses is mistaken.
Consider another example. Boff interprets Jesus‘ invitation in Matthew 5:48,
―You must therefore be perfect just as your heavenly Father is perfect,‖ to mean that as
God has showed his indiscriminate love without limits and as Jesus has lived out that
love in his challenge to the oppressing structures of his era, his followers should also
express and demonstrate this love by confronting the structural oppression of their own
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era.26 In Boff‘s view, the situation in Latin America has striking parallels with the
sociopolitical situation of Jesus‘ time; Palestine too is suffering from unjust structures
and institutions. Jesus preaches the kingdom of God and delivers his teaching in the
antitheses as the start of a new age of liberation. In doing so, he aligns himself with the
oppressed and takes on the Pharisees and the scribes who oppress people in the name of
the law.
Boff also interprets the ―perfection‖ in Matthew 5:48 in terms of structural good
and evil and believes that this text supports his paradigm of socio-political liberation
agenda. The problem is, however, that he reads into the verse something which Jesus did
not mean to say. As this dissertation has argued, here Jesus is only concerned with
individual conduct which demonstrates the moral principle of loving people
indiscriminately. Jesus‘ concern here is with individuals and not with the perfection of
any socio-political structure of the State or how the State should handle the marginalized
and the oppressed.
IV. An appraisal of Thielicke’s usus elencthicus pattern of the antitheses
The chapter on Helmut Thielicke‘s interpretation of the antitheses shows that he
employs the theological use of the law, the usus elencthicus, to interpret the antitheses.
He extends this function of the law in the antitheses as a mirror of human shortcomings
not only for individuals but also for States. The basis of this is his assumption of the
radical transformation the world has undergone after the fall. Since nothing good can be
found in the totally corrupted world, all States in the world belong to the fallen order of
the world and are also sinful. God in his grace has revealed his radical demands in the
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antitheses in order to show how corrupt human beings are, individually and
institutionally.
The way Thielicke interprets the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount does not
tell people what they can do but rather reveals to them the fallen character of the present
world. They describe an innocence lost in the Fall and not yet regained, since the second
coming has still not occurred. For the time being, one must in some way come to terms
with this fallen world. Christians always need to view human history as constantly
marked by human sin.
This paradigm of usus elencthicus allows him to interpret the antitheses not only
as a reminder of inadequacies for individuals but also for States. The demand to love
enemies (Matt.5:43-48), for example, is a reminder that even if a State declares a war for
a just cause, it is not the way it is supposed to be. It is because the world has fallen that
such implementation is needed. Thielicke explains in this way:
In this text there is an indictment of our whole world…This becomes especially
clear when we consider that here Jesus‘ mercy is at odds, not merely with certain
degenerate aspects of the world, but even with the completely legal and
recognized juridical ordinances of our world…In this stark, slashing, striking, and
therefore unescapable way of stating it, Jesus is saying to us that human law and
justice are incapable of regulating our relation to our neighbor as God wants it to
be, but that the law is only a regulation of necessity which is necessary in our
fallen world.27
This implementation will not last into eternity. It will disappear when the eschaton, the
true kingdom of God established by Jesus‘ second coming, arrives. When that happens,
there will no longer be any continuing reminder of what ought not to be since there will
be no war in the world to come.
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By stretching the scope of the antitheses not only to individuals but also to States,
Thielicke seems to allow the usus elencthicus pattern to become the overarching
paradigm which controls his interpretation of the antitheses. In the above example, he
stretches the use of the law as a reminder of the individual fallen nature to the structuralinstitutional fallen nature. It is theologically sound to say that in the eschaton, when the
true kingdom of God is established, there will not be any war. But to use the antitheses to
support this doctrine seems wanting and pressing something which might not be the
emphasis of the antitheses. It appears that Thielicke forces his paradigm on the text,
instead of letting the text speak for itself. The message of the text is clearly focused on
individuals – such as an offended brother (Matthew 5:23), a woman lustfully looked at
(Matthew 5:28), a wife divorced (Matthew 5:32), a person swearing by his head
(Matthew 5:36), a person helped (Matthew 5:42), and a brother greeted (Matthew 5:47).
Using the usus elencthicus pattern to say that these teachings to individuals also apply to
the State is a stretch.
V. A review of Yoder’s non-violent model of the antitheses
The chapter on John Howard Yoder‘s interpretation of the antitheses explains that
for Yoder, the antitheses are for the church, both as individual members but also as a
community. His use of the term ―community‖ for the church, however, seems ambiguous
when one attempts to understand the term in the light of the distinction between church as
organism and church as institution. Yoder himself seems to leave it for his readers to
define. In his pamphlet, The Christian Witness to the State, Yoder only states that ―it is
possible for the Christian or the Christian church to address to the social order at large or
to the state criticisms and suggestions concerning the way in which the state fulfills its
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responsibility for the maintenance of order.‖28 The Christian church in the quote can
mean both the church as an organism and an organization or institution. Regardless of the
ambiguity, one can at least be sure that for Yoder the scope of the antitheses is for
individuals and beyond. This is evident in Mark Nation‘s comment that for Yoder it is by
looking at Jesus that Christians know not only what behavior Jesus desires for them, but
also what he desires for the State.29 When Jesus desires Christians, for example, as an
individual and as a community (whatever the term ―community‖ might mean for Yoder)
to love their enemies, he also desires the same for the State.
The basis for Yoder‘s interpretation is the paradigm of non-resistance. As a
renowned pacifist, Yoder argues for the epistemic value of non-resistance. He writes that
non-resistance is ―an epistemology about how to let truth speak for itself.‖30 This means
that for Yoder the commitment to non-resistance is a life-shaping conviction that shapes
all other conviction. This is the epistemic value of non-resistant conviction, namely, that
it shapes how a person sees and understands the world. Yoder‘s paradigm of nonresistance shapes how he arrives at knowledge and understands Scripture. This is evident
when he insists that Christians should imitate Jesus.
The basis for Yoder‘s paradigm of non-resistance is Jesus. Jesus lives his life nonresistantly; so should Christians. Christians must know that they are called to be faithful
to Jesus; that is, they must know what faithful living means primarily by looking at the
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life of Jesus and responding to his call upon their lives. They confess that this same Jesus,
the Christ, reigns over the world. The same one who calls them to deny themselves and to
love even enemies, is the One who reigns over all ―dominion, authority and power‖ (cf. 1
Corinthians 15:24). Jesus is the in-breaking of the kingdom of God, and this cannot be
abstracted from the life of Jesus; his life is the very witness of the kingdom – it is what
the kingdom looks like. It can then be seen that Jesus‘ ministry is the embodiment of
God's kingdom – not simply ideals to be followed, but the concrete announcement of
what God's reign looks like.
This reign of Jesus over all dominion, authority and power without doubt includes
the State. This is the reason why the norm for Christians is also the same norm for the
state. Yoder declares that ―The reign of Christ means for the state the obligation to serve
God by encouraging the good and restraining the evil, i.e., to serve peace, to preserve the
social cohesion in which the leaven of the Gospel can build the church, and also render
the old aeon more tolerable.‖31 If Christians are called to be non-resistant, then the norm
by which Christians are obliged to obey is also the same for the State. If the State cannot
obey this norm, then it is not because the State must have a different norm. Instead, it
only shows that the State responds differently from Christians. In Yoder‘s words, ―The
difference between Christian ethics for Christians and Christian ethics for the state is
therefore due to duality not of realms or levels, but of responses.‖32 For this reason,
Christians can call upon the government to implement policies that pursue justice and
minimize the use of violence.
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Yoder here suggests that the Christian life is guided more by example than by
precept or command, especially the example of Jesus. Jesus came into the world not only
to redeem but to be an example of holy, obedient living. To have the example of Jesus as
a norm for the Christian life is in itself noteworthy. Herman Bavinck comments that
―examples often have greater persuasive power than mere doctrines of law‖ and
furthermore, while ―the law itself cannot change us, redirect us or renew us…from Christ,
who is both our Savior and our example, proceeds reforming recreating, renewing power,
a power that makes us like him and completely restores the image of God in us.‖33 This
does not mean that one should just have a general concept of living like Jesus in the New
Testament. Yoder concurs with this since he rejects a naïve outward replicating of the
shape of Jesus‘ life. He calls living barefoot like Jesus in the New Testament, for
example, ―a red herring.‖34 Instead, he argues for one normative pattern which ―holds in
every strand of the New Testament literature,‖ namely, ―vulnerable enemy love and
renunciation of dominion in the real world.‖35 By this one and only pattern is one bound
by the New Testament to ―be like Jesus.‖ Since Jesus lives out his life non-resistantly,
which is clearly demonstrated by his death on the cross, Christians must follow the same
way of life. They should have a non-resistant way of life.
For Yoder, the non-resistant way of life is the concrete way Jesus reveals the
nature of his reign over the world. While his death on the cross is the clearest
demonstration of this way of life, Jesus also expresses this in his Sermon on the Mount.
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This theological emphasis allows Yoder to make the antitheses a norm both for Christians
and the State. The reason is the nature of God's kingdom. The Sermon on the Mount,
including the antitheses, is the concrete announcement of this reign, and it constitutes a
new social order.36 Yoder argues that Jesus applies this reign to the political as well as the
civil order since in Jesus ―God judges the present order and promises another one.‖37 The
antitheses apply not merely to the individual realm but also beyond since they hold
unconditionally for the public domain of institutional-political and social life in terms of
national and international freedom. Justice and peace can only be realized to the extent
that the reign of Jesus or the kingdom of God is realized. To proclaim its coming and to
strive for its fulfillment in this fallen world is therefore the mission of the people of God.
In seeing Jesus‘ life not only as perfect, but also as the concrete representation of
God's rule, Yoder is able to see what Jesus‘ reign should look like when it is embodied in
the Christian life. The fact that Jesus‘ reign was brought about by a non-resistant witness
means that for Christians to be a foretaste of God‘s kingdom, they must also practice nonviolence. In the same way, since the announcement of God's kingdom by Jesus led to his
death at the hands of the governing authorities, Christians must also be fully aware of the
fundamental opposition to the non-violent way of life by the State.
Since this new social order makes political claims, its faithful members will likely
meet with opposition, for, as Yoder states, Jesus calls people into a ―community of
voluntary commitment, willing to take upon itself the hostility of a given society.‖38 Jesus
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is seen as calling people to a different way, a way that is not less political or social, for it
is exactly this way of being which will cause political opposition. This political
statement is not political for its own sake, and certainly not a new way to achieve
political power, but rather it is an eschatological recognition that in Jesus God promises a
better social order. This is therefore a revolutionary political statement, rooted in the
eschatological kingdom. And for Yoder, such recognition has far-reaching implications,
as it did for Jesus, both for the life of the people who want to follow Jesus‘ example, as
well as for all their social and political relationships, especially in relationship to the
State. This is why Yoder argues that both Christians and the State should have the same
norm. This is the reason why Christians should witness to the world and its political
States concerning this new social order established by God through Jesus, especially in
his teaching of the antitheses.
I have two concerns with Yoder‘s interpretation of the antitheses. The first one is
a general one concerning Yoder‘s position on the relationship between the church and the
State. The second is specifically on Yoder‘s paradigm of non-resistance in his
interpretation of the antitheses – a paradigm which he imposes on the State.
A. Yoder on the church and the state
As noted above, Yoder argues that Christians should indeed call upon the
government to implement policies that pursue justice. Such engagement is not wrong.
Christians can engage the government in such a way because Scripture has something to
say about God‘s purposes for government. For example, Scripture says that a State or
civil government is to restrain evil and promote good (Romans 13:1-6; 1 Peter 2:13-14;
and, Genesis 9:5-6). At least, Christians can ask their government or State to govern and
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make its society more just and peaceful. In short, Christians as individuals can engage
and help the State to make a better or more just society. I agree with Yoder so far.
Yoder, however, seems to conflate the method by which the church engages the
world with the content of the gospel which the church proclaims to the world. To argue
that the church should be a city on the hill by means of a non-resistant lifestyle which the
State should follow (whether or not the State will comply is no concern here) implies that
the main task of the church is not bearing witness to the gospel of grace for individuals.
This gospel is indeed delivered non-resistantly by Jesus on the cross. But to argue that
this method of non-resistance should become the core of the church‘s witness, as Yoder
seems to do, does not automatically bring out the content of the gospel. One should not
confuse the content of the gospel with the method by which it is delivered. One
consequence of confusing the content with the method is that the church becomes like
other secular or worldly organizations. This betrays the nature and purpose of the church
itself. There is nothing the church can offer to the world which the world does not have,
except the gospel of grace.
B. Yoder, the non-resistant paradigm, and the antitheses
Yoder argues that the non-resistance vision is not the prophetic vision of a few
individuals, but that every member of the body of Christ is called to non-resistance in
discipleship. Every member is called to abandon all loyalties which counter obedience,
including the desire to be effective immediately or to make oneself responsible for civil
justice.39 Yoder employs the antitheses, such as Matthew 5:39, to justify this position. He
indeed allows a local police action which aims not at annihilation but at a readjustment of
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tensions to preserve a proximate justice.40 Such allowance, however, does not soften
Yoder‘s position. For Yoder, Christians can neither endorse nor participate in any violent
action taken by the State. This position seems problematic.
One indeed dissipates the Christian witness if one throws Scripture away in the
discussion of Christian participation in establishing civil order of a society, yet one
should not go beyond Scripture. The question one should ask of Yoder in his
interpretation of the antitheses is this: is it a fair reflection of the proper interpretation of
Scripture? The problem with his interpretation seems that he reads into the antitheses
something that might not be their focus or intention. This is evident when he argues that
the norm of the antitheses, such as not resisting evil, is not only for Christians but also for
the State to obey. Yoder does say that the church should not order the State around and
tell it to become a non-resistant State. Rather, he calls Christians to live lives of nonresistance as a witness. Still, whether the church should explicitly tell the State what to do
or implicitly tell the State what to do by her example, the point remains the same. To
apply such an antithesis to the State seems wanting because in the antitheses Jesus trains
his disciples in personal holiness and not in how to govern a society. There are two
reasons for this.
First, Douma points out that advocates of pacifism face the temptation to quote
the Sermon on the Mount, but to ignore what the rest of the Old and New Testaments say
about violence that is exercised by God or permitted by him.41 In fact, in Luke 22:36
Jesus actually commands his followers to carry a sword (which is intended for selfdefense and protection from robbers). In Yoder‘s case, his use of a non-resistant
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paradigm seems to cause him to highlight the antitheses at the expense of other biblical
teachings. Yoder interprets the antithesis ―do not resist evil‖ (Matthew 5:38-39) to mean
that the State should also be non-resistant. The reason for this is that the Christian life is
guided more by example than by precept or command, especially the example of Jesus.
What Jesus desires for Christians is also what Jesus desires for the State. Yoder‘s form of
argument, however, seems to place too much emphasis on the example of Jesus,
especially his teaching on the antitheses. One should not restrict Christian ethics to the
teachings of Jesus in the four Gospels. Other parts of Scripture talk about civil
government – e.g. Genesis 9:5-6, the historical narratives and laws contained in Exodus
to Deuteronomy and in Judges to 2 Chronicles, Romans 13, and 1 Peter 2:13-14. When
Christians downplay those passages and place too much emphasis on following Jesus‘s
example, they may misunderstand what the whole Scripture says about civil government.
Christians should not contrast the authority of Jesus with the authority of Scripture in
moral matters. Jesus does not put himself in opposition to the teaching of the whole of
Scripture (see Matthew 5:17-20).
Second, even if one concedes that the Sermon on the Mount constitutes a new
social order and embodies the non-resistant way of life, this does not necessarily mean
that the scope of this social order, as exemplified by the antitheses, is also intended to
order the relationship of any State Y to another State Z. Christians, for example, may
engage the State by urging it to make better civil laws concerning pornography because
they want to obey Jesus‘ moral teaching in Matthew 5:27-30 the antithesis concerning
sexual purity. This does not betray Jesus‘ intention in the antitheses. One may stretch the
application of the antitheses to civil laws which regulate individual relationships. But that
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is as far as the scope of the antithesis may go. Yoder seems, however, to stretch this
scope to political relationships between States. For example, Yoder argues that when
Christians engage in a war between States, they are violating Jesus‘ demand to turn the
other cheek and to love enemies, because when ―Christian kills Christian the greatest
possible offense against the unity of the body of Christ takes place.‖42 This argument,
however, that the church is a global community and a war would mean that Christians
would fight and kill Christians is unconvincing.43 The argument indeed assumes no
qualitative differences in the wars in which a Christian might fight. However, if the justwar theory is defensible, one may not fight in just any war. Some Christians might fight
on the side that is not just. If so, they may be killed (even by Christian opponents), but in
this case their killing is not unjust. Being a Christian does not exempt one from
punishment for wrongdoing, even if the instrument of punishment is another Christian.
In terms of the relationship between love and justice, Yoder here seems to fail to
properly relate love and justice. He tends to tilt towards love and stay there. He does not
appear to think highly of justice. Yoder should not separate love and justice completely.
As an individual, one may turn the other cheek when unjustly attacked. Loving others, as
this dissertation understands, is to give others what they do not deserve to get. One‘s
responsibilities, however, are different when one stands in the position of a guardian of a
third party as a civil magistrate. Because one is responsible for the lives and welfare of
the people, one must resist, even with force, unjust aggression against them. Being just,
as this dissertation understands the term, is to give others their due. This is the duty of the
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State as it stands in this third party relationship with its citizens. Again, Yoder‘s emphasis
on the use of a non-resistant paradigm may cause him to think lightly of justice which in
practice often exists to resist evil. As a result, Yoder highlights the antitheses at the
expense of other biblical teachings. He takes Jesus‘ moral teaching about individual
conduct in loving enemies and mistakenly applies it to the conduct of the State – thus
undermining the explicit teaching on civil governments in other parts of Scripture. In the
book of Romans, for example, Paul writes that the State should ―bear the sword‖ to
oppose evildoers and execute God‘s wrath on the wrongdoer (Romans 13:4). At least
here, in his interpretation of the antitheses Yoder seems to confuse the roles of love and
justice in ethical matters.
In sum, Yoder lets his non-resistant paradigm excessively control his
interpretation of the antitheses and have the last word. As a result, he does not clearly
distinguish the roles of love and justice in his interpretation of the antitheses. The critical
distinction between love, which is individual, and justice, which is institutional, appears
to be lost in Yoder‘s teaching. He takes Jesus‘ moral teaching on matters of individual
personal conduct and – mistakenly, in my view –applies them to the realm of the State.
Now is the time to address as a whole the interpretation of the antitheses as Jesus‘ moral
teaching to individual persons. This interpretation will also serve as a case to further
clarify the place of social ethics in Scripture.
VI. The antitheses and the place of social ethics in Scripture
As the Introduction of this dissertation explains, social ethics refers to how an
institution morally manages or governs its structural life. As argued above, the antitheses
are for individuals and not for the State. They are meant to govern the moral life of
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individuals. They are not concerned with giving a prescription for States on how to
morally manage or govern their structural life.
The study on Boff, Thielicke and Yoder and their interpretations of the antitheses
has demonstrated that they seem to allow their interpretative paradigm to determine what
Scripture says. Even though no one reads Scripture without a paradigm, what is decisive
is whether or not one gives the last word to Scripture or one‘s own paradigm. Those who
give their paradigm the last word eventually undermine Scripture as a whole. The fact
that one accepts the whole of Scripture as the Word of God at least restrains one to yield
Scripture to one‘s own paradigm. In ethics, especially, as Douma points out, Scripture
functions to ―reveal to us the law of God as it has been given within a history of
redemption in Christ.‖44 Paying attention to the whole canon in the study of Christian
ethics means that both Old and New Testaments have canonical authority. One reads the
Old Testament in the light of the New Testament, but also the reverse may apply: one
must not use the New Testament without the light of the Old Testament.45 For this
reason, one needs to evaluate critically one‘s use of all of Scripture when reflecting on
the interpretation of the antitheses.
As the chapter on Calvin illustrates, Calvin employs the analogy of Scripture as a
paradigm to interpret the antitheses. He does not isolate the antitheses in themselves but
compares them with other passages in Scripture in order to understand their message.
This approach does not put into opposition, for example, the Old Testament against the
44
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New Testament or Jesus versus Paul. Jesus himself recognizes the validity of this
approach since in the antitheses he gives many allusions to the Old Testament. Even in
the preceding verses (Matthew 5:17-20) he emphasizes that he does not undermine the
authority of the Old Testament canon. This approach also does not undermine the
authority of the New Testament canon. For example, Jesus‘ teaching ―do not resist an evil
person‖ (Matthew 5:39) does not prohibit States from exercising the right and
responsibility to carry out punishments for crimes like premeditated murder. Other New
Testament passages aid in such understanding. This passage is similar to Romans 12:19,
where Paul prohibits personal vengeance, while it differs from Romans 13 which
explicitly addresses the responsibilities of States. By allowing Scripture to speak as a
whole, one has a good reason, as Calvin does, to argue that Jesus is not telling
governments in the antitheses how they should act, in this case, with regard to the
punishment of crime. The focus of attention in Jesus‘ teaching in the antitheses is on the
individual Y-to-Z relationship. At least, one may legitimately point out that the State Yto-Z relationship poses questions with which Jesus does not deal.
The chapter on the Roman Catholic Church also argues that the focus of the
antitheses is on the individual Y-to-Z relationship. By placing the antitheses alongside the
Decalogue in teaching morality to the people of God in their Catechism, the Roman
Catholic Church does not undermine the authority of the Old Testament canon in their
interpretation of the antitheses. In this case, they recognize that as the Decalogue,
especially the second table, regulates the relationship between individuals, the antitheses
also regulate the relationship between individuals. The Roman Catholic Church does not
pit Jesus against Moses. They also admit that sometimes love and justice can be in
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tension for an individual, especially when justice is sought by waging war between
States. An individual may struggle in his or her conscience whether to participate in a
battle since it means killing others. The Catechism suggests that if this happens then the
individual may not participate in the war but instead should serve the State in some other
way. This recognition demonstrates that the Roman Catholics understand the interplay
between love and justice in fallen human life – that sometimes some individuals may
experience a tension between them in their conscience. This also reveals that the focus of
the antitheses ―do not murder‖ and ―love your enemies‖ (Matthew 5:21-26, 43-48) is on
individuals. When the individual duty of a citizen seems to be in tension with the
institutional duty of a State, the Catechism does not suggest that the State should obey the
antitheses but instead highlights their personal-individual nature by suggesting that the
individual should opt-out from the war and find different venues to serve the State.
While Calvin and the Roman Catholic Church support the thesis of this
dissertation, there are two cautionary remarks this dissertation acknowledges in order to
show the strength of the thesis. In discussing relevant biblical data for how a State should
morally manage its structural life, John S. Feinberg explains that two words of caution
must be remembered.46 First, the distinction between description and prescription must
restrain one from the tendency to absolutize everything one sees. Descriptions of
governmental practices and believers‘ actions in relation to the State do not prescribe
moral obligations. This means there is little direct biblical instruction on many of the
matters. To argue that the antitheses are for individuals is to show that the antitheses are
one of those biblical instructions which do not directly pertain to State conduct. The
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antitheses are prescriptive in matters of individual conduct, but not in matters of State
conduct. This interpretation recognizes that in matters of governing the structure of a
State the antitheses should not be the source of moral conduct. While the citizens of a
State should love one another, they should also treat one another justly. The antitheses
have their focus on love, which is individual and personal in its nature, namely how to
treat others in ways they do not deserve. This implies that the antitheses do not deal with
the question of justice, namely how to give others their due or what they deserve. The
danger of making the antitheses the source of moral conduct for States is to conflate love
and justice. While love and justice are closely related, they cannot and should not be
considered one and the same principle in governing human moral life. The antitheses are
eventually about love in actions toward people at an individual level. And at the level of
States, the loving thing to do is sometimes to uphold justice toward people. A State may
even declare a war towards other States for just causes.
Second, Feinberg adds that one must not draw timeless absolutes from Old
Testament Israel‘s experience under the theocracy, for that was an unusual situation.47
God literally was the ruler in Israel. God was directly in charge of both spiritual and
political matters. The Old Testament nowhere teaches that this was to be the arrangement
for Gentile nations, nor does the New Testament show that this is the format for saved or
unsaved after the time of Christ. Like the Old Testament, the New Testament does not
prescribe the government arrangement of States. This implies that arguing that the
antitheses provide prescriptions for governing States is akin to arguing that the Old
Testament prescribes that States be theocratic today.
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VII. Summary
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the antitheses are intended to govern
individual moral conduct. The basis of the argument is that in the antitheses Jesus teaches
what it means for one to love others. Loving others means giving them something they do
not always deserve. This is the scope of the antitheses. They are for individuals. To apply
the antitheses to States are clearly forced and unnatural. The antitheses on adultery and
divorce (Matthew 5:27-32), in particular, are so specific to manage relationship between
a man and a woman that applications to States are unconceivable.
Some theologians, however, attempt to stretch the scope of the antitheses to
States. Leonardo Boff, Helmut Thielicke and John Howard Yoder, each with their own
paradigm of interpretation, have argued that the antitheses are not only moral teachings
for individuals but are also for States. Boff argues that the antitheses call for sociopolitical liberation engagement against oppressive structures of States. Thielicke suggests
that the antitheses should become a reminder or mirror for States to determine how
corrupt their structures and politics are, and how far they have fallen. Yoder insists that
the antitheses demand that States should be non-violent. While a portion of Scripture may
legitimately be applied to different contexts, there is a danger of eisegesis when one
attempts to argue for something which is not intended in a given passage or not dealt
within a given passage in the first place. The antitheses are clearly about loving others
and focus on individual X-to-Y relationships. To argue that they are more than that in
their scope runs the risk of eisegesis.
John Calvin and the Roman Catholic Catechism support the thesis of this
dissertation. They interpret the antitheses as meant for individuals and not for States. I
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would also like to add that this does not mean that there are no other parts of Scripture
which do not talk about States or governments. Scripture‘s treatment of them, however, is
largely descriptive and not prescriptive. Scripture does not give a detailed guideline on
how to best govern or manage a socio-political government. The important thing is that
order is preserved and justice is present within society.

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I have argued, by way of a theologically informed systematic
ethical defense, that the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:21-48) are
binding on all people and intended to govern the conduct of individuals and not of States
or political governments. In this concluding chapter I will reaffirm the argument of this
dissertation and offer some reflections on the project of the dissertation for further study
and for its contribution to the ministry of the church.
I. Summary of the argument
This dissertation contributes to the scholarship of the Sermon on the Mount by
addressing two problems in the study of the antitheses. The first concerns the nature of
the moral demands in the antitheses. The second deals with their scope. I inspect the two
problems by examining some of the hermeneutical options to see how the nature of their
presuppositions predetermines the logic of their conclusions in the interpretation of the
antitheses. Those hermeneutical options are given by Leonardo Boff, John Calvin,
Helmut Thielicke, John Howard Yoder, and the official position of the Roman Catholic
Church.
Leonardo Boff opts to obscure the universal sense of oughtness in the antitheses
in order to relax the moral demands on the poor. They do not teach morality. Instead,
they are an exposition of how people, liberated from the oppression of exclusivism and
authoritarianism of the law, should engage in social liberation. He is mistaken, however,
in his interpretation. His denial that the antitheses are binding on all individual people is
based on a truncated view of morality, which is clearly inconsistent with Jesus‘ teaching.
Boff also believes that the antitheses are without doubt an authoritative source for his
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paradigm of a socio-political commitment to deal with the situation of the oppressed and
to liberate them from the structural evils of the State which perpetuate the situation. But
to say that the antitheses are authoritative for socio-political liberation practice does not
of itself assure that Boff has arrived at an appropriate theological-ethical formulation. It
seems that he allows the cultural background of Latin America‘s oppressive situation to
become the paradigm which excessively controls his interpretation of the antitheses. Boff
indeed respects the authority of Scripture, but his interpretation of the scriptural text of
the antitheses is mistaken.
John Calvin and Helmut Thielicke both argue for the universal bindingness of the
antitheses on all people. While Calvin argues that the antitheses reveal God‘s moral will
for all people, Thielicke explains that the antitheses posit a challenge to all people
concerning their moral shortcomings. They differ, however, in their approach to the
problem of whether the antitheses can apply to States. Thielicke stretches the scope of the
antitheses by arguing that they also posit a moral challenge to States, not only to
individuals. This is not the case with Calvin. By allowing Scripture to speak as a whole,
Calvin argues that in the antitheses Jesus is not telling governments how they should act.
The focus of attention in Jesus‘ teaching of the antitheses is on the individual Y-to-Z
relationship. One may legitimately point out that the State Y-to-Z relationship poses
questions with which Jesus does not deal.
Yoder‘s particular interpretation of the antitheses does not necessarily contradict
the thesis that the antitheses are binding on all people. He seems to recognize the
possibility that the antitheses can be binding on all people. Yoder, however, chooses not
to make the argument even though he may think so. For him, the antitheses are given to a
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particular people, in this case Christians. This choice, however, tends to promote a
sectarian approach to morality. Although Yoder does not intend to do this, his
interpretation that the antitheses are only for Christians inevitably tends to promote a
non-universal view of morality. This view of morality will in one way or another hinder
Christian participation in the public discourse of morality. Yoder also seems to let his
non-resistant paradigm overly control his interpretation of the antitheses and have the last
word. As a result, he does not clearly distinguish the roles of love and justice in his
interpretation of the antitheses. The critical distinction between love, which is individual,
and justice, which is institutional, appears to become lost in Yoder‘s case. He takes Jesus‘
moral teaching on matters of individual personal conduct and – mistakenly, in my view –
and applies them to the realm of the State.
By relating the antitheses to the Decalogue in the Catechism, the official Roman
Catholic Church demonstrates the extent of the antitheses. They are universal and
individual. As the Decalogue contains the privileged expression of Natural Law, the
antitheses also are an expression of Natural Law. In this matter, even though the New
Law is revealed to Christians in a special way, they are universally binding. While they
are binding universally, RCC further recognizes that the antitheses are ethics directed
more to the conduct of persons, rather than nations. That is, these demands are revealed
to individuals and not intended to guide the conduct of States.
In this dissertation, by comparing and contrasting these hermeneutical options, I
have argued that the antitheses mark neither departure from Natural Law theory, nor from
the law of the Old Testament. Natural Law theory and the Decalogue testify that what is
moral is binding on all people. The antitheses are also moral and therefore they are
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binding on all people too. They are binding on all people even though the context from
which they come from is particularly Christian. I have also demonstrated that the
antitheses are intended to govern individual moral conduct. The basis of the argument is
that in the antitheses Jesus teaches what it means to love others. Loving others means
giving them something they do not always deserve. This is the scope of the antitheses.
They are for individuals. To apply the antitheses to States is clearly forced and unnatural.
In sum, in this dissertation I have established that the antitheses constitute moral
teaching, which God specially reveals to Christians in Scripture, and as such are universal
and binding on each human person. They are also intended to prescribe moral conduct of
individuals and not of States.
II. Areas for further study
There are at least three possible areas for further study. First is the area of
theological study. Second is the area of hermeneutical study. The third and last one is the
area of ethical study.
A. The area of theological study
The thesis of this dissertation, that the antitheses are binding on all people, is a
positive answer to the question of whether Christian ethics can be universalized. This
does not mean, however, that the antitheses should become a non-Christian ethics. J. L.
Houlden notes that the New Testament never presents ethics autonomously.1 This implies
that the antitheses pose the question not only whether the Christian can speak to or affect
universal moral values, but also the question of what is the nature of discipleship of a
believer who perfectly imitates the Father as Jesus did (cf. Matthew 5:48). This is a

1

125.

J. L. Houlden, Ethics and the New Testament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 66,
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question related to the kind of discipleship, in which the believer identifies with the needs
of the other, neighbor or enemy. The theological implications of such questions can be
explored.
B. The area of hermeneutical study
The principle of interpretation used in this dissertation is focusing on a particular
pericope (Matthew 5:21-48) within a broader context, in this case the passage known as
the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5-7). This principle of interpretation recognizes that
the antitheses should not be removed from its setting in Matthew. But this principle of
interpretation does not resolve all the difficulties of the Sermon. Many pericopes in the
Sermon are still puzzling. For example, how does Jesus‘ command to let ―your light shine
before others‖ (Matthew 5:16) relate to his demand, ―Be careful not to do your acts of
righteousness in front of others, to be seen by them‖ (Matthew 6:1)? What are the pearls
which are not to be thrown to the pigs (Matthew 7:6)? Such questions can stimulate
further research which focuses on hermeneutical issues.
C. The area of ethical study
In this dissertation I only argue for the nature and the scope of the antitheses.
They are binding on all people. They are intended to govern the conduct of individuals
and not of States. One further matter for ethical research could be a practical issue. For
example, are there any exceptions, in practice, to the moral demands of the antitheses?
This is a way the practicality of the antitheses can be explored.
III. The contribution of the project to the ministry of the church
Serious students of Scripture sometimes lose sight of the fact that the study and
interpretation of Scripture should never be an end in itself. George Ladd reminds every
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student of Scripture that ―when a gulf exists between the lecture-room and the pulpit,
sterility in the class-room and superficiality in the pulpit often results.‖2 God has given
His written Word for the practical purpose of enabling the church to minister to the
world: ―All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting and
training in righteousness, so that all God‘s people may be thoroughly equipped for every
good work‖ (2 Timothy 3:16-17).
In this dissertation I have given much attention to the systematic and ethical study
of the antitheses (Matthew 5:21-48). But this dissertation should never be an end in itself.
Instead, this dissertation can be used to remind the church, the people of God, that they
are called not just to listen to the commands of Jesus in the antitheses, but also to
understand the moral life as discipleship, as following Jesus in his obedience to the
Father.
When the people of God encounter the will of God in the moral demands of the
antitheses, they should realize that they have not yet come to the end of the history of
redemption or to the end of their own personal journey as followers of Jesus. The people
of God are still on the way, as in Romans 6:5, ―If we have been united with him in a
death like his, we will certainly also be united with him in a resurrection like his.‖ The
hearts of God‘s people should be set to obey the commandments of God whose face they
have seen in the crucified and risen One. Their hearts are ready to obey because the grace
of God enables them, along the way, to make progress in the life of discipleship.
At least since the seventh century, Christians have been praying, in the words of
the Collect for Peace used in vespers: ―O God, from whom come all holy desires, all

2

George Eldon Ladd, The Gospel of the Kingdom: Scriptural Studies in the Kingdom of God
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1973), 7.
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good counsels, and all just works: Give to us, your servants, that peace which the world
cannot give, that our hearts may be set to obey your commandments.‖3 This dissertation
can become an ethical-theological system or construct for the people of God which, in
effect, encourages such a prayer or suggests, even if only implicitly, suggests that it is not
wrong to pray in this way.

3

Quoted in Gilbert Meilaender, ―Hearts Set to Obey,‖ in I Am The Lord Your God: Christian
Reflections on the Ten Commandments, eds. Carl E. Braaten and Christopher R. Seitz (Grand Rapids: Wm.
B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2005), 253 (253-275).

THESES
THESES RELATED TO THE DISSERTATION
1. Leonardo Boff obscures the universal sense of oughtness in the antitheses in order
to relax the moral demands on the poor. He also argues that the antitheses are an
authoritative source for his paradigm of a socio-political commitment to deal with
the situation of the oppressed.
2. John Calvin and Helmut Thielicke both argue for the universal bindingness of the
antitheses on all people. While Thielicke stretches the scope of the antitheses by
arguing that they also posit a moral challenge to states, not only to individuals,
Calvin argues that in the antitheses Jesus is not telling governments how they
should act.
3. John Howard Yoder argues that the antitheses are given to a particular people, in
this case Christians. He also interprets Jesus‘ moral teaching on the antitheses to
apply to the realm of the state.
4. By relating the antitheses to the Decalogue in its Catechism, the official Roman
Catholic Church demonstrates the extent of the antitheses. They are universally
binding on all people and for the conduct of individuals.
5. By comparing and contrasting these hermeneutical options, the antitheses mark
neither departure from natural law theory nor from the Decalogue in the Old
Testament. The antitheses are binding on all people. The antitheses are also
intended to govern individual moral conduct.
THESES RELATED TO COURSE WORK
6. Rudolf Bultmann‘s conception of the revelation of God as ultimate, supratemporal, and critical makes preaching as an event intended to confront the hearer
with a crisis of decision.
7. Contrary to certain scholars, George Whitefield is a passionate preacher with a
character of integrity. His marketing strategy and theatrical performance are
means of presenting the gospel truthfully in his ministry, instead of examples of
his spiritual weaknesses.
8. John Chrysostom has high expectations for pastors, not because they are fated to
be some elite, upper crust of exemplary Christian, but because their vocation, as
leaders of God‘s people, demands a certain character of morally strenuous
attributes.
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9. By examining and comparing a series of biblical loci, Herman Witsius argues
against those who believe that it is more probable that the moon is inhabited than
that it is not.
10. Calvin‘s principle of accommodation in his interpretation of Scripture and his
respect toward science reasonably entail that he would have a positive
consideration toward Copernicus‘ revolutionary theory.
THESES RELATED TO PERSONAL INTEREST
11. A preacher should never shoot above the listeners‘ heads. Instead of making easy
things hard, a good preacher makes hard things easy and avoids obscure argument
in a sermon.
12. When a preacher stops learning to preach, shallowness in the pulpit often results.
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